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Abstract 
Risky decision making occurs in both humans and non-human animals.  For a large 
portion of the history of scientific investigation into human judgment and decision making, risky 
behavior has been viewed as flawed and irrational.  However, the past several decades have seen 
advances in the view of human rationality.  Scientists have suggested that, rather than using 
probability theory as the metric by which humans are judged as rational or irrational, human 
minds should be evaluated with respect to specific ecologies (e.g., Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001) 
with some scientists going further and specifying the ecologies as those which our ancestors 
evolved; essentially, our minds and their decision processes are adapted to solve specific 
recurring problems, and to solve those problems in specific environments. 
Within the domain of risky decision making there are a number of theories and models 
which are consistent with the hypothesis that human (and non-human) minds are molded for 
specific behavioral patterns based on environmental cues.  One example is the priority heuristic.  
The priority heuristic is based in the ecological rationality approach—that heuristics are designed 
for specific ecologies.  However, the ecological rationality of the priority heuristic is 
underspecified.  Studies One and Two of the present dissertation compared predictions made by 
two models of risk-taking from evolutionary biology and behavioral ecology (dominance theory 
and risk-sensitive foraging) with a variety of predictions made by the priority heuristic.  Data 
clearly showed that risk-sensitive foraging outperforms the priority heuristic (Study One) and 
that the priority heuristic cannot account for the motivation to acquire a minimum number of 
resources.  Study Two showed mixed results for the priority heuristic when compared to 
dominance theory.  Specifically, choice patterns were consistent with the priority heuristic, but 
process data in the form of decision times were not consistent with the priority heuristic.  Also, 
the data pointed to a strong effect for desiring higher status when competing against others of 
varying status. 
 Study Three compared four potential models of risky decision making in an attempt to 
extend the pattern of results from Studies One and Two showing general risk-sensitivity when 
attempting to achieve a specified need level (Money for Study One; Status for Study Two).  
Also, Study Three attempted to clarify the scope of the pattern of general risk-sensitivity by 
  
examining differential patterns of results based on whether the models predicted motivations to 
achieve need levels for money, status, or both.  Results from Study Three were consistent with a 
general model of risk-sensitivity which operated on both monetary need levels and status need 
levels.  This effect was additionally ubiquitous for males and females, contrary to predictions by 
dominance theory.   
 The data from three studies showed support for a general model of risk-sensitivity 
consistent with those proposed by others (Mishra, 2010).  The concept and implications of this 
general risk-sensitivity model are discussed, as well as future directions to understand the finer 
details and potential scope of this particular general risk-sensitivity model.  
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Abstract 
Risky decision making occurs in both humans and non-human animals.  For a large 
portion of the history of scientific investigation into human judgment and decision making, risky 
behavior has been viewed as flawed and irrational.  However, the past several decades have seen 
advances in the view of human rationality.  Scientists have suggested that, rather than using 
probability theory as the metric by which humans are judged as rational or irrational, human 
minds should be evaluated with respect to specific ecologies (e.g., Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001) 
with some scientists going further and specifying the ecologies as those which our ancestors 
evolved; essentially, our minds and their decision processes are adapted to solve specific 
recurring problems, and to solve those problems in specific environments. 
Within the domain of risky decision making there are a number of theories and models 
which are consistent with the hypothesis that human (and non-human) minds are molded for 
specific behavioral patterns based on environmental cues.  One example is the priority heuristic.  
The priority heuristic is based in the ecological rationality approach—that heuristics are designed 
for specific ecologies.  However, the ecological rationality of the priority heuristic is 
underspecified.  Studies One and Two of the present dissertation compared predictions made by 
two models of risk-taking from evolutionary biology and behavioral ecology (dominance theory 
and risk-sensitive foraging) with a variety of predictions made by the priority heuristic.  Data 
clearly showed that risk-sensitive foraging outperforms the priority heuristic (Study One) and 
that the priority heuristic cannot account for the motivation to acquire a minimum number of 
resources.  Study Two showed mixed results for the priority heuristic when compared to 
dominance theory.  Specifically, choice patterns were consistent with the priority heuristic, but 
process data in the form of decision times were not consistent with the priority heuristic.  Also, 
the data pointed to a strong effect for desiring higher status when competing against others of 
varying status. 
 Study Three compared four potential models of risky decision making in an attempt to 
extend the pattern of results from Studies One and Two showing general risk-sensitivity when 
attempting to achieve a specified need level (Money for Study One; Status for Study Two).  
Also, Study Three attempted to clarify the scope of the pattern of general risk-sensitivity by 
  
examining differential patterns of results based on whether the models predicted motivations to 
achieve need levels for money, status, or both.  Results from Study Three were consistent with a 
general model of risk-sensitivity which operated on both monetary need levels and status need 
levels.  This effect was additionally ubiquitous for males and females, contrary to predictions by 
dominance theory.   
 The data from three studies showed support for a general model of risk-sensitivity 
consistent with those proposed by others (Mishra, 2010).  The concept and implications of this 
general risk-sensitivity model are discussed, as well as future directions to understand the finer 
details and potential scope of this particular general risk-sensitivity model. 
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Preface 
In the summer of 1838, a young Charles Darwin, then only 29, was contemplating a 
decision which he probably believed to be one of the most important in his life up to that point.  
The decision was not whether to continue working on the scientific data he had accumulated on 
his nearly 5-year voyage with the HMS Beagle.  It was not to continue working out the 
theoretical structure of how species could evolve in their phenotypic structure over time.  
Instead, the decision young Charles Darwin was contemplating was whether or not to marry 
Emma Wedgwood.  Charles, a very detailed young man, approached this difficult problem just 
as he had with the various naturalistic phenomena experienced over the previous five years in the 
far reaches of the planet:  by scribbling notes in one of his many notebooks.  In this particular 
instance, Charles created a pros and cons list of getting married (two columns below) (adapted 
from Desmond & Moore, 1991, p. 257). 
Marry 
Children – (if it Please God)  -- 
Constant companion, (& friend in old age) 
who will feel interested in one, --object to be 
beloved & played with.  –better than a dog 
anyhow.  –Home, & someone to take care of 
house – Charms of music & female chit chat.  
– These things good for one’s health.  – but 
terrible loss of time. –  
 My God, it is intolerable to think of 
spending ones whole life, like a neuter bee, 
working, working, & nothing after all.  – No, 
no won’t do.  – Imagine living all one’s day 
solitarily in smoky dirty London House.  – 
Only picture to yourself a nice soft wife on a 
sofa with good fire, & books & music perhaps 
— Compare this vision with the dingy 
reality of Grt. Marlbro’ St. 
 Marry – Mary Marry Q.E.D. 
Not Marry 
Freedom to go where one liked – choice of 
Society & little of it. – Conversation of clever 
men at clubs – Not forced to visit relatives, 
& to bend in every trifle.  – to have the 
expense & anxiety of children – perhaps 
quarrelling – Loss of time. – cannot read in 
the Evenings – fatness & idleness – Anxiety 
& responsibility – less money for books &c – if 
many children forced to gain one’s bread.  – 
(But then it is very bad for ones health to 
work too much) 
 Perhaps my wife wont like London; 
then the sentence is banishment & 
degradation into indolent, idle fool. 
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 As can be seen at the bottom of the left-hand column in the figure, Darwin did decide to 
marry Emma Wedgwood, and they were by most accounts happily married until Charles’ death 
in 1882.  This simple heuristic technique for making a decision is commonly used when people 
are trying to make a complex decision.  Normative models of decision making would suggest 
that people calculate the probabilities and decision weights for each of the potential options of a 
decision, sum those, and then choose the option with the highest value (e.g., the highest 
subjective expected utility).   
For example, if Kahneman and Tversky (1976) were advising Charles on his decision to 
marry Emma Wedgwood they would have suggested that he assign a decision weight to 
―Children if it please God‖ (essentially, how important is this possibility to Charles), and then to 
estimate the probability that it would happen.  These two would then be multiplied.  The same 
procedure would be performed for each of the pros and cons on each side of the argument (i.e., 
to marry or not to marry).  In the end, Charles would simply add the values for each column and 
choose the column with the highest value.  Simple enough, right?  Not quite. 
 Using this technique assumes many things.  One basic assumption is that the columns for 
Marry and Not Marry contain an exhaustive list of the possibilities; all of the possible outcomes 
have to be listed.  But how would Charles possibly know that he would indeed have children and 
that one of them would tragically pass away from scarlet fever, forever changing his own outlook 
on religion?  In the real world we often do not know the probabilities, the exact importance of 
certain attributes of a decision, or even have a decent understanding of the possible events in the 
future.  Essentially, we are making decisions on the fly in a dynamic and ever-changing 
environment.  Normative methods of understanding decision making processes often fail to 
account for these basic facts of the world. 
 A different way to examine Darwin’s decision process shown in the figure is by assuming 
that he used a simple heuristic method to decide whether or not to marry:  by simply tallying the 
number of pros and cons for each side (e.g., Dawes, 1979; Gigerenzer, 2008).  Tallying is 
anecdotally used often when making decisions.  It is easy to use, and does not assume that people 
use some compensatory strategy whereby they are multiplying decision weights with utility 
estimates of different possible outcomes.  Instead, each possible outcome is given a weight of 
―1.‖  If you examine Darwin’s list in this light, it is easy to see that he thought of far more pros 
for Marry than for Not Marry.  This heuristic not only predicts what Darwin’s decision would 
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have been if we would have been able to look at his notes prior to making the decision, but it 
also explicitly describes the process he used when making the decision.  The study of processes 
is important if we want to take a cognitive approach to understanding judgment and decision 
making. 
 For many years the psychological study of judgment and decision making has been 
dominated by normative theories illustrating human biases when compared to the objectively 
correct solutions derived from probability theory.  Often these experimental demonstrations of 
biases have resulted in the mere labeling of phenomena without any explicit discussion of the 
mechanisms underlying the phenomena (e.g., representativeness, availability).  However, recent 
research using a fundamentally different approach to research—ecological rationality—has 
resulted in explicitly described process models of decision making which can be empirically 
tested and falsified.  This dissertation is one example of such research.  Perhaps using these 
methods we can uncover the cognitive processes occurring when Darwin made on of the most 
important decisions of his life.  Enjoy.  
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Chapter 1 - A New View of the Human Mind 
Humans occasionally take risks.  Specifically, humans sometimes choose riskier options 
over safer alternative options (Daly & Wilson, 2001; Fuemmeler, Taylor, Metz, & Brown, 2002; 
Stulp, Kordsmeyer, Buunk, & Verhulst, 2012; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).  This propensity to 
take risks has historically been given as an example of human irrationality, implicitly suggesting 
that if we only had more information, more time, and more cognitive capacity, we would not 
take unnecessary risks and would instead be a much safer species (Delfabbro & Winefield, 2000; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).  However, recent research has called 
into question the claim of irrationality in risky decision making, and if one examines risk taking 
more closely, it is readily apparent that risk taking is often not random, but instead highly 
systematic (Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, & Hertwig, 2006; Ermer, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2008; 
Mishra & Lalumière, 2010; Mishra, Lalumière, & Williams, 2010; Rode, Cosmides, Hell, & 
Tooby, 1999).  Such systematic risk taking seems to further suggest that the behavior of risk 
taking surfaces in response to implicitly- or explicitly-recognizable variables in the environment, 
and that the behavior of risk taking may not be due to throwaway explanations such as limited 
cognitive capacity. 
Although the term ―risk‖ is colloquially used in reference to many different types of 
behaviors and characteristics, the definition used throughout this dissertation is that risk is equal 
to variance.  Essentially, if someone is given to lotteries with equal expected values, the riskier 
lottery can be operationally defined as the lottery with a higher variance in payoffs.  This 
definition can be colloquially returned to typical examples of behaviors often thought of as 
―risky.‖  For example, people may view skydiving as riskier than standing on the ground and 
watching someone else skydive.  In terms of variance, the skydiver has a high probability of 
having fun and a relatively low probability of dying, whereas the person on the ground has an 
almost certain probability of not dying, but will have perhaps less fun.  The skydiver’s 
distribution of adrenaline payoffs is much more variable, and therefore the decision to skydive is 
riskier.  This definition of risk is consistent with past literature in areas of foraging behavior in 
non-human animals (Stephens & Krebs, 1986). 
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Risk taking is a complex behavior, and it is therefore highly probable that risk taking is 
the result of complex cognitive architecture.  When scientists—including psychologists—discuss 
the ―design‖ of a complex feature, as psychologists often do when speaking of cognitive 
architecture, and as biologists often do when speaking of phenotypic structure, there begs the 
question: ―What is doing the designing?‖  The field of evolutionary biology answers that 
question promptly and definitively:  Evolution by natural selection is currently the only viable 
scientific theory capable of explaining complex life (Dawkins, 1976/2006), and the umbrella of 
natural selection does not stop at the species level, but trickles down to the specific adaptations—
both physical and psychological—which each species possesses. 
For most organisms the world is an unforgiving place.  Organisms inevitably produce 
more offspring than the environment can sustain.  Random mutations, while often deleterious, 
occasionally provide an individual organism with a slight reproductive advantage.  Any 
reproductive advantage, encapsulated at the level of the gene, will have a decent probability of 
also being present in that particular organism’s offspring (Dawkins, 1976/2006).  Through many 
successive generations that phenotype will become widespread in the species due to the 
reproductive advantage it confers upon its possessors (Darwin, 1859/1976).  This general process 
is the cornerstone of modern biology, and has become a foundational and indispensable idea 
(Dobzhansky, 1973).   
The broad concept of evolution is generally agreed upon within the biological sciences.  
Instead what is often argued is how the process occurs rather than the theoretical certitude that 
evolution enacts phenotypic changes on organisms over many generations.  However, evolution 
may create more than phenotypic changes alone, but may also act on the psychological structures 
of human and non-human minds (Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992).  Darwin (1859/1976) 
briefly mentioned this in his seminal work On the origin of species, and further developed 
psychological ideas in later works (Darwin, 1871/1971, 1872/1979).  It is also apparent that 
Darwin believed evolution could act on the behavioral patterns of organisms.  Indeed, the fields 
of ethology and behavioral ecology have provided ample evidence in support of Darwin’s proto-
hypothesis (Lorenz, 1958; Tinbergen, 1951; von Frisch, 1967).   
Let us assume that evolution does indeed act on behavioral patterns by favoring those 
patterns which either directly or indirectly provide some reproductive advantage.  The next 
question is precisely how could behavioral patterns be shaped through natural selection?  The 
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question becomes more tractable if we think of behavioral patterns as the result of complex 
information processing systems, similar to the functioning of a computer; a given mechanism 
(cognitive component) produces a certain output (behavior) in a specified situation (an 
environment).  So, if evolution acts on the behaviors by ―rewarding‖ those which lead to 
―successful‖ outcomes, it then indirectly acts on the mechanisms producing those behaviors.  If 
the development of specific types of mechanisms are genetically encoded, then successful 
behavioral patterns leading to reproductive success over the long term would result in the same 
mechanisms being carried on to the next generation.  This concept of information processing 
mechanisms as a description of how human and non-human cognition may work is described in 
the next section. 
 Modularity versus Generality in Cognition 
For decades the computer metaphor of the human mind has been used in cognitive 
psychological research.  This metaphor has propelled research into how the human mind works, 
and has driven the burgeoning fields of study under the academic umbrella of cognitive science.  
The realization that what we conceive of as ―thought‖ can be conceptualized as the series of 
communications between highly specialized modules represented a watershed moment for the 
science of cognitive psychology (Pinker, 1997), and has had implications for specialized areas of 
study within many areas of cognitive science (e.g., the study of judgment and decision making).  
Also, the idea of a computational theory of mind (Fodor, 1983) coupled with advances in 
evolutionary biology yielded the burgeoning field of evolutionary psychology (Barkow et al., 
1992).   
Evolutionary psychology developed in response to perceived stagnation and lack of 
theoretical growth in the social sciences.  For many years researchers and scholars in the social 
sciences (e.g., anthropology, sociology, and psychology) operated under the umbrella of what 
Tooby and Cosmides (1992) termed the Standard Social Science Model (SSSM).  The SSSM 
concept of the human mind was as a blank slate (e.g., Locke, 1690/1956), perhaps with a few 
basic innate processes such as associative learning.  These mechanisms received input from 
culture itself, leading to most of the human behavioral spectrum being a result of learned culture.  
And thus, the consistencies seen in human behavior within cultures and the disparities seen 
between cultures was easily explainable based on the SSSM.  The SSSM framework also divided 
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the social sciences into their respective fields of study, with anthropology studying cultural 
differences, and psychology studying the ―innate‖ mechanisms for learning culture (e.g., 
associative learning, social learning, etc.).     
Paired with the SSSM was the concept of the mind as a content-independent problem 
solver.  Proponents of this content-independent mind believed that content independence 
(freedom from contextual constraints) allowed for a more flexible mind and the resulting 
flexibility in human behavior and decision making.  In essence, a flexible mind is ―good‖ and a 
mind constrained by context and content is ―bad.‖  However, as Tooby and Cosmides (1992) 
point out, the concept of a content-independent mind is very problematic on a few grounds.   
The first issue is that a truly content-independent mind would have no cognitive 
architecture to solve any of the hundreds of problems our ancestors faced, not to mention the 
perhaps more cognitively complex tasks modern humans face.  The notion that the content-
independent mind is shaped and molded by culture is problematic because there would have to 
be an incredibly complex cognitive architecture to sort and parse the stream of information from 
a given culture and incorporate it into the cognitive structure of the mind.  Content-independent 
minds do not have such architecture.  They have a general problem solving architecture. 
The second issue has to do with something much more practical regarding content-
independent systems of any kind, not just in reference to human cognitive architecture.  The 
issue has been called both the frame problem and combinatorial explosion.  Computer scientists 
have long observed something known as the ―frame problem‖ (Boden, 1977; Dennett, 1987).  
Specifically, the frame problem is the observation that, when designing a program or a system, it 
is rather easy for the problem to become rapidly intractable; the problem the program is trying to 
solve is too large, and the number of possibilities becomes functionally limitless.  To combat this 
issue, computer scientists create very specialized functions within very specialized programs.  
Specialized functions and programs solve problems faster and more accurately than more general 
purpose programs because they come pre-packaged with more information.  This pre-packaged 
information only works at creating more efficient programs because the program is designed to 
work on specific problems or in specific situations.  To conclude, the frame problem is solved in 
computer science by defining, or ―framing‖ the problem in a very detailed way.  Operations are 
written for the program which contains a rich set of information about the structure of the 
decision space, the types of options that should be available when making a decision, the goal of 
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the decision, etc.  These content-dependent programs contain much more information than 
content-independent programs.  The information is not irrelevant, but directly relates to the 
problem the program is trying to solve.  This allows the program to operate faster and more 
efficiently because there are fewer options to search in the problem space; mathematically 
defined, this is also called combinatorial explosion.   
Combinatorial explosion occurs in any decision algorithm dealing with any number of 
alternative options.  For example if a domain-general, content-independent decision algorithm, 
such as those which may exist in the mind of your neighbor, is designed to solve the problems 
which arise every day, we may specify the decision options both graphically and mathematically.  
Let us assume that your neighbor must first decide to wake up.  This is a binary choice with two 
options: (1) wake up, or (2) don’t wake up (see Figure 1-1).  So, at this point, the content-
independent guidance system in your neighbor’s head is only making a choice between two 
options which may have long term consequences for his reproductive fitness.  However, the next 
step involves something to drink in the morning and this decision involves three different 
choices: (1) coffee, (2) orange juice, and (3) water.  Each of these options may have differing 
effects on fitness long term, based on caffeine in coffee, vitamins in the orange juice, or the need 
for basic hydration after sleep.  The next decision involves deciding to exercise, either (1) don’t 
exercise, or (2) do exercise. Note that the decision here is greatly affected by the previous 
decision as well, as both exercising and drinking coffee increase heart rate, while different 
effects occur after drinking orange juice or water.  Finally, your neighbor has to decide whether 
or not to ask out on a date the attractive female, Amy, from next door.  All previous decisions 
may have an effect her decision to say yes or no to a date.   
The point here is that, in order to produce a desirable behavioral outcome—in this 
instance getting Amy to go on a date—depends on the correct succession of choices.  In this 
example there are a total of 13 combinations of choices.  The date with Amy is the successful 
outcome in this scenario, however, as Tooby and Cosmides (1992) point out, ―the issue then 
becomes, what kind of guidance systems can propel computational systems sufficiently often 
toward the small scattered islands of successful outcomes in the endless expanse of alternative 
possibilities?‖ (p. 102).  The answer is most certainly not a domain-general, content-independent 
one because each variable (e.g., what to drink, whether or not to exercise) multiplies the number 
of potential decision trajectories.  Determining which decision trajectory to take in ancestral 
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environments had very high stakes.  A domain-general guidance system with no pre-packaged 
information helping frame the decision space would have resulted in more (costly) time to make 
a decision, and potentially guidance down the incorrect path, leading to no food and physical 
death, or to no mate and genetic death.     
 
Figure ‎1-1  Example of the Effects of Combinatorial Explosion on the Decision Process 
 
 
To further explain the importance and practicality of specialization regarding the concept 
of context-dependent, domain-specificity, let us reflect on the operation of two widely used 
pieces of software: Microsoft Word and Microsoft Excel.  A word processor such as Microsoft 
Word does not perform the same functions as Microsoft Excel, a spreadsheet program.  The two 
programs perform their specialized tasks very well.  They can even share information; tables can 
be imported into Microsoft Word and text can be copied and pasted into Microsoft Excel.  The 
specialized programs can communicate information back and forth regarding graphs located in a 
Word document such that, if data is changed in a spreadsheet, it will effectively change the graph 
in the Word document.  Nonetheless, the two programs cannot perform the same functions 
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equally well.  Microsoft Word is an effective word processor, but cannot perform spreadsheet 
functions with the same facility as its counterpart Microsoft Excel. 
The caveat of specialization is important not only in reference to the frame problem but 
also in reference to how evolution works.  Evolution is not an ultimate, goal-directed process;  
there is no absolute end in which the final product is reached and evolution effectively stops.  
Rather, evolution acts via a one-up process.  Although the process of evolution by natural 
selection is not intentional or goal-directed, it takes what is already present in the organism and, 
by chance modification, improves on what is already present, similar to overhauling a ship while 
at sea
1
; modifications can be made plank by plank but each modification must be careful not to 
sink the ship (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992, p. 60).  In terms of behavior, that which is the most 
effective at leading to reproductive success will spread throughout the population and become 
widespread, that is, until an even better design appears in the population. 
Let us assume that a certain behavior, which leads directly to reproductive success, may 
be, at first, the result of a simple, general purpose program (hereafter referred to as a module).  
Through chance mutation, organisms may acquire new features to this module.  Most will be less 
effective, but some will be more effective.  One aspect is likely true for all modules that result in 
more effective behavior: effective modifications tend to be due to a more specialized module.  
Referring back to the frame problem, it is apparent that most modules which have a specialized 
function will, on average, perform better than their general-purpose colleagues.  Thus, it is 
plausible that over evolutionary history, natural selection has shaped modules—reliably 
developing patterns of neural connectivity—that solve specific adaptive problems in specific 
environments, leading to an increase in reproductive success. In essence, these modules and their 
resultant behavior can explain much about human and non-human psychology.  Next, the role of 
modules in the concept of rationality is explored.   
                                                 
1
 It should be noted that chance modification most often does not result in a better design.  The vast majority of 
chance modifications are deleterious to the organism to which the modification occurred.  However, over deep time, 
some modifications produce beneficial effects.  These effects are retained due to their impact on increased fitness in 
the specific organism and its offspring. 
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 Massive Modularity and Relevance to Rationality 
 Modularity—in some degree—as a conceptual framework for how the mind is designed, 
and for how the mind can guide behavior to desirable outcomes, is well regarded in the cognitive 
sciences (e.g., Barrett, 2005; Gallistel, 2000; Kashtan & Alon, 2005; Pinker, 1997).  However, 
there remains some disagreement between theorists of both the scientific and philosophical 
types.  The concept of modularity is divided into roughly two streams of thought: (1) Fodorian 
modularity, derived from Fodor's (1983) original conception of modularity, and (2) massive 
modularity, the framework derived from evolutionary thought as it relates to modular systems in 
the mind (Barrett, 2005, 2012; Barrett & Kurzban, 2006; Carruthers, 2005; Coltheart, 1999; 
Pinker, 1997; Samuels, 1998). 
 Despite the apparent surface similarities between these two camps of modularity, the 
differences are theoretically crucial and thus the debate can, and has been, heated (Pinker, 1997; 
for rebuttal see Fodor, 2000).  Further, the debate has unfortunately become lost in inaccuracies 
which have occasionally derailed scientific progress within the systematic search for how the 
mind is actually constructed.  This debate is vast, intricate, and ongoing.  Thus, the details will 
not be discussed here, as they are not the primary focus of the present studies.  However, other 
scientists have framed the debate quite well, and interested readers are directed to Barrett and 
Kurzban (2006).    
 When systems are designed in a modular fashion, they by definition function on more 
specialized problems.  A massive modularity perspective assumes that the mind is composed of 
modules "all the way down.‖  Because modules are specialized for specific contexts they also 
tend to produce proper decisions in those contexts.  In short, in specific contexts (e.g., specific 
environments/ecologies) modular decision processes lead to "rational" decisions.  These modules 
are only useful in certain environments, and environmental cues serve as a triggering mechanism 
in determining which module should be activated, and thus for which module's decision process 
should be used.  By taking a module out of context it is highly probable that the module and its 
decision process will lead to an undesirable or "irrational" choice.  In short, a decision process—
activated by modular organization—is only "rational" when it is evaluated in the appropriate 
ecology, context, or environment.  This philosophical approach has been, more so than any other 
group, coherently championed by the ABC research group at the Max Planck Institute for 
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Human Development (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research 
Group, 1999). 
 Ecological and Evolutionary “Deep”‎Rationality 
Thus far the idea has been introduced that human phenotypic design and psychological 
design are the products of evolution by natural selection.  We have mentioned that evolution may 
act on psychological processes by enacting changes on the modular structure of the mind.  The 
modular structure—as opposed to a general structure—has been promoted, and given some 
justification.  Some space has been devoted to describing how modular systems can create what 
might be termed ―rational‖ behavior.  Next, the relationship between modularity, as it relates to 
―deep rationality‖ (Kenrick et al., 2009), and heuristics is described.  The relationship between 
modules—of the massive type—and heuristics is symbiotic, with each bringing different 
qualities to the scientific table.  However, the relationship would not work if both ideas were not 
based in a similar theoretical framework:  that cognition is inextricably linked to the 
environment, and should be evaluated as such (Simon, 1957). 
Typically in judgment and decision making research a basic tenet of rationality is that 
individuals attempt to maximize expected utility, and that this is done irrespective of external 
contextual variables.  The concept of ecological rationality is similar, but with respect to context.  
The concept of deep rationality is that evolutionary utility = fitness.  Thus, decision processes are 
rational in the sense that the process tended to promote genetic propagation either through 
reproduction or through the rearing of close genetic relatives.  However, this should not be 
confused with what Symons (1992) refers to as Darwinian Social Science (DSS).  Specifically, in 
DSS, researchers examining behavior through the ―Darwinian‖ lens tend to look for the effects 
of any behavior on current fitness (i.e., reproductive viability).  This is an incorrect use of 
evolutionary thought as applied to social science research.  Research examining the correlates of 
behavioral tendencies on current reproductive success is only useful in determining whether a 
behavior is adaptive—that is, whether it currently leads to reproductive success.  However, this 
research is not by itself capable of determining whether a behavioral pattern is an adaptation.  
Adaptations are created over deep evolutionary time, and for a very specific and recurring 
feature of an environment.  However, the current environment may not be the same as the 
environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA).  For example, an adaptation to enjoy and seek 
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food high in sugar content is currently no longer adaptive.  The concept of deep rationality 
frames judgment and decision making as the examination of the current decision processes 
which were shaped in an EEA.  Thus, it is plausible that current decision processes may be 
adaptations which are no longer adaptive, or may not appear adaptive (i.e., may appear irrational) 
when examined in context-free economic and judgment and decision making experiments.     
 Modules, Evolution, and Models of Risky Behavior 
The previous discussion has developed the hypothesis that the mind is composed of a 
large number of modules.  These modules are reliably developing patterns of cognition which 
solve problems.  In short, they are they are the machinery by which psychology relates back to 
behavior.  Within the field of evolutionary psychology—including the compatible fields of 
behavioral ecology, evolutionary biology, cognitive science, and the study of fast-and-frugal 
heuristics—the primary goal is to discern (1) the existence of these modules, (2) their level of 
domain specificity, and (3) the pain-staking and elaborate process of providing evidence that a 
given module is indeed an adaptation, irrespective of whether it is currently adaptive (for review 
see Barkow et al., 1992). 
The guiding philosophy of this dissertation is that the psychological study of risk-taking 
can be vastly improved by taking the perspective that the mind is composed of many content-
dependent modules, each specialized to solve a specific problem.  Often these problems were 
evolutionarily recurrent problems faced by our ancestors over deep time.  Rather than 
approaching risk-taking using normative, or even context-independent processes such as 
expected utility or prospect theory, it is believed that much more information can be gained by 
examining risk-taking as a systematic pattern of behavior.  To summarize, risk-taking may be 
―rational‖ when the behavior is in response to certain environmental cues.  Fortunately, various 
theoretical perspectives have attempted to explain risk-taking behavior in response to precisely 
such environmental cues.  Three of these theoretical perspectives are the focus of the current 
dissertation.  Each will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 2 - Theoretical Perspectives on Decisions under Risk 
The present collection of studies will focus on three theoretical explanations of risk-
taking, two from behavioral ecology, and one from the fast-and-frugal heuristics tradition in 
psychology.  Although these three theoretical perspectives on risk taking are different, and, in 
some scenarios make different predictions, they are all compatible with the meta-theoretical 
position of massive modularity due to their alignment with either evolutionary studies in 
behavioral ecology (risk sensitive foraging and dominance theory) or within the framework of 
ecological rationality (the priority heuristic).  While it is believed that all three of these 
theoretical perspectives are moves in a promising direction, more work is needed to disentangle 
their proper ranges of explanation, as a theory that can explain everything consequently explains 
nothing.  The perspectives are described in more detail in the sections that follow. 
 The Priority Heuristic 
The priority heuristic is the fast-and-frugal heuristic answer to complex compensatory 
models of risk taking such as prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), cumulative prospect 
theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), and a variety of others (e.g., Birnbaum & Chavez, 1997; 
Lopes & Ogden, 1999).  The major difference between the priority heuristic and most other 
theories of risk taking in psychological or experimental economics research is that the priority 
heuristic is non-compensatory, that is it takes into account only a few pieces of information at a 
time, and does not assume that the decision maker combines information during the decision 
process (Brandstätter et al., 2006). 
 Background and Development 
Brandstätter et al. (2006) entertained a few potential heuristic types before choosing the 
lexicographic category.  Lexicographic heuristics are a set of heuristics which compare the 
values of two options, one value at a time, until a difference is found (e.g., Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 1996; Tversky, 1972).  Then the appropriate option is chosen depending on the goal 
of the choice being made.  Because lexicographic heuristics assume a one-by-one sequential 
search through cues, perhaps the most important issue for lexicographic heuristics is the ordering 
of those cues.   
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The Take the Best heuristic assumes that decision makers order cues based on their 
validity (i.e., the accuracy of a cue at predicting the target).  For instance, in the well-known 
German Cities problem in which participants are asked to determine which of two German cities 
has the largest population, people are provided with a number of cues (e.g., whether the city has 
a soccer team, whether the city has an airport).  The validity of each can be determined by 
selecting the city in each pair which has a given cue as the largest (e.g., selecting Munich as a 
larger city because it has a soccer team), and then checking the accuracy of those decisions.  It is 
assumed that decision makers are fairly accurate at ordering cues based on their validity, and the 
heuristic appears to work well in specific situations (e.g., Lee & Zhang, 2012).  However, the 
priority heuristic must rely on very different cues in making decisions between riskier and safer 
gambles.  Two important issues are finding the relevant cues, or, as the priority heuristic refers to 
them, ―Reasons‖, and determining how these reasons are ordered lexicographically. 
Upon examining the standard behavioral economics two option, two outcome gambles, it 
is clear that there are four pieces of information to which a decision maker could attend: The 
minimum gains, the maximum gains, the probability of the minimum gains, and the probability 
of the maximum gains.  In two option gambling tasks, people can examine and compare the 
values of each gamble on those attributes (i.e., reasons).   
Regarding the lexicographic order, Brandstätter et al. (2006) cite prior research to pare 
down all possible permutations of the ordering of reasons.  For instance, prior research has 
shown that payoffs, or gains, are valued more heavily by decision makers than probabilities of 
their occurrences (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001).  A thorough review of the 
decision making literature, specifically regarding risky choice behavior, led Brandstätter et al. 
(2006) to organize the lexicographic order such that minimum gains appeared prior to maximum 
gains.  Thus the ordering of the priority heuristic reflects a pervasive observation in most of the 
judgment and decision making research that, when in the gain domain as opposed to the loss 
domain, people tended to be risk-averse.  That is, people prefer to choose gambles with the 
highest minimum gain rather than the gambles with the highest maximum gain because often the 
highest maximum gain is paired with a lower probability of winning (i.e., it is more variable, and 
therefore riskier).  Lastly, empirical testing demonstrated that decision makers more heavily 
attend to the probabilities of the minimum gain than the total value of the maximum gain, thus 
resulting in a finalized lexicographic order (Figure 2-1). 
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Figure ‎2-1  Standard Lexicographic Order of the Priority Heuristic. 
Order Reason
1 Minimum Gains
†
2 Probability of Minimum Gains
‡
3 Maximum Gains
†
4 Probability of Maximum Gains
‡
Note.   † = Aspiration level is equal to 1/10 of maximum gain between
all gambles, rounded to closest prominent number; ‡ =  Aspiration level
is equal to .10 (i.e., 1/10 of probability scale).
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After the order of reasons was set for the priority heuristic, other components of the 
decision process were established.  Specifically, the priority heuristic consists of three rules 
which are followed in this order: (1) the priority rule, (2) the stopping rule, and (3) the decision 
rule.  The priority rule consists of nothing more than going through the reasons in Figure 2-1 in 
the designated order.  The decision maker compares the properties of each gamble for each 
reason as he or she moves through the priority rule.  At some point the properties for each 
gamble may be ―different enough‖ to constitute choosing a gamble.  This is precisely the 
function of the stopping rule.  The most important issue regarding a stopping rule is determining 
when the magnitude of separation between the properties of two or more gambles constitutes a 
―big enough‖ difference. 
    Drawing from prior work on satisicing (Simon, 1957) the priority heuristic’s stopping 
rule utilizes aspiration levels—amounts or levels that, if met, constitute stopping a search during 
decision making and proceeding to the decision phase.  Because the priority heuristic’s reasons 
contain both probabilities and quantities (e.g., most often monetary amounts), there must be two 
different types of aspiration levels, and these levels must change with respect to the other 
properties of the gambles.  For quantities (e.g., money) the priority heuristic assumes that 
decision makers set the aspiration level at 10% of the maximum gain among all gambles, 
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rounded to the nearest prominent number (i.e., 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500, 1000)
2
.  Gamble 
properties (i.e., minimum gains or maximum gains) are then compared based upon the aspiration 
level.  If the difference between the relevant quantities of two or more gambles exceeds or is 
equal to the aspiration level for that reason, then search stops.   
The aspiration level for probabilities is much simpler.  For probabilities 10% of the 
probability scale is used as an aspiration level and, since the probability scale remains constant, 
the aspiration level is not dependent upon properties of any of the gambles.  Instead the 
aspiration level remains at .10.  The stopping rule works the same for probabilities of gains as it 
does for the gains themselves.  The probabilities between gambles are compared and if their 
difference is equal to or larger than .10 then search stops at whichever reason the decision maker 
was on (Figure 2-1).   
 Empirical Evidence of the Priority Heuristic 
Brandstätter et al. (2006) provided a large portion of the empirical support for the priority 
heuristic although the 2006 paper was also heavily theoretical in addition to empirical.  
Brandstätter et al. demonstrated that the priority heuristic can be used to predict majority choice 
using a large set of data from many different studies.  Comparisons of several complex models 
compared against the priority heuristic revealed that the priority heuristic did as well as, and 
often much better, in predicting majority choice of participants in the data sets.  Other analyses 
examining decision time supported the prediction that decision time should increase when 
participants use more reasons to make their decisions (see Figure 2-1).   
Despite the support for the priority heuristic in the fast-and-frugal camp of researchers, 
some third-party psychologists have found shown data inconsistent with the priority heuristic’s 
predictions.  For instance, Johnson, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, and Willemsen (2008) examined the 
priority heuristic using MouseLab, experimental software designed to examine process data.  
This offered a very suitable environment in which to test the priority heuristic’s own predictions 
about its underlying process.  Contrary to the priority heuristic’s predictions however, Johnson et 
al. found that people did not most often compare minimum gains across gambles—a prediction 
of the priority heuristic—but instead most often made transitions from a gamble’s payoffs (either 
                                                 
2
 Brandstätter et al. (2006) define prominent numbers as ―powers of 10 (e.g., 1, 10, …), including their halves and 
doubles.  Hence, the numbers, 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, and so on, are examples of prominent numbers‖ (p. 413). 
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maximum or minimum) to the probabilities of those payoffs.  This particular transition implied 
to the researchers that participants in their study were using both pieces of information—a 
gamble’s payoffs and probabilities—in order to compute expected values for different gambles.  
This is of course consistent with expected utility theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947) 
and its contemporary variants (e.g., prospect theory; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) which assume 
that multiple pieces of information—in the form of probabilities and payoffs—are integrated. 
Johnson et al. (2008) did however discover that decisions between gambles could be 
accurately predicted based on process data derived from transitions between pieces of 
information and the amount of time spent on a piece of information.  This particular type of data 
offers an important insight into heuristic process models such as the priority heuristic and is one I 
will return to later in this dissertation (see General Discussion).  Using eye-tracking methodology 
Glöckner and Herbold (2011) demonstrated essentially the same finding: that individuals’ 
decision processes, as operationally defined by eye fixations and movements, are not consistent 
with predictions made by the priority heuristic. 
Other process-based studies have found similar results when examining the priority 
heuristic.  For instance, Ayal and Hochman (2009) used a mixed-factorial design to examine the 
differential effects of disparity in gambles’ expected values, and the number of reasons used by 
the priority heuristic, on decision time.  Although, in certain conditions, the priority heuristic’s 
choice patterns were supported, the decision time process data was not supportive.  Specifically, 
participants took more time to choose between gambles with roughly equal expected values, with 
the effect of increasing number of reasons examined having very little influence on decision 
time. 
However, some recent research using fMRI techniques to examine the connectivity, and 
activity, between different brain regions has lent some support for non-compensatory models of 
risky choice (e.g., the priority heuristic).  Rao, Li, Jiang, and Zhou (2012) examined the relative 
activations of brain areas known to be involved in the processing of payoffs and probabilities.  
These researchers either explicitly asked participants to perform tradeoffs between probabilities 
and payoffs when making their decisions, or did not tell them any explicit instructions about how 
to make their choices.  Their results showed that the connectivity between regions involved in 
payoffs and probabilities was significantly more activated when participants were explicitly told 
to make tradeoffs as opposed to being given no instruction.  The authors suggest that this is 
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evidence that, when not being given explicit instruction, people may not use compensatory 
methods in determining which gamble to choose. 
Another claim about the priority heuristic—that it can perform equally well and 
sometimes better than compensatory models—has fallen under criticism by some researchers 
(e.g., Birnbaum, 2008).  Specifically, Birnbaum made the claim in re-examining the Brändstatter 
et al. (2006) data that, if the proper parameters (i.e., λ, α, β) are estimated from the data set prior 
to fitting, cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) performs quite well.  
However, Brändstatter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig (2008) note that there is a key difference 
between the ―accuracy‖ of models in the sense that Birnbaum means, and the sense that they 
(Brändstatter et al.) mean.  Specifically, there is a difference between data fitting in the case of 
Birnbaum’s re-analysis, and prediction in the case of Brändstatter et al. (2006).  The priority 
heuristic has no flexible parameters.  Thus, the data is not needed prior to fitting.  Rather, the 
heuristic can make cold predictions without any prior knowledge of individual differences in the 
individual making the decisions.  This is quite different from cumulative prospect theory, which 
has five adjustable parameters. 
As can be seen by the limited amount of research on the priority heuristic, both its 
accuracy and hypothesized process are in question.  Proponents of the ecological rationality 
approach to studying judgment and decision making are clearly in support of the priority 
heuristic’s abilities as a process model and as a predictor of choice behavior (e.g., Katsikopoulos 
& Gigerenzer, 2008).  Furthermore, some research outside of that specific group has also shown 
support for such simple models (McCrea & Bulanda, 2010; Rao et al., 2012).  The majority of 
research has, however, not been in support of the priority heuristic as either a process model or 
as a predictor of choice behavior (Ayal & Hochman, 2009; Glöckner & Herbold, 2011; Hilbig, 
2008; Johnson et al., 2008).  Despite this, there is still some utility in modeling cognitive 
processes as heuristics.   
These heuristics make explicit the structure of the decision, revealing the components of 
importance, and easily allowing for falsification and updating, as can be seen by the number of 
researchers who have falsified the heuristic’s predictions.  This stands in stark contrast to less 
explicit models of risky behavior such as prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  A 
crucial next step for the priority heuristic, before a complete overhaul of the hypothesized 
process model, is to examine different contexts in which it may perform well.  To determine 
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these different contexts, more well-established models of risky choice behavior were drawn from 
the literature on behavioral ecology and evolutionary biology.   
 Risk-Sensitive Foraging Theory 
In the realm of animal feeding behavior, payoffs of resources are not arbitrary.  The 
difference between patches of food resources quite literally can mean the difference between life 
and death.  Ultimately, this may have implications for gene propagation since organisms which 
fail to live forego future reproductive efforts.  Thus, the point of the foraging game is to secure 
enough resources to survive.  However, in a variable environment, organisms must often choose 
between probability distributions of resources, rather than certain amounts on each foraging 
attempt (Stephens & Krebs, 1986).  For instance, if the squirrel on the Kansas State University 
campus needs 25 acorns per day to survive and has accumulated only 15 up to the point of the 
last foraging attempt of the day, the last choice matters greatly; choosing the incorrect patch of 
resources (i.e., choosing the wrong ―gamble‖) may result in survival to the next day, or 
unfortunate death.     
 Background and Development 
Seminal work by Stephens and Krebs (1986) outlined the scientific philosophy of 
approaching foraging behavior from the perspective of an economist.  Their work also collected 
and summarized research from foraging theory and interpreted it within the economic 
framework.  Their central thesis on risk-sensitivity in foraging:  organisms are not risk-invariant.  
Rather, their choices are based in both the need level of the resource for which they are foraging, 
and also in the variability of the distributions of resources from which they are foraging (i.e., 
―sampling‖).  In this work Stephens and Krebs define risk as variance, and when they discuss 
risk-prone and risk-averse, they mean the general tendency to seek or avoid resource 
distributions of increasing variance.  By imagining food resources just as an economist would 
envision any resource worth pursuing, Stephens and Krebs demonstrated that economic 
principles could be applied to foraging behavior.  One implication of their work (Chapter 6) 
outlined what would happen if organisms needed a specific amount of a resource to survive.  
This idea was termed the energy budget rule. 
The observation of risk-sensitivity to food rewards appears to have been discovered as 
early as Leventhal, Morrell, Morgan Jr., and Perkins Jr. (1959).  However, a more formal theory 
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referred to as risk-sensitive foraging (as it is in this dissertation), among other names, appears to 
have first been thoroughly described by Caraco, Martindale, and Whittam (1980) on research 
with yellow-eyed juncos (Junco phaenotus).  In this research, Caraco et al. provided juncos with 
the choice of one of two containers of either (1) a constant amount of millet seeds (safer option) 
or (2) a variable amount (e.g., 0 seeds or 10 seeds at equal probabilities) with an equal expected 
value as the option with the constant amount.  Caraco et al. examined choice patterns of the 
juncos when they were in a positive energy budget (i.e., given enough food to satisfy their daily 
energy requirements) or when they were in a negative energy budget (i.e., not given enough food 
to satisfy their daily energy requirements).  Caraco et al. then modeled the utility functions for 
individual juncos in different energy budgets and discovered vastly different functions depending 
on energy budget (Figure 2-2).  For instance, individual juncos in negative energy budgets 
displayed convex utility functions indicating risk-proneness, whereas juncos in the positive 
energy budget displayed concave utility functions indicating risk-aversion. 
      
Figure ‎2-2  Effects of Energy Budget on Utility of Seeds (Caraco et al., 1980) 
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 Following Caraco et al. (1980), other research attempted to model the risk-sensitive 
foraging patterns of the organisms involved in these studies.  Various scientists envisioned the 
risk-sensitive choice patterns as being the result of a shortfall minimizing organism (e.g., Caraco 
& Lima, 1987; Stephens, 1981; Stephens & Charnov, 1982); an organism in this sense would 
seek to minimize the probability of not reaching a specific daily energy requirement
3
.  Note that 
the model of risk-sensitive foraging presented here remains an optimization model of foraging.  
However, the optimization occurs in minimizing the probability of falling short of an energy 
requirement, rather than maximizing potential resource gains from a patch of food.   
As with most models in optimal foraging theory, risk-sensitivity to resources can be 
expressed mathematically.  Stephens (1981) and Stephens and Charnov (1982) described the z-
score model in such mathematical terms:  p(S0 > R) = p(surviving the night), where p(surviving 
the night) can be expressed as 1-Φ(z).  This model essentially states that the probability of 
surviving the night is equal to the probability that an organism’s energy budget at the end of the 
day (S0) is larger than its energy requirement (R).  The probability is then calculated by the 
formula 1-Φ(z), where z = (R – μ) / σ.  The values of μ and σ represent the mean and standard 
deviation, respectively, of the assumed-to-be normally distributed energy budget at the end of the 
day (S0).  The value of Φ refers to the cumulative normal distribution, in this case of the value of 
z, whatever its value. 
Using this model, Stephens and Krebs (1986) describe an organism as a z-minimizer, and 
thus a shortfall minimizer.  The z-score model describes how choosing risk (variance) makes 
sense given the assumptions of the model.  For example, if we keep μ and R constant, but only 
vary σ, one can see how it affects 1-Φ(z), or the probability of surviving the night (Figure 2-3). 
                                                 
3
 Stephens and Krebs (1986) note that the use of daily energy budgets is primarily a convention which may have 
started with Caraco et al. (1980).  However, the concept of an energy budget could, in theory, be applied to any 
specified time span. 
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Figure ‎2-3  The Effects of Variance (Risk) on the Probability of Survival using the z-score 
model of risk-sensitive foraging (Stephens, 1981) 
 
 Figure 2-3 shows that, as variance (risk) increases, the probability of surviving the night 
changes differentially depending on the energy budget of the orgnism making the decision.  This 
also suggests that choosing the maximum possible variance is the optimal solution given a 
negative energy budget, whereas the minimum possible variance is optimal given a positive 
energy budget.  It also suggests, however, that the outlook is grim for those in a negative energy 
budget; the payoff of choosing risk has diminishing return in the form of increases in the 
proability of surviving the night.  Perhaps this leads to increased motivation to choose risk; times 
are truly desparate for those in a negative budget. 
 Empirical Evidence for Risk-Sensitive Foraging in Humans 
Since risk-sensitive foraging was first formalized into a coherent framework there have 
been numerous studies indicating consistent results: that given a negative energy budget, 
organisms tend to be risk-prone relative to when they are in a positive energy budget.  This effect 
has been shown for a number of different species.  For example, Caraco (1983) extended the 
results from Caraco et al. (1980) to white-crowned sparrows.  Others have shown this general 
effect of risk-sensitive foraging to apply to common shrews (Barnard & Brown, 1985), rats 
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(Kirshenbaum, Szalda-Petree, & Haddad, 2000), bumble bees (Cartar, 1991), some species of 
fish (Young, Clayton, & Barnard, 1990), and even humans (Mishra & Fiddick, 2012; Mishra, 
Gregson, & Lalumière, 2012; Mishra & Lalumière, 2010; Pietras & Hackenberg, 2001; Rode et 
al., 1999; Searcy & Pietras, 2011; Winterhalder, Lu, & Tucker, 1999).  The focus of risk-
sensitive foraging discussion turns next to human examples. 
Rode et al. (1999) commented on the nature of a pervasive and perplexing paradox within 
the judgment and decision making field: the ambiguity effect.  The ambiguity effect, also called 
ambiguity aversion, describes the tendency to prefer gambles with known probabilities over 
gambles with uncertain, or not explicitly given probabilities, thus demonstrating an aversion to 
ambiguity.   
For example, in an example described by Ellsberg (1961), suppose that participants are 
told that they get to play a lottery.  The lottery consists of two boxes, each with a different 
proportion of black and white balls.  In Box A, there are 50 white balls and 50 black balls, 
whereas in Box B there are a total of 100 black and white balls with an unknown proportion.  
Participants in psychological studies of this example would then be asked which box they would 
draw from, after being told that they would win $100 dollars upon drawing a black ball.  The 
observation: most people prefer the box with known probabilities (Box A), which, under 
normative methods would suggest that the probability of a black ball in Box A (.50) is greater 
than the probability of the black ball in Box B (< .50; conversely meaning that the probability of 
the white ball is > .50).   
The paradox occurs when participants are then asked which box they would choose if the 
white ball was rewarded with the $100.  Again, most people choose Box A with known 
probabilities, showing that people are not using normative methods in deciding; choosing Box A 
in the first round indicates that, for Box B, p(black) < .50, justifying choosing Box A.  However, 
choosing Box A in the second round suggests the decision maker believes p(white) < .50  in Box 
B, which by completion means they believe p(black) > .50 in the same box.  Participants 
behavior consistent with p(black) being both greater than and less than .50 illustrates the 
paradox, and the general avoidance of ambiguity.  This has been demonstrated many times (e.g., 
Fox & Tversky, 1995; Keren & Gerritsen, 1999). 
However, Rode et al. (1999) suggested one plausible explanation for ambiguity aversion 
was that ambiguity served as a cue for variability, and people tend to be variance-, or risk-averse.  
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By showing that people were indeed avoidant to high variance, but not necessarily ambiguity 
(see Experiment 3), they set the stage to examine theoretical reasons why people may be avoidant 
of variance.  Drawing, on risk-sensitive foraging theory, Rode et al. then demonstrated that 
people would flip their behavioral patterns from ambiguity avoidant to ambiguity seeking when 
placed in a situation of high need (i.e., a negative energy budget).  In their studies, participants 
had the option to choose from one of two boxes, each containing different proportions of black 
and white balls, similar to the Ellsberg (1961) example.  In one box (e.g., Box A), the proportion 
of balls were explicitly stated (e.g., 70% white, 30% black), thus participants knew the chances 
of drawing a black ball.  The other box (e.g., Box B) did not have an explicitly stated proportion.  
However, participants were told that the proportion of white and black balls would be 
determined by drawing from a container with 101 chips, each with the specific proportions of the 
black and white balls being determined.  The 101 chips corresponded to the 101 possible 
proportions of the 100 balls (i.e., 100 black balls and 0 white balls, to 0 black balls and 100 white 
balls).  In this example, Box B was known as the ambiguous option.   
What was discovered was that when participants had 10 draws with replacement to draw 
a certain number of black balls, and this number was necessary to move to an actual money 
earning round, both the amount of black balls needed (the need level) and the variability in the 
options from which participants could draw mattered.  Specifically, when the known risk option 
did not offer a good chance of reaching the need level (e.g., if they needed 5 black balls, and the 
proportions of the known risk option were 70% white balls, 30% black balls), participants were 
more likely to choose the ambiguous option with an unknown probability of black balls.  Rode et 
al. interpreted these data as being consistent with risk-sensitive foraging theory; participants 
chose what they perceived as high variance when the less ambiguous option did not give them a 
good chance of reaching a need level. 
 Mishra and Lalumière (2010) took the decision under risk paradigm used by Rode et al. 
(1999) and modified it to be more dynamic and ecologically valid by having participants 
experience the payoffs and probabilities of payoffs through simulation in a dynamic laboratory 
environment, similar to what an organism would experience in a real-world environment.  
Specifically, Mishra and Lalumière created a computerized game in which participants were 
asked to sample from different trees and try to obtain 50 apples during seven trials (described to 
participants as obtaining 50 apples during a ―week‖).  Prior to the actual game, participants were 
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trained so they could learn the various payoffs and probabilities typically sampled from trees of 
different colors.  Then participants were asked to complete the experiment, during which they 
would try to earn the 50 apples during the seven trials (i.e., during the ―week‖).  However, 
participants were unaware that during the first five trials half of them were sampling from lower 
producing trees than the other half of participants, resulting in having only half as many apples 
as necessary by the sixth ―day.‖  These participants were in a negative energy budget relative to 
the participants who had higher producing apple trees during the first five ―days‖ of the 
experiment.  Mishra and Lalumière then examined the proportion of choices from the higher risk 
tree during the last and seventh trial; the sixth trial was not used as a dependent variable.  Their 
conclusions were that participants in the high need (negative energy budget) group were much 
more likely to choose the riskier tree on the seventh day than the low need (positive energy 
budget) group.  This finding showed that, even in a dynamic environment, humans behave 
consistent with risk-sensitive foraging theory. 
The transition from static environments (e.g., Rode et al., 1999) to dynamic environments 
(e.g., Mishra & Lalumière, 2010) is important for a few reasons.  As pointed out by others (e.g., 
Hayden & Platt, 2009; Hertwig et al., 2004), the task environment may have important 
implications for risky choice behaviors. Also, as pointed out by Schuck-Paim, Pompilio, and 
Kacelnik (2004), great care must be taken when transcending the gap between human economic 
and judgment/decision making phenomena to biological phenomena, with a major component of 
the gap being the difference in how these judgment and decision making phenomena are tested 
(e.g., dynamically or statically).  Thus, it is important that the same effect (i.e., risky choice 
based on the energy-budget rule of risk-sensitive foraging) has been shown in both static task 
environments (described) and more dynamic experiments (experienced) in a few different studies 
(e.g., Pietras & Hackenberg, 2001; Searcy & Pietras, 2011).   
To some extent, risk-sensitive foraging theory has also been applied to anthropological 
studies of subsistence societies (for review see Winterhalder, Lu, & Tucker, 1999), and the 
general framework of risk-sensitive foraging has even been applied to explain the phenomenon 
of risky choice framing effects (Mishra & Fiddick, 2012; Mishra, Gregson, & Lalumière, 2012).  
Collectively, these studies show a robust effect of need levels on risky decision making in both 
humans and non-human animals, in experimental contexts and in their natural environments.  
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These data suggest that the organisms involved have an evolved mechanism for being sensitive 
to outcome variance of different decision options, across a wide range of decisions. 
  
 Dominance Theory 
   In humans, it has been documented that cues of relative status are often highly 
predictive of risky behavior.  For example, cues such as socioeconomic status were highly 
predictive of intrasexual violence, including homicide, in the data gathered by Wilson and Daly 
(1985). Also, the offender’s age and sex were highly predictive of intrasexual violence, with 
males between 15 and 25 being the biggest violent offenders.  This observation sparked their 
term ―the young male syndrome.‖ So, why do young males deem it necessary to take risk 
associated with violent competition? 
 Background and Development 
Dominance theory—formalized for psychological research by Ermer et al. (2008)—is 
based in substantial literature from evolutionary biology and psychology showing that human 
and non-human males engage in risky behavior in an attempt to acquire more resources and/or 
status, offering the potential of elevating their status in a male hierarchy (Hammerstein & Parker, 
1982; Maynard Smith, 1974; Maynard Smith & Price, 1973).  This specific example of 
intrasexual competition is sexually dimorphic, with the behavior being much more prominent in 
males than females.  For example, cross-culturally, females desire higher status men more so 
than men desire higher status women (Buss, 1989).  It then follows that males of prime 
reproductive age should have significant motivation to acquire higher status.  Indeed this has 
been found in many occasions, with the direct result being that risk taking in an attempt to reach 
higher status increases during the young adult years of a male’s life (Wilson & Daly, 1985; 
Wilson, Daly, & Pound, 2002). 
 However, this motivation to take risks in male-male competition is also highly 
systematic, and is modulated by the relative status of the individual with whom one is competing 
for resources.  For instance, it has been shown that a potential evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) 
for intrasexual conflict consists of examining the competitor for cues of his competitive qualities 
in order to determine his status relative to yours.  The best strategy is then to compete only if you 
are of equal status to your competitor; if you are clearly lower in status than your competitor it is 
25 
 
better to retreat and compete another day (Maynard Smith, 1974; Maynard Smith & Price, 1973).  
It is also not beneficial to the person higher in status; they have nothing to gain by competing 
against a lower status individual, but may take an unnecessary risk in competing.  
 Empirical Evidence for Dominance Theory in Humans 
The framework of predictions which Ermer et al. (2008) termed dominance theory is 
based in mostly non-human animal research and/or mathematical modeling based on known non-
human animal research (e.g., Hammerstein & Parker, 1982; Maynard Smith 1974; Maynard 
Smith & Price, 1973).  However, the basic concepts have been applied to a few areas within 
human competition as well. 
For example, Stulp et al. (in press) examined data from different athletic leagues in both 
German football (American soccer), and American basketball (i.e., the NBA).  Stulp et al. 
examined levels of aggression by using the metric of number of fouls committed by both teams 
during contests.  Stulp et al. operationalized relative rank of each team by using each team’s rank 
at the time of the game.  Their findings:  When the difference between rankings of teams was 
small, the number of fouls committed increased, thus suggesting that aggression and risk-taking 
was elevated between groups of equal status.  
Intrasexual competition in nature typically involves some type of prolonged posturing up 
until a point of actual physical conflict.  This is of course different than what can be tested in a 
laboratory.  However, the underlying psychological processes occurring during intrasexual 
competition likely involve the motivation to be risk-prone rather than risk-averse when being 
evaluated by someone of perceived equal status, especially when competing with that person for 
a needed resource.  This general case can be evaluated in the laboratory by examining such 
mundane tasks as choices between risky and safe gambles, and has been demonstrated by Ermer 
et al. (2008) among others (e.g., Frankenhuis, Dotsch, Karremans, & Wigboldus, 2010; Hill & 
Buss, 2010). 
Ermer et al. (2008) demonstrated that hypotheses about animal intrasexual conflict could 
be tested using traditional descriptive gambles used in classic judgment and decision making 
research.  In their studies, Ermer et al. told participants that they were being evaluated by 
students from other universities.  The universities were pilot tested for perceived status.  Results 
from their studies showed that, when choosing between two gambles—one risky, one safe—male 
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participants behaved according to the predictions of an asymmetric war of attrition (i.e., low risk 
taking when competing against lower, or higher status individuals, but high risk-taking against 
equal status individuals).  This trend was not discovered for females however, and it was not 
discovered when participants (male or female) were choosing between options which provided 
non-status resources (i.e., medical problem illustrating losses of life). 
 Other researchers have more directly tied such competitive risk-taking to sexual 
selection, suggesting that such risky behavior during competition is a signal to females of status, 
or resource holding potential (e.g., Archer, 2009; Baker & Maner, 2009; Frankenhuis et al., 
2010).  For instance, Frankenhuis et al. demonstrated that risk-taking behavior in males was most 
heavily influenced by females.  Baker and Maner (2009) found similar results.  However, Ermer 
et al. (2008), as well as Hill and Buss (2010) demonstrated that risk-taking was not dependent 
upon opposite-sex presence.  
Hill and Buss (2010) demonstrated that this desire for higher status was robust.  
Specifically, they showed that participants would choose the gambles which provided a chance 
of having more than their peer group, even if the gamble was objectively less desirable; people 
would take less money if it was more than their peers.  However, Hill and Buss did not 
manipulate perceived status levels as did Ermer et al. (2008), leaving a potential gap in their 
connection between various research examining risk-taking as a function of the status of 
competitors and/or onlookers. 
It is clear from research that status is an important variable in intrasexual competition.  
Research has also shown that this phenomenon is not limited to non-human animal research, but 
applies in experimental lab settings for humans (e.g., Ermer et al., 2008) as well as more real-
world contexts (e.g., Stulp et al., in press). 
Because both Hill and Buss (2010) and Ermer et al. (2008) were able to demonstrate the 
effects of status in using paper and pencil, static, described gambles, that method was deemed 
useful for the studies described in this dissertation.  The utility of using paper and pencil 
described gambles was also consistent with the findings from other studies, testing different 
theoretical perspectives (e.g., Brandstätter et al., 2006; Rode et al., 1999).            
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 Individual Differences:  Numerical Literacy   
Despite a growing need to understand basic mathematical and statistical concepts in the 
modern world, there appears to be a large group of individuals who fail to perform well when 
presented such tasks (Hanoch, Miron-Shatz, Cole, Himmelstein, Federman, 2010; Hill & Brase, 
2012; Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001; Peters et al., 2006).  The concept of numerical literacy has 
been defined in different ways by different researchers within the medical, educational, and 
psychological fields.  Lipkus et al. define numeracy as a person’s facility with basic probability 
and mathematical concepts.  However, numeracy is often measured in terms of applying these 
basic probability and mathematical concepts to novel contexts, usually in the form of word 
problems.  Thus, numeracy is not merely mathematical ability, but rather the ability to apply 
what is known to new and relevant situations in a correct manner (Hill & Brase, 2013). 
 Although the theoretical construct of numerical literacy remains a somewhat open 
question (Barwell, 2004; Hill & Brase, 2013; Schapira, Walker, & Sedivy, 2009; Weller et al., 
2012), the primary utility of numeracy in judgment and decision making research is as a measure 
of individual differences in numerical processing (Chapman & Liu, 2009; Hill & Brase, 2012; 
Peters et al., 2006; Sirota & Juanchich, 2011).  This is also the primary importance of numeracy 
in the current collection of studies.   
 Brandstätter et al. (2006) mention that one weakness of the priority heuristic is that it 
does not account for individual differences which may moderate the performance of the heuristic 
in predicting behavioral patterns.  While risk-taking propensity as an individual difference was 
mentioned by Brandstätter et al., the authors did not mention numerical literacy.  However, 
numerical literacy has been shown to play a role in how individuals process choices which vary 
in payoffs and probabilities (Peters & Levin, 2008). 
 Peters and Levin (2008) attempted to look into the effect of individual differences in 
numeracy on the risky-choice framing effect.  Specifically, Peters and Levin asked participants 
to rate the attractiveness of individual options (e.g., 100 lives saved for certain) in isolation and 
then asked them to rate their preferences for two gambles together, one certain, one risky (e.g., 
which do you prefer? 100 lives saved for certain, or a 1/3 chance that 300 are saved but 2/3 
chance that none are saved).  Participants in this study were, of course, randomly assigned to 
either the positively framed problems or the negatively framed problems. 
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 Results from the study showed that for high numerates (individuals scoring high on the 
Lipkus et al., 2001 measure), the attractiveness ratings of the individual options were significant 
unique predictors of the preferences for one option over another in the combined decision tasks.  
Thus, for high numerates, the framing of the problems was not a significant unique predictor.  
These results stand in stark contrast to the results for low numerates.  Low numerates’ individual 
ratings of options were not unique predictors of overall preferences, but the framing of the 
problems was a unique predictor. 
 Peters and Levin (2008) interpreted these results as meaning that there are qualitative 
differences in how high and low numerates use the information in risky choice paradigms.  High 
numerates rely on the payoffs and probabilities (the numerical information) when forming an 
opinion about the overall gambles, whereas low numerates do not use such information or at 
least use such information considerably less.  Instead, low numerates rely on other information in 
the problems such as the whether the problem is framed as positive (saving lives) or negative 
(losing lives). 
A large collection of research on numeracy suggests that this individual difference 
variable strongly predicts performance on a variety of mathematical tasks (e.g., Chapman & Liu, 
2009; Hill & Brase, 2012; Peters et al., 2006).  Particularly important to the current studies on 
risky decision making is the observation made by Peters and Levin (2008) that facility with 
mathematical and probability concepts may play an important role in predicting whether 
individuals will utilize the numerical properties of gambles when making their decisions.  
Because the priority heuristic (1) hypothesizes that individuals perform some basic mathematical 
operations either implicitly or explicitly, and (2) at this point, lacks any integration with 
individual differences in decision making, the factor of numeracy is included in the first two 
studies of this dissertation. 
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Chapter 3 - Study One 
Conclusions about the ability of the priority heuristic to model human risky choice 
behavior have not yet been empirically settled (Birnbaum, 2008; Johnson, Shulte-Mecklenbeck, 
& Willemsen, 2008; Reiger & Wang, 2008).  However, perhaps of more profound theoretical 
importance is to return to the issue of when the priority heuristic is ecologically rational; that is, 
under what environmental conditions do people appear to use a process similar to the priority 
heuristic?  Or put simply, in which ecology is the priority heuristic ecologically rational?   
The priority heuristic was created as a demonstration that complex models of decision 
making with many parameters are not needed to explain human decision behavior.  For example, 
Brandstätter et al. (2006) demonstrated that the priority heuristic can predict behavior patterns 
better than more complex models, such as prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), 
cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), the transfer of attention-exchange 
model (Birnbaum & Chavez, 1997), and the security potential/aspiration level theory (Lopes & 
Ogden, 1999).  However, choices between risky and safe options normally depend on many 
variables, not simply those of the probabilities and the potential payoffs.  It could be argued that 
the priority heuristic is limited to being a clever demonstration of how other models of decision 
making should be created: that is, as process models which need not assume averaging, and 
weighting within the organism’s cognitive processes.   
So, it may be that the ecology of the priority heuristic is no more than the ecology of 
standard psychology and economics experiments where the only manipulation is in terms of the 
probabilities and payoffs of described gambles.  Although Brandstätter et al. (2006) 
demonstrated that there is merit in using process models such as the priority heuristic when 
predicting risky choice behavior, there may be little validity in the priority heuristic in terms of 
how our minds were designed, by natural selection, to solve consistent adaptive problems such as 
when to take risks.  The priority heuristic does not take into account several potential 
environmental concerns that may motivate an organism to choose risk over safety (e.g., energy 
budget, status of competitor).  Fortunately, there is a rich literature on risky choice behavior in 
non-human animals from evolutionary biology and behavioral ecology that does take into 
account many environmental considerations when making decisions under risk.  One well-
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supported theory in behavioral ecology is risk-sensitive foraging (Stephens, 1981; Stephens & 
Krebs, 1986). 
Study One was designed to systematically test whether the priority heuristic’s predictions 
based on its hypothesized process would hold true when put in more ecologically valid 
environments faced by many organisms (Barnard & Brown, 1985; Caraco, 1981, 1983; Cartar, 
1991; Kirshenbaum, Szalda-Petree, & Haddad, 2000; Real & Caraco, 1986; Young, Clayton, & 
Barnard, 1990), including perhaps humans (Mishra & Lalumière, 2010; Pietras & Hackenberg, 
2001; Rode et al., 1999; Winterhalder, Lu, & Tucker, 1999).  Specifically, we wanted to see if 
the priority heuristic would be able to account for behavior in the face of resource need levels
4
.  
Although the layout of the study is reminiscent of approaches of strong inference (Platt, 1964), 
the major goal of Study One was to test when the priority heuristic might work well, rather than 
examining if one model of risky choice was ―correct‖ while the other was not.  Indeed this is a 
major goal of the ecological rationality approach to judgment and decision making (Gigerenzer 
& Brighton, 2009; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Todd & 
Gigerenzer, 2007).   
A major goal of any model—or any theory—is to test its range of focus.  For instance, 
Darwinian evolution postulated the modification of species over time.  However, Darwin’s 
proposed process ―driving‖ evolution—the process of natural selection—assumed some form of 
mechanism for inheriting such modifications.  Pangenesis, Darwin’s own idea for how 
inheritance could work (Darwin, 1871/1971), was later supplanted by Mendelian genetics and 
then more advanced models of inheritance (e.g., the Boveri-Sutton chromosome theory), 
ultimately leading to a revolution in evolutionary thinking during the 20
th
 century known as the 
―modern synthesis.‖  The modern synthesis led, in turn, to extensive support of Darwin’s own 
evolution by natural selection, despite some of his other idea’s being supplanted by better ones 
along the way.  This process is illustrative of an ideal in science, but it also demonstrates how 
theories and models of observed phenomena are modified through the scientific process.  This 
                                                 
4
 Throughout this dissertation I refer to ―need levels.‖  Most often in risk-sensitive foraging research these need 
levels are conceptualized as amounts of tangible resources (e.g., calories) needed to literally survive.  However, for 
this dissertation and all of its studies I refer to need levels as the amount of earned fake money necessary to reach a 
potential second round, during which participants may earn additional fake money. 
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process is certainly also true in the behavioral sciences, with the psychology of judgment and 
decision making being no exception.   
The priority heuristic is an example of a fast-and-frugal heuristic for making risky 
decisions in the tradition of the ecological rationality approach in psychology.  However, it is 
unknown when this heuristic will work; that is, under what conditions does the hypothesized 
process stop predicting behavior?  The goal of Study One was to test a few of the possible 
conditions. 
To summarize, the priority heuristic makes specific predictions about preferences for 
gambles in risky choice situations.  The structure of the priority heuristic’s predictions should not 
change with respect to context (e.g., if money earned through gambling is changed to food 
consumed through foraging).  Although the priority heuristic is in the tradition of ecological 
rationality, the ecology does not necessarily imply the same thing when speaking in terms of our 
species’ evolutionary history.  If fast-and-frugal heuristics such as the priority heuristic are 
adequate ―as-if‖ models of human cognition then they should also be compatible with the 
massive modularity thesis—that minds are composed of a large number of context-dependent, 
domain-specific modules, each specialized to solve recurrent problems that our ancestors faced 
throughout evolutionary history.  However, the priority heuristic does not, on the surface, appear 
to be capable of handling different contexts.  Ultimately, this is an empirical question, and one 
which is the focus of Study One of this dissertation.         
 Hypotheses 
From these two models of risky choice behavior—the priority heuristic and risk-sensitive 
foraging—specific predictions can be made about overall preferences for risky options 
depending on specific characteristics of the decision problem (i.e., the probabilities and payoffs 
of winning and losing each gamble) and the environmental considerations (i.e., amount of money 
needed to advance to a potential next round). 
 The Priority heuristic 
General predictions cannot be made that would encompass all decision problems because 
the various payoffs and probabilities of each decision problem will affect the prediction made by 
the priority heuristic.  However, the priority heuristic’s predicted choices are embodied within 
the process model itself (Figure 2-1).  For the gambles created for Study One (see Decision 
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Tasks section below), the priority heuristic predicts that gambles labeled as ―3rd Reason‖ tasks 
should result in higher preferences for the riskier gamble than gambles labeled as ―1st Reason‖ 
tasks (Figure 3-1).  An additional prediction about the priority heuristic would be that decision 
time, based on the time taken by each participant to make a decision, should increase when 
problems require more steps of calculation as outlined by the priority heuristic’s hypothesized 
process.  For example, decision problems that require only one ―reason‖ should take less time to 
decide than problems that require two or three reasons. 
 
Figure ‎3-1  Priority Heuristic Predictions for Preferences in Study One 
 
 Risk-sensitive foraging 
Participants should be risk-averse and choose the safer option when it is enough to reach 
the need level, characterized in the present experimental methodology as the amount of money 
needed to reach a potential second round.  However, people should be risk-seeking when the 
riskier option is the only option that gives them a chance to reach the need level (Figure 3-2).  
Risk-sensitive foraging makes no predictions about decision time in this specific context.   
33 
 
Figure ‎3-2  Risk-Sensitive Foraging Predictions for Preferences in Study One 
 
 Moderating effect of numeracy 
Peters and Levin (2008) suggest that high numerates, more than low numerates, use their 
evaluations of the different numerical options when deciding between two options, one risky and 
one safe.  If this is true, one would expect that models which implicitly assume some numerical 
processing should better predict decisions for high numerates than low numerates who may be 
using other types of information to make a decision.  Because the priority heuristic implicitly 
assumes a modest level of numerical processing (e.g., calculation proportions, comparing 
decimals), it is plausible, given the findings of Peters and Levin, that numeracy should moderate 
the accuracy of the priority heuristic in predicting risky-choice preferences.  Specifically, higher 
numerates should behave more consistently with the priority heuristic than lower numerates, 
resulting in high numerates having  a high preference for the riskier gamble in 3
rd
 Reason tasks 
and a lower preference for the riskier gamble in 1
st
 Reason tasks (Figure 3-3).  There are no 
specific predictions regarding potential main effects of numeracy or the direction of the 
numeracy/risk-proneness relationship.   
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Figure ‎3-3  Numeracy-Priority Heuristic Relationship Predictions for Study One 
 
 Study One Method 
 Participants 
Data were collected from 60 participants enrolled in introductory psychology courses at 
Kansas State University.  All participants received experimental research credit which went 
toward a course requirement.  Students not wishing to participate in research were given the 
option of writing short response papers to peer-reviewed psychological research articles.  The 
demographic characteristics of the participants were consistent with typical college-age samples 
used in psychological research in terms of age (M = 18.88, SD = 2.15), and the ratio of males to 
females, (Males: n = 14, Females: n = 46).  Also typical of human-participant research 
conducted in the Midwestern United States, the majority of participants were of Caucasian 
ethnicity (n = 50), with other ethnic groups being less represented: African American (n = 4), 
Asian (n = 4), and Hispanic (n = 1).  One participant identified their ethnicity as ―Other.‖   
 Design 
Research has shown a tendency for participants in human psychological research to be 
relatively risk-averse, especially when gambles are framed in terms of gains, as they are in Study 
One and throughout this dissertation (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; but see Wang & Johnston, 
35 
 
1995).  Pilot testing for Study One showed the same tendency for general risk-aversion.  To 
address such risk-aversion, and examine relative risk-aversion, two different measures of choice 
behavior were used in Study One.  A binary choice paradigm (Binary Choice; BC) was used in 
which participants chose between one gamble over another; this is the most ecologically valid 
decision paradigm, but is also highly susceptible to low variability in choices, with most 
participants choosing the safe gamble.  To provide for more sensitive measurements of choice in 
Study One, participants were also asked to provide a preference rating for the same gambles on a 
scale from 1 to 6, with 6 indicating a higher preference for the risky gamble, and 1 indicating a 
higher preference for the safer gamble (Continuous Preference; CP).  This measure provided a 
more sensitive metric for determining each participant’s motivation to choose risky over safe 
gambles, but it also introduced an additional problem of order effects.  To address the potential 
for order effects—whether providing a continuous preference, or making a binary choice first, 
have differential effects on decisions—the order was counterbalanced within Study One’s 
design.    
The purpose of Study One was to systematically examine a few conditions under which 
the priority heuristic may, or may not, work well, by introducing variables from risk-sensitive 
foraging (i.e., the energy-budget rule) (Stephens, 1981; Stephens & Krebs, 1986).  To assess the 
performance of these two different models of risky decision making, while also providing the 
opportunity to look at potential order effects of different choice paradigms, a 2 (Budget:  
Negative and Positive) by 2 (Task Order: BC 1
st
 or CP 1
st
 ) by 2 (Reason Number: 1
st
 Reason 
and 3
rd 
Reason) mixed factorial design was utilized.  In this design, Reason Number was within-
participants while Budget and Task Order were between-participants.   
 Materials 
Study One used novel ―decision tasks‖:  problems in which participants were asked to 
choose between two gambles, each with different buy-in amounts, payoffs, and respective 
probabilities of winning and losing.  Participants also answered questions as part of the General 
Numeracy Scale (Lipkus et al., 2001) to assess the potential moderator effect on priority heuristic 
predictive accuracy, and the Domain Specific Risk Scale (Kruger, Wang, & Wilke, 2007) to 
control for individual differences in domain-specific risk-taking.  The decision tasks and 
individual difference measures are described in more detail in the sections that follow.   
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Decision tasks 
To measure performance a total of four different problems were created (Table 3-1).  
Half of the problems were created so they would correspond to reason number one in the priority 
heuristic (1
st
 Reason).  The other half of the problems were created in a way consistent with 
decision making at the third reason of the priority heuristic (3
rd
 Reason)
5
.  Participants received 
both the 1
st
 and 3
rd
 Reason problems.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions of Budget.  To create experimental environments analogous to varying energy 
budgets, different ―need levels‖ were created, such that participants would need to earn different 
amounts of money in order to move to a second round, if a second round occurred.  In reality, 
there was never a second round.  All participants only completed a single round.  The purpose of 
telling participants that they may be a potential second round was to create an environment in 
which there was an uncertain future.  Thus, if the future round occurred, there would be a good 
reason to have the necessary fake money to play that round.   
For the purposes of Study One, conditions in which the ―safer‖ gamble and the ―riskier‖ 
gamble offered the possibility of reaching the need level were characterized as being positive 
budget.  Participants did not need to take risk in order to reach the need level.  The need level in 
the negative budget conditions was set in a way that only the riskier gamble allowed the 
possibility of reaching the need level.  The expected values between the riskier and safer gambles 
were identical for all decision tasks.  This is a requisite for testing the priority heuristic in that 
decisions need to be ―difficult‖ (i.e., expected values between options need to be similar) 
(Brandstätter et al., 2006).  
 
                                                 
5
 The standard lexicographic order of the priority heuristic suggests that gambles should be compared first at 
minimum gains (i.e., the 1
st
 Reason).  The decision task labeled 1
st
 Reason in Study One was designed so that the 
difference between the two gambles would meet the aspiration level and search would stop, resulting in the 
participant choosing the safer gamble because it had the highest minimum payoff.  Similarly, for the 3
rd
 Reason 
decision task, it was designed to require participants to continue search through the 2
nd
 Reason, resulting in 
participants stopping search at the 3
rd
 Reason and choosing the gamble with the highest maximum payoff (i.e., the 
riskier gamble). 
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Table ‎3-1  Decision Task Characteristics for Study One 
Condition First Task Second Task Reason Budget Need Level Safer Riskier Safer Riskier
1st Negative $300 $25 $100 $250 (.90) $600 (.50)
3rd Negative $400 $20 $25 $400 (.55) $450 (.50)
1st Negative $300 $25 $100 $250 (.90) $600 (.50)
3rd Negative $400 $20 $25 $400 (.55) $450 (.50)
1st Positive $200 $25 $100 $250 (.90) $600 (.50)
3rd Positive $300 $20 $25 $400 (.55) $450 (.50)
1st Positive $200 $25 $100 $250 (.90) $600 (.50)
3rd Positive $300 $20 $25 $400 (.55) $450 (.50)
4
Continuous 
Preference
Binary 
Choice
2
Continuous 
Preference
Binary 
Choice
3
Binary 
Choice
Continuous 
Preference
Decision Task Order Buy-in Amounts Winnings (Probabilities)
1
Binary 
Choice
Continuous 
Preference
  
The General Numeracy Scale 
The General Numeracy Scale (GNS) (Lipkus et al., 2001) was used to assess participants’ 
levels of numeracy.  The GNS is an eleven-item scale consisting of questions assessing 
participants’ understanding of number conversion, risk, and probability concepts (Appendix A).  
Lipkus et al. developed the GNS primarily for use within medical decision making contexts and, 
as a result, their scale poses questions framed in medical and disease terminology.  However, 
Lipkus et al. suggest that the GNS assesses a global construct of numerical literacy despite its 
content focused on medical decision making.   
Despite its wide use (e.g., Cokely & Kelley, 2009; Hill & Brase, 2012; Peters et al., 
2006), the GNS has been criticized for its undesirable psychometric properties, most prominent 
of which is a highly negatively skewed distribution of scores, and potential ceiling effects 
(Liberali, Reyna, Furlan, Stein, & Pardo, 2011; Weller et al., 2012).  This creates problems when 
researchers utilize standard median split techniques for use in ANOVA (MacCallum, Zhang, 
Preacher, & Rucker, 2002).  Despite these issues, many people still use such median split 
techniques on the GNS (e.g., Chapman & Liu, 2009; Peters et al., 2006; but see Galesic & 
Garcia-Retamero, 2011 and Peters & Levin, 2008).  The GNS was used in Study One primarily 
due to scientific inertia; despite attempts to create better, more theoretically motivated scales 
(Cokely, Galesic, Shulz, Ghazal, & Garcia-Retamero, 2012; Weller et al., 2012), the GNS 
remains the most widely used measure of numerical literacy.  As such, it was used in Study One 
to assess each participant’s facility with processing and understanding numerical information.  
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Domain Specific Risk Scale 
Risk taking propensity was measured in Study One due to the potential effect that 
individuals may have variable levels of general risk taking which may influence the variables of 
interest in Study One (i.e., need level, priority heuristic reasons).  Mishra and Lalumière (2010) 
demonstrated that, when a need level is present in decisions from experience, individual 
differences in risk taking propensity do not significantly predict actual risk taking beyond that 
participant’s energy budget at the time of making a decision.  This would suggest that there is no 
merit in assessing individual differences in risk taking propensity.  However, Mishra and 
Lalumière also note that, in conditions where participants had already met their need level, their 
subsequent choices—either risky or safe—were heavily predicted by general risk taking 
propensity.  These results would suggest that, when there are no environmental constraints such 
as the need to reach a required need level, individual risk taking propensity is predictive of risky 
choice behavior.  In order to control for risk-taking in Study One, individual tendencies to be 
risky in domain-specific contexts were measured. 
Risk taking propensity may not be a domain general individual difference variable 
(Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002).   However, because of the evolutionarily-motivated nature of the 
current research, a domain specific risk taking scale which embodied evolutionarily-important 
risk taking behavior was used.  The Domain Specific Risk Scale (DSRS) (Kruger et al., 2007) 
consists of 15 likert-response statements corresponding to five evolutionarily-important domains 
of risk (Appendix B).  The domains of risk are: between-group competition, within-group 
competition, fertility, mating and resource allocation for mate attraction, and environmental.    
 Study One Procedure 
To elicit motivated responding in participants, Study One was presented as a gambling 
competition between students from all over the Kansas State University campus.  Participants 
were be brought into the lab by a researcher wearing professional clothing and a white lab coat.  
The appearance of the researcher remained professional in order to make participants believe in 
the importance of taking the study seriously; some research has demonstrated that professional 
attire, including lab coats, increases third-party perceptions of power and status toward the 
person wearing the attire (Brase & Richmond, 2004).  Once in the laboratory participants were 
first told that the study they were participating in was actually designed to be a competition 
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between students from Kansas State University.  They were told that they would be participating 
in a gambling competition in which they would choose between gambles, and at the end of the 
study they would play out the gambles selected in order to see if they had won fake money.  
Participants were then told that the student with the most fake money would win the competition, 
and would be notified after all students had participated in the competition.  All participants were 
then asked if they understood the gist of the competition.  Questions by participants were 
answered by the researcher.   
Participants were then instructed to click ―OK‖ on the screen in MediaLab (Jarvis, 2008).  
Participants first were presented with a ―welcome‖ screen with the text ―Welcome to the 
Decisions about Money Competition.‖  Immediately below this text was the official Kansas State 
University logo.  Participants then automatically proceeded to the informed consent screen.  At 
this time the researcher explained the informed consent to participants and asked them to read 
the informed consent and ask any questions if necessary.  Participants were then directed to the 
paper copy of the informed consent located at each computer station.  Once participants had 
signed the informed consent sheets and agreed to participate in the competition, they proceeded 
to the rules section of the study.   
Participants learned the rules of the game by clicking through an animated PowerPoint 
slideshow.  The slideshow was designed so that participants could move through at their own 
pace, one bullet point or animation at a time, by left-clicking the mouse on their respective 
computers.  The rules of the game were that participants would be competing in two separate 
gambling competitions during the experiment.  Participants were told that they would be 
choosing between two gambles with different odds and payouts, and that they would play out 
their chosen gambles at the end of each round.  Each round consisted of two decision tasks; 
participants were told the two decision tasks were unrelated.  The two decision tasks were said to 
be independent of each other, similar to having ―two horses in a race.‖  We, the researchers, were 
simply letting the participants have two separate chances of winning the competition.  The two 
decision tasks actually constituted the within-participants independent variable of Reason 
Number (i.e., 1
st
 Reason, and 3
rd
 Reason). 
Participants were additionally told that there would be either one or two rounds of the 
competition and that each computer would randomly select the number of rounds each 
participant would be allowed to play, so it could be different for each participant in the 
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competition.  Furthermore, in order to reach a potential second round, participants would need to 
earn a certain amount of fake money to qualify for the second round.  Thus, participants were 
essentially told that they would be placed in an environment in which there is an uncertain 
future; they knew that there may be a possible future round in which they could earn money, but 
this was not guaranteed.  If they wished to earn money in the potential second round they needed 
to take steps to ensure their likelihood of making it to the second round (by choosing the gambles 
that would offer them  the best chance of earning the minimum need level in the decision tasks).  
This amount of money needed to reach the potential second round, hereafter referred to as the 
―need level‖, was manipulated between-participants as part of the Budget manipulation.  After 
finishing the rules in PowerPoint, participants were asked if they had any questions about how 
the game was played.  Participants were then asked a series of five questions to assess their 
understanding of the rules using MediaLab (Jarvis, 2008).   
Participants then completed a sample decision task in which it was made clear that their 
performance on the decision task would not affect their actual performance in the competition; 
the sample decision task was simply to teach participants how the competition would be 
structured.  In this sample decision task participants were shown the exact same graphical 
representation of the gambles as they were in the actual decision tasks, however, after the sample 
tasks, participants then played out their gambles to see if they won fake money (Figure 3-4).  The 
payouts to participants were structured so that each participant, regardless of what gambles they 
chose, won a single gamble and lost the other gamble.  This was done in order to remove any 
unintended priming effects of winning during the sample decision task on actual decisions in the 
later, and more important, experimental decision tasks.  
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Figure ‎3-4  Example decision task for Study One 
 
 
After participants completed the sample decision tasks they were stopped and asked if 
they had any questions about the competition, or the procedure, before the actual competition 
began.  Questions were answered by the researcher prior to beginning the ―competition‖ (the 
main part of the study).  First participants answered the two decision tasks (1
st
 Reason, 3
rd
 
Reason).  These two decision tasks were presented in a randomized order to participants.  These 
first two decision tasks were either answered in the binary choice format or the continuous 
preference format depending on the condition to which each participant was randomly assigned.  
Next, participants answered questions on the General Numeracy Scale (Lipkus et al., 2001).  
Questions on the GNS were randomized from their normal order for each participant, and so the 
ordering of questions is not the same as seen in the Appendix A.  Following the GNS, 
participants answered questions from the Domain-Specific Risk Scale (DSRS) (Kruger et al., 
2007).  The DSRS items were also randomized for each participant and did not appear in the 
same order as those in the Appendix B.  Following the DSRS items participants were asked to 
recall their answers to the first two decision tasks.  They were then told that they would be 
answering the same decision tasks again, but in a slightly different format.  Participants were told 
that the necessity of this follow-up was because we, the researchers, wanted to match each 
participant with the gambles he or she absolutely preferred.  Once matched with their preferred 
gambles, they would then be able to, at the end of the round, play the gambles out to (potentially) 
earn fake money.   
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Following their answers to the second instantiation of their original decision tasks, 
participants were asked a series of follow-up questions, including questions on the importance of 
the need level in making their decisions, as well as the importance of the probability of winning, 
potential amount won, and potential amount lost.  Additionally, participants were asked about 
their level of suspiciousness with regard to the authenticity of the competition (Appendix C). 
When participants completed the follow-up questions their computer automatically 
proceeded to a dialogue box notifying them that the experiment was finished and that they 
should notify the researcher present.  At this time the researcher told the participants that the 
competition was not real, and that we (the researchers) used deception in order to get them to 
respond in a certain way.  Participants were all given debriefing forms and asked if they were 
distressed by being lied to.  No participants responded that they were distressed, but the 
researcher made clear that they could use the contact information provided on the debriefing 
form (Appendix D) if they felt distressed, or simply had questions after the experiment.  If 
participants had no further questions, they were thanked for their participation and Study One 
was concluded.    
 Study One Results 
Study One was conducted with the aim of systematically examining one potential 
scenario in which the priority heuristic may not be able to successfully predict individual risky 
choice and preference patterns—environments in which there are predetermined need levels, 
creating motivation for risky preferences (Mishra & Lalumière, 2010; Real & Caraco, 1986; 
Rode et al., 1999; Stephens & Krebs, 1986); the priority heuristic’s model does not explicitly 
take into account resource need levels.  Decision tasks were created and need levels assigned to 
different conditions, resulting in different predictions for risk preference (both binary choice and 
continuous preference) for the priority heuristic and risk-sensitive foraging.  Further, different 
predictions were made for the relationship between numerical literacy and risky-preference as it 
may relate to the priority heuristic.  To test the specific hypotheses made, a series of statistical 
analyses were performed.  These hypotheses and their respective analyses are described in the 
sections that follow. 
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 Preliminary Data Issues 
Before the major analyses were performed a series of preliminary data issues were first 
resolved.  Among these issues were (1) cleaning the decision time data, (2) the use of covariates 
and (3) specific analytic techniques to be used on a variety of data collected in Study One.  These 
issues are addressed in more detail in the following sections. 
 Preliminary Data Cleaning 
Unlike the Likert scale responses for the continuous preference ratings which were 
limited in range from 1 to 6, decision time data was not limited and thus the data were screened 
for outliers by using the z-score method (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  The variables for reaction 
time of the continuous preference ratings tCP and the reaction time for binary choice task, tBC 
were converted to z-scores and sorted according to size.  Any cases with values greater than 
±3.29 were removed from the analyses on decision time.  Because the priority heuristic is within-
participants, each participant had two decision times for each type of decision task (e.g., BC and 
CP), one for each level of Reason Number.  In the case that a participant had only one outlier, 
that person’s data for the remaining decision task was also deleted because it would otherwise 
result in incomplete within-participant data (i.e., data for one level of Reason Number but not for 
another).  Using this method a single data point was deleted from the tBC (z = 6.05) and one 
other was deleted from the tCP (z = 5.30).  In the end, the total sample sizes for the analyses on 
decision times (tBC and tCP) were n = 59 for tBC and n = 59 for tCP. 
 Risk Propensity as a Covariate   
Prior to Study One it was assumed that general risk taking propensity in the individual 
participants may have unintended effects on the dependent variables of interest.  To control for 
the individual differences in risk taking the subscales of the Domain Specific Risk Scale (Kruger 
et al., 2007) were assessed using a Pearson correlation matrix.  The correlations demonstrated the 
relationships between each of the five subscales of the DSRS and the summed continuous 
preference scores, summed binary choice reaction times, and summed continuous preference 
reaction times.  The summed dependent variables were created to demonstrate the correlations 
between the subscales of the DSRTS and risk-proneness and reaction time collapsed across 
Reason Number.   
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Following the guidelines of Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) the correlation matrix was 
examined to look for (1) the relationships between all potential covariates (DSRS subscales), and 
(2) the relationships between the dependent variable and the potential covariates.  As suggested 
by Tabachnick and Fidell, acceptable covariates should not be significantly correlated with other 
covariates entered into a model, but should be significantly correlated with the dependent 
variable.  Highly correlated covariates entered into the same model result in diminished return in 
the form of adjusted dependent variables, while also resulting in decreased degrees of freedom.  
In short, the costs do not outweigh the benefits.   
The correlational analyses demonstrated that there were no statistically significant 
correlations between any of the subscales of the DSRS and any of the continuous dependent 
variables (Table 3-2).  Due to the results of these analyses, it was determined that the use of any 
of the risk subscales as a covariate was not warranted and would potentially remove degrees of 
freedom while not providing an increase in statistical power.   
 
Table ‎3-2  Correlations between potential covariates and dependent variables in Study One 
 
 
It is odd to discover that none of the subscales of the Domain Specific Risk Scale, 
designed to measure individual differences in risk-proneness on a variety of evolutionarily 
important domains, significantly correlated with preferences for risky gambles.  However, 
Mishra and Lalumière (2010) demonstrated that personality differences in risky decision making 
only predicted risky behavior in situations of low need (analogous to a positive energy budget in 
Study One).  Further examination of the data from Study One revealed the same basic trend; 
specifically, between-groups risk propensity was positively correlated with risk preferences (CP 
summed across Reason Number) only when the need was low (i.e., when participants were in a 
positive budget) (see Table 3-3).  No covariates were analyzed in the main analyses due to their 
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lack of an omnibus relationship with any of the dependent variables of interest, and, in the case 
of continuous preference ratings, a violation of the assumption of homogeneity of regression 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  
 
Table ‎3-3  Correlations between Potential Covariates and Dependent Variables for Each 
Level of Budget 
 
 Potential Order Effects 
In Study One there was a potential order effect due to the use of two different measures 
of risk taking.  These measures were the Binary Choice (BC) task and the Continuous Preference 
rating task (CP).  Both of these measures were given to all participants but in a different order.  
The order variable was called Task Order and was divided into two levels (BC 1
st
 and CP 1
st
) 
indicating which of the two measures were administered first, with the other measure coming 
last.  To assess the potential order effects a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Task 
Order as the independent variable was administered for the three different continuous dependent 
variables (CP, tCP, and tBC).  These three different dependent variables were summed across 
Reason Number and the analyses were performed on the summed dependent variables.  A lack of 
order effects in these analyses deemed it unnecessary to use the Task Order variable in the 
primary analyses.  
Results from the one-way ANOVA on Continuous Preference ratings (CP) showed no 
significant order effects for any of the three dependent variables:  CP, F(1, 58) = 0.14, p = .709, 
η2 < .01; tBC, F(1, 57) = 0.59, p = .445, η2 = .01; tCP, F(1, 57) = 1.78, p = .188, η2 = .03.  These 
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results suggested that Task Order did not play a significant role in determining behavioral 
preferences (CP) or the underlying process (tCP and tBC).  Because of these results, Task Order 
was left out of the main analyses. 
 General Data Analytic Procedures 
All analyses utilizing a continuous dependent variable (continuous preference ratings and 
all decision time analyses) were analyzed using a 2 (Budget: Negative and Positive) x 2 (Reason 
Number: 1
st
 Reason and 3
rd
 Reason) mixed-factorial ANOVA with Budget as the between-
participant independent variable and Reason Number as the within-participant independent 
variable.   
In the case of the binary choice dependent variable nonparametric statistical analyses had 
to be performed due to the dichotomous nature of the participants’ responses.  Specifically, to 
assess the effect of Budget on binary choice a sum score was created by adding binary choice 
variables across each of the levels of Reason Number (coded as 0=safe choice, 1=risky choice).  
This resulted in an ordinal dependent variable ranging from 0 to 2 with higher scores indicating 
higher levels of risky choices.  Then, to determine whether negative or positive energy budget 
conditions resulted in higher levels of risky choice a Mann-Whitney U test was performed.  This 
test is the nonparametric equivalent to an independent samples t-test.  To examine the effect for 
Reason Number another nonparametric test, McNemar’s test was used to assess the difference of 
risky choice proportions depending upon which reason number was used in the priority heuristic. 
Assessment of the relationship between risk-proneness and numeracy was analyzed using 
sum-difference regression techniques (Judd, Kenny, McClelland, 2001).  Those analyses are 
described in a later section.  In addition, a primer on sum-difference regression is provided due to 
the novelty of the analytic strategy.  Specific analyses and results are discussed in the sections 
that follow according to the research questions they answer.   
 Preference Ratings and Binary Choices for Risky Gambles 
The primary analysis of concern for Study One was conducted to assess which model 
best explained the data:  the priority heuristic or risk-sensitive foraging.  Although research 
design and data analysis were structured in the fashion of strong inference (Platt, 1964), it was 
always a possibility that risk-sensitive foraging and the priority heuristic would both be partially 
supported.  Indeed, the two variables of interest (Budget and Reason Number) provided four 
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different discrete conditions, each with a specific data pattern predicted by risk-sensitive 
foraging and the priority heuristic.  Prior to data analysis it was highly plausible that there would 
be some interactive effect between the independent variables of interest and preferences and 
choices for risky gambles. 
 Continuous Preference Ratings 
For this analysis, risk-sensitive foraging predicted a main effect for Budget with higher 
risk-preference ratings for gambles in the negative budget condition.  Risk-sensitive foraging 
makes no predictions regarding any main effect for Reason Number or any predictions regarding 
an interaction between Budget and Reason Number.    
Recall that decision tasks were created that would elicit specific response patterns if the 
process hypothesized by the priority heuristic was correct.  From the rationale involved in 
creating the decision tasks, it was thus hypothesized, consistent with the priority heuristic, that 
there should be a main effect for Reason Number with higher risk-preference ratings for gambles 
in the 3
rd
 reason condition.  No main effect for Budget and no Reason Number x Budget 
interaction were predicted by the priority heuristic’s hypothesized process because the heuristic 
does not explicitly take into account such environmental characteristics.   
Statistical analysis of the continuous preference ratings in the two-way mixed-factorial 
analysis of variance yielded a main effect of Budget, F(1, 58) = 9.32, p = .003, partial η2 = .14, 
with participants in the negative energy budget conditions (M = 3.00, SD = 1.71) reporting 
significantly higher levels of preference for the riskier gamble than participants in the positive 
energy budget conditions (M = 2.12, SD = 1.44) (Figure 3-5).  
There was no significant main effect for Reason Number, F(1, 58) = 0.57, p = .455, 
partial η2 = .01.  Participants reported similar continuous preference ratings for both the 1st 
reason decision tasks (M = 2.45, SD = 1.73) and the 3
rd
 reason decision tasks (M = 2.67, SD = 
1.53).  There was no statistically significant interaction in the analysis:  Reason Number x 
Budget, F(1, 58) = 0.27, p = .605, partial η2 = .01, suggesting that there was no moderating 
relationship between the independent variables with respect to continuous preference ratings for 
the gambles in Study One.  
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Figure ‎3-5  The Effects of Budget and Reason Number on Continuous Preference Ratings 
 
 
 Relationship between Binary Choices and Continuous Preference Ratings 
Recall that continuous preference ratings were utilized in Study One due to pilot testing 
and past research which suggested that there may be widespread risk-aversion in the present 
study.  This was potentially problematic for any task involving a binary choice between gambles 
because it was possible that participants would overwhelmingly choose the safer option, 
providing little or no variance with which to test the pressing research questions.  Indeed, data 
from the continuous preference ratings further imply such risk aversion; on a 1 to 6 scale with 6 
indicating an absolute preference for the riskier gamble and 1 an absolute reference for the safer 
gamble, the average continuous preference rating was 2.55 (on the side of the safer gamble).   
Binary choice data were also collected in Study One.  One point of interest is whether or 
not people are consistent with regard to their choices; that is, whether people who choose the 
safer option also provide lower continuous preference ratings indicating risk-aversion, and vice 
versa.  To assess consistency in responding two separate point biserial correlations were 
calculated: one to assess the relationship between continuous preference ratings and binary 
choices for the 1
st
 Reason decision tasks, and one to assess that same relationship with the 3
rd
 
reason decision tasks.   
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Point biserial correlation coefficients are typically suppressed due to the restricted range 
of the dichotomous variable—in this case the binary choice variable (Kemery, Dunlap, & 
Griffeth, 1988).  Nonetheless, the correlation coefficients between binary choices and continuous 
preference ratings in Study One indicated a high level of consistency.  Specifically, for 1
st
 
Reason decision tasks, the relationship was strong and positive between participants’ continuous 
preference ratings and their binary choice decisions, rpb (58) = .40, p = .001.  The same pattern 
was true for 3
rd
 Reason decision tasks, rpb (58) = .46, p < .001.  Collectively these strong 
correlation coefficients suggest that participants who report a higher preference for the riskier 
gamble in the continuous preference rating (indicated by a higher value) will also tend to choose 
the riskier gamble in a binary choice task (riskier gamble coded as 1, safer gamble coded as 0). 
 Binary Choice 
Although it can be argued that continuous preference ratings are a better measure for 
testing the differences in risky choice behavior, there remains some utility in assessing binary 
choice data.  Most choices in nature are binary, all-or-nothing decisions rather than a preference 
on some continuum ranging from one option to another.  However, due to the nature of the data 
(binary) and the experimental design (mixed), different statistical procedures had to be used to 
analyze the data in a way that would produce the same variety of answers as analysis of the 
continuous preference ratings. 
To test for an effect of Budget on discrete, all-or-nothing risky choices, a Mann-Whitney 
U test was performed on the sum of risky choices across Reason Number.  This variable was 
ordinal ranging from 0 to 2 and thus it was inappropriate to use a parametric comparison such as 
a t-test.  However, the Mann-Whitney U test is the nonparametric equivalent of an independent-
samples t-test.  Results from the Mann-Whitney U test showed that participants in the negative 
budget had a higher average rank (34.85) than participants in the positive budget condition 
(26.15), suggesting that, on average, participants in the negative budget condition chose the risky 
gambles more often than participants in the positive budget condition (Figure 3-6).  This 
difference was statistically significant, U = 319.50, p =.030. 
 
 
 
50 
 
Figure ‎3-6  The Effects of Budget on Binary Choice in Study One 
 
To assess the significance of Reason Number in eliciting differential risky choice 
behavior, a McNemar’s test was performed on the within-participants variable.  Results of the 
test showed that the number of risky choices for 3
rd
 Reason problems (n = 16) was not 
statistically greater than the number of risky choices for 1
st
 Reason problems (n = 7), collapsing 
across Budget, χ2 (1, N = 60) = 2.78, p = .093 (Figure 3-7). 
 
Figure ‎3-7  The Effects of Reason Number on Binary Choice in Study One 
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 Decision Time for Preference Ratings and Binary Choices 
Recall that additional predictions were made regarding the priority heuristic in relation to 
the amount of time necessary, on average, to make a decision.  Referring back to Figure 2-1, it is 
clear that the priority heuristic predicts that decisions requiring a larger number of reasons (3
rd
 
reason decision tasks in the present study) should take longer to arrive at a decision than 
decisions requiring a fewer number of reasons (1
st
 reason decision tasks in the present study).  
Because the present study utilized two different methods of choice behavior (continuous 
preference and binary choice) reaction time data were collected for both decision paradigms. 
 Continuous Preference Decision Time  
Results from the analysis of reaction times for the continuous preference ratings showed 
no statistically significant main effect for Budget, F(1, 57) = 0.18, p = .678, partial η2 < .01, 
suggesting that, despite significant differences in actual reported decision tendencies (see 
previous analyses), the participants’ Budgets did not seem to affect their time needed to make a 
decision, with negative budget decisions (M = 16,116.38, SD = 7,149.82) no different than 
positive budget decisions (M = 15,371.07, SD = 8,834.20) (Figure 3-8).   
Of primary concern for this analysis was the prediction made by the priority heuristic that 
1
st
 Reason decision tasks should require significantly less time to arrive at a decision than 3
rd
 
Reason decision tasks.  Data from continuous preference rating decision times did not support 
this prediction, F(1, 57) = 0.81, p = .371, partial η2 = .01.  Specifically, 1st Reason decision tasks 
(M = 16,258.73, SD = 9,375.34) did not take less time to make a decision on than 3
rd
 Reason 
decision tasks (M = 15,216.08, SD = 6,625.93) in Study One when participants were providing 
continuous preference ratings.  Additionally, the interaction between Reason Number and 
Budget, F(1, 57) = 0.08, p = .773, partial η2 < .01, failed to reach statistical significance.  In sum, 
no significant effects were found with respect to decision time for the continuous preference 
ratings (Figure 3-8). 
The lack of a statistically significant main effect for Reason Number on decision time for 
the continuous preference ratings is perplexing.  Using standard Fisherian statistical analysis it is 
not possible to say with any degree of confidence that the null hypothesis is true in these data 
(i.e., that there truly exists no effect of Reason Number on decision time).  However, using 
Bayesian approaches a degree of confidence in the null hypothesis can be calculated from the 
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data.  Statistical techniques described by Rouder, Speckman, Sun, and Morey (2009) were used 
to calculate the JZS Bayes factor for the effect of Reason Number on decision time.  Consistent 
with their methods, the t statistic of 0.90 calculated using a paired-samples t-test was used in 
conjunction with the sample size (N = 60) and a Scale r value of 1 (recommended by Rouder et 
al.)
6
.  The resulting JZS Bayes factor from the analysis was B01 = 6.64.  According to Rouder et 
al., this value can be interpreted as the null hypothesis (i.e., no effect of Reason Number on 
decision time) being 6.64 times more likely than the alternative hypothesis (i.e., Reason number 
has an effect on decision time).  According to Rouder et al., this falls within the categorical range 
of ―some evidence‖ in support of the null hypothesis. 
 
Figure ‎3-8  The Effects of Budget and Reason Number on Continuous Preference Decision 
Time (tCP) 
 
 Binary Choice Decision Time 
Data from the binary choice tasks were analyzed using the same analytic technique as 
decision time data for the continuous preference ratings (tCP).  Consistent with those findings, 
                                                 
6
 The JZS Bayes factors reported in all studies were calculated using the web-based applets found at 
pcl.missouri.edu/bayesfactor 
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there was no statistically significant main effect for Budget, F(1, 57) = 1.11, p = .297, partial η2 
= .02.  Specifically, binary choices took approximately the same amount of time whether the 
participant was in a negative budget (M = 11,447.88, SD = 5,136.10) or a positive budget (M = 
10,416.52, SD = 5,642.97). 
The within-participant main effect of Reason Number was also not statistically 
significant, F(1, 57) = 0.50, p = .482, partial η2 = .01.  The interaction between Reason Number 
and Budget, F(1, 57) = 0.01, p = .919, partial η2 < .01, also failed to reach statistical significance.  
For the priority heuristic, the lack of a main effect for Reason Number is the most troubling since 
the heuristic predicts increases in decision time based on the number of reasons utilized; thus, 3
rd
 
Reason decision tasks should take significantly more time than 1
st
 Reason decision tasks.  
Regarding these data, it was shown that problems which should require only the 1
st
 Reason to 
decide (M = 11,300.29, SD = 5,759.51) did not actually take less time to make a decision than 
problems which should require participants to move to the 3
rd
 Reason (M = 10,581.59, SD = 
5,025.36) (Figure 3-9). 
Because of the null results for decision time with respect to Reason Number, the JZS 
Bayes factor was computed for binary choice decision time as well.  The same methods were 
utilized as described in the previous analysis using JZS Bayes factors.  A paired-samples t-value 
of 0.71, a sample size of N = 60, and a Scale r of 1.0 were used in the analysis.  The JZS Bayes 
factor was computed as B01 = 7.70.  This suggests that the null hypothesis of no effect of Reason 
Number on decision time is 7.70 times more likely as the alternative hypothesis that Reason 
Number does have effect on decision time.  This is consistent with ―some evidence‖ of support 
for the null hypothesis. 
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Figure ‎3-9  The Effects of Budget and Reason Number on Binary Choice Decision Time 
(tBC) 
 
 The Role of Numeracy 
 A Primer on Sum-Difference Regression 
Regression was chosen as the analytic technique to examine the role of numeracy on 
priority heuristic-consistent decision making.  Because numeracy as measured by the General 
Numeracy Scale (Lipkus et al., 2001) is a continuous score ranging from 0 to 11, and it is highly 
negatively skewed, it seemed appropriate to use regression techniques.   
However, because the independent variable of Reason Number in Study One was within-
participants, normal regression techniques used to test for moderating relationships between 
variables (e.g., Baron & Kenny, 1986) could not be used to test the relationship between Reason 
Number and preference for the riskier gambles.  Instead, a sum-difference regression approach 
(Judd, Kenny, & McClelland, 2001; for a brief, but clear description see Giancola, Saucier, & 
Gussler-Burkhardt, 2003, p. 1949) was used to test for moderation in the mixed design (GNS 
score = between-participants, Reason Number = within-participants). 
Sum-difference regression is performed by creating two separate dependent variables, 
one by summing across the two (or more) levels of the within-participant variable, and the other 
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by subtracting scores between the levels of the within-participant variable.  If there are more than 
two levels of the within-participant variable then specific comparisons will need to be made.  
The comparisons can either be planned in advance or an exhaustive list of comparisons can be 
made.  However, in the case of the current study, there were only two levels of the within-
participant variable.  This allowed for the use of only a single difference score to assess the 
within-participant variable of Reason Number.  It is also important to remember the direction of 
the subtraction in interpreting regression coefficients after analysis. 
 When the separate dependent variables are created, separate regression analyses are then 
performed, one for each dependent variable.  In cases where there are only two levels of the 
within-participant independent variable, there will only be two analyses, one for the summed 
dependent variable and one for the differenced dependent variable.  The results and coefficients 
for analyses using the summed dependent variable constitute all between-participant effects and 
fully-between-participant interactions (if there are any).  The differenced dependent variable’s 
results constitute any within-participant interactions with the variables in the output.  For 
instance, regression results when the differenced dependent variable is regressed onto a between-
participant independent variable represent the interaction between the within-participant and 
between-participant independent variables.  This is the test of moderation for sum-difference 
regression.  Additionally, to examine the main effect for the within-participant independent 
variable, one would examine the statistical test for the constant.  If the constant is statistically 
significant it suggests that it is statistically different from zero.  Because the dependent variable 
is a difference score, it means that the difference between within-participant conditions is 
significantly different from zero when other independent variables are set at zero.  The 
summative conclusions drawn from the two regressions constitute the same conclusions that can 
be drawn from a mixed-factorial analysis of variance.  The benefit here is that there is no need to 
break numeracy into artificial discrete groups.   
 Numeracy as a Moderator 
The sum-difference regression technique was used to analyze the potential moderator 
effect of numeracy on the effect between Reason Number and continuous preference ratings for 
gambles.  Numeracy, as assessed by the GNS, was centered by subtracting the mean from each 
score, thus resulting in a new mean of zero.  This technique was chosen over standardizing 
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because it allowed for conclusions drawn from the unstandardized regression coefficients (bs) to 
be interpreted with respect to actual scores on the GNS. 
The summed dependent variable was calculated by adding 1
st
 Reason continuous 
preference ratings to 3
rd
 Reason continuous preference ratings (1
st
 Reason CP + 3
rd
 Reason CP).  
The differenced dependent variable was calculated by subtracting 3
rd
 Reason continuous 
preference ratings from 1
st
 Reason continuous preference ratings (1
st
 Reason CP – 3rd Reason 
CP).  Thus, negative values on the differenced variable reflected a higher preference for the 
riskier gamble in 3
rd
 Reason decision tasks.   
Two simultaneous regression analyses were then performed.  First, the summed 
dependent variable was regressed onto the centered GNS scores.  The differenced dependent 
variable was also regressed onto the centered GNS scores.  Results for the summed dependent 
variable model were not statistically significant [F(1, 58) = 2.95, p = .091, R
2
 = .05].  Numeracy 
was also not a unique predictor of continuous preference ratings summed across Reason Number, 
t(58) = -1.72, p = .091, b = -0.26)
7
.  Results from the differenced dependent variable model were 
also not statistically significant [F(1, 58) = 3.31, p = .074, R
2
 = .05].  The main effect of Reason 
Number, assessed by examining the regression equation’s constant, was not significantly 
different from zero, t(58) = -0.77, p = .444, b = -0.22.  The b can be interpreted as there being 
only a 0.22 difference between the mean continuous preference ratings for 1
st
 Reason and 3
rd
 
Reason problems, with 3
rd
 Reason problems having slightly higher ratings for the riskier gamble, 
although this difference is not statistically significant.   
Of most importance is the role of numeracy as a potential moderator.  Results from the 
difference scores regressed onto numeracy would reflect whether the difference between 
continuous preference ratings for 1
st
 and 3
rd
 Reason problems (reflected in the dependent 
variable) depends on a person’s numeracy level.  The Peters and Levin (2008) hypothesis about 
processing differences being reflected through numeracy would be supported by results 
                                                 
7
 Regression coefficients displayed in the sum-difference regression results, and discussed in later sections are 
unstandardized bs.  These weights were chosen over standardized versions for two reasons: (1) the main effect for 
Reason Number is interpreted through the constant in the regression equation, and the constant only has an 
unstandardized b.  (2) Interpretation of unstandardized bs is more intuitive, especially when comparisons are not 
made across different variables with different scales.  In those cases it is more appropriate, and easier to use 
standardized rather than unstandardized bs.  
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indicating that numeracy was a strong, unique predictor of difference scores on continuous 
preference ratings.  Further, the estimates of this relationship would need to be negative (i.e., 
negative beta weights), showing that higher numerates have a tendency to prefer the riskier 
gamble in 3
rd
 Reason decision tasks, but the safer gamble in the 1
st
 Reason decision tasks.  
However, this relationship was not statistically significant, suggesting that the interactive 
relationship is not a unique predictor of continuous preference ratings, t(58) = -1.82, p = .074, b 
= -.25.   
Using the parameters from the simultaneous regressions for continuous preference scores 
for each separate Reason Number, the effect of numeracy on the relationship between Reason 
Number and CP can be plotted.  Data were plotted along numeracy by creating high and low 
numeracy groups (Figure 3-10).  These groups were created by using one standard deviation 
above and below the mean (SD = 2.04).  The slopes were determined performing separate 
regressions, one for each of the two different Reason Numbers.  The numeracy-risky preference 
relationship was negative for 1
st
 Reason problems (b = -.26) and almost zero for 3
rd
 Reason 
problems (b = -.003). 
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Figure ‎3-10  The Effect of Numeracy on the Relationship between Reason Number and 
Continuous Preference Ratings in Study One 
 
 Study One Discussion 
Study One was conducted to examine if the priority heuristic (Brandstätter et al., 2006) 
could predict participants’ behaviors regarding risky choice when novel environmental variables 
were introduced.  These novel variables were the amounts of money necessary to move to a 
potential next round.  Risk-sensitive foraging (Stephens & Krebs, 1986) predicts that participants 
should be sensitive to necessary amounts, and therefore be risk-prone when only riskier options 
provide a chance of reaching a specified need level.  Although the theory’s background is in non-
human animal research, with need levels most often conceptualized as caloric intake needed to 
survive, psychological research has also shown people to be sensitive to need levels for gaining 
monetary rewards (Mishra & Lalumière, 2011; Rode et al., 1999).  By designing decision tasks 
with certain features Study One was able to systematically examine if the priority heuristic could 
work well, regardless of a participant’s need level.  Additionally, individual differences in 
numerical literacy were examined in order to determine whether the priority heuristic may be a 
more accurate model of risky decision making in high numerates. 
 Can the priority heuristic handle need levels? 
 In short, it appears the answer is no, at least not very well.  Participants consistently 
preferred the riskier gamble more than the safer gamble when participants were in a negative 
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energy budget, that is, when only the riskier gamble offered a chance of reaching the need level.  
This was true regardless of Reason Number for the priority heuristic, and was consistent with the 
predictions of risk-sensitive foraging.  Decision tasks were designed so that 1
st
 Reason decision 
tasks should result in risk-aversion, and 3
rd
 Reason tasks in risk-proneness, if indeed the priority 
heuristic is an adequate as-if model of the human decision process.  Data did not support the 
priority heuristic’s predictions.  Participants were not significantly more likely to choose the 
riskier option, or have a higher preference for it, in 3
rd
 Reason decision compared to 1
st
 Reason 
decision tasks.   
Perhaps even more compelling evidence is provided by decision times for participants in 
the different conditions of Study One.  The priority heuristic predicts increases in decision time 
when decision tasks require an increased number of reasons to reach a conclusive decision.  This 
prediction was supported by Brandstätter et al. (2006).  However, data from Study One did not 
support the prediction and found results inconsistent with those of Brandstätter et al.  There were 
in fact no significant differences in decision time based on different levels of the independent 
variables; even Budget, which did have an effect on risky preference ratings, did not appear to 
have an effect on decision time.   
Results from Study One suggest that, although the priority heuristic has been shown to be 
a viable heuristic for predicting majority choice in a large set of decision problems (Brandstätter 
et al., 2006) it does not appear to supersede risk-sensitive foraging in terms of predictions about 
preferences for riskier or safer gambles.   In fact, the pattern of data does not require any 
integration of the priority heuristic and can be explained entirely in terms of the risk-sensitive 
foraging framework. 
 Are high numerates’ decisions more consistent with the priority heuristic? 
In short, it depends.  Following the conclusions from Peters and Levin (2008) it was 
hypothesized that there may be a relationship between numeracy and decisions consistent with 
the priority heuristic.  The priority heuristic appears to assume some basic level of numerical 
processing on the part of the individual, and Brandstätter et al. (2006, p. 425) mention that a 
weakness of their heuristic is a lack of accountability for individual differences (e.g., numeracy).   
Following the logic of the findings from Peters and Levin (2008) and the process model 
from the priority heuristic, it was hypothesized that highly numerate participants, more so than 
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low numerates, would prefer gambles consistent with the predictions of the priority heuristic: (1) 
low preferences for 1
st
 Reason decision tasks, and (2) high risky preferences for 3
rd
 Reason 
decision tasks.  Ideally this would have statistically been revealed by way of a statistically 
significant interaction between Reason Number and numerical literacy score.  This was not the 
case.  However, there was a negative relationship between numeracy and preference for the 
riskier gamble on 1
st
 Reason decision tasks, consistent with what was expected.  There was 
however almost no statistical relationship (e.g., b = 0) between numeracy and preference for the 
riskier gamble on 3
rd
 Reason decision tasks when there should have been a significant positive 
relationship. 
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Chapter 4 - Study Two 
The results of Study One offered support for a general theory of risk-sensitivity 
associated with risk-sensitive foraging theory, at the expense of predictions made by the priority 
heuristic.  These conclusions held for binary choice, preference ratings, and decision time 
measurements.  In essence, the previous results provided empirical evidence in support of a 
superordinate role of risk-sensitive foraging mechanisms over simple lexicographic heuristics.  
In light of this evidence, the purpose of Study Two was to examine how the priority heuristic 
would perform in other environments which have, up to this point, been explained from the 
perspective of biological theories of risky behavior in the context of intrasexual competition; 
Study Two sought to examine how well the priority heuristic would perform against dominance 
theory.  
Despite the observation that the priority heuristic does not seem to perform well in 
environments containing need levels, this evidence does not preclude the possibility that the 
heuristic will work well in other ecologically valid environments experienced by human and 
non-human organisms.  One characteristic of such an environment is the relative status of 
individual organisms competing for resources, when the status of the individual is related to how 
it will perform during the competition in question.  Ermer et al. (2008) term rational behavior in 
such contexts dominance theory and base it on work from behavioral biology research examining 
competitive behavior.  Often this competitive behavior escalates in the amount of risk taking, 
with participants competing against one another moving in a sequential step-by-step process in 
which they evaluate one another; if they are similar on a given trait then they proceed to the next 
step in competition which is often riskier (Maynard Smith, 1974; Maynard Smith & Price, 1973).  
This incremental process of competition results in escalated risk taking when both participants 
are relatively close in status, but lowered risk taking when there is a discrepancy between status 
levels of the two competing individuals (usually males for theoretical reasons; see Wilson & 
Daly, 1985). 
As with the premises in Study One, the priority heuristic is created in the tradition of fast-
and-frugal, ecologically rational heuristics.  This should mean that the heuristic has a very 
specific ―ecology‖ in which it will predict both the decision process (i.e., decision time; tBC and 
tCP) and the outcome of that process (i.e., the choice behavior; CP and BC).  As with all 
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ecologically rational heuristics, the primary scientific goal is to systematically determine when 
and where they work best.  Study Two represents another sequential step in the process of fine 
tuning and narrowing down on the proper ecology of the priority heuristic.  It has already been 
empirically shown that dominance theory can predict choice behavior in certain experimental 
(Ermer et al., 2008; Rosati & Hare, 2012) and ―real-world‖ scenarios (Stulp et al., 2012); 
however, it has not been determined whether the priority heuristic can also predict choice 
behavior in similar situations, where individuals are competing against same-sex others who are 
perceived as being higher, lower, or equal in status to the individual making the decision.  If the 
priority heuristic is capable of predicting risky choice behavior in situations of same-sex 
competition, it offers not only a new environment in which the priority heuristic may explain 
behavior but it also offers previously tested scenarios (e.g., Ermer et al.) an adequate process 
model describing the choice behavior (i.e., the priority heuristic). 
   Hypotheses 
As with Study One the different models of decisions under risk assessed in Study Two 
also make specific predictions regarding which gambles to choose (the riskier or safer).  Also, as 
with Study One, the predictions made by the priority heuristic are embodied within the 
hypothesized heuristic.  Despite data from Study One suggesting that the priority heuristic’s 
model may not hold in situations of resource need levels, the model’s viability has not been 
tested in situations of competition between same sex individuals varying in levels of perceived 
status.  In conclusion, the hypotheses offered here are justified. 
 The Priority Heuristic 
The priority heuristic’s predictions are embodied within the hypothesized process model 
shown in Figure 2-1.  This standard lexicographic order described by Brändstatter et al. (2006) is 
depicted in Figure 2-1 which shows that people should, if the process is correctly described, 
attend to the minimum gains, probability of minimum gains, maximum gains, and probability of 
maximum gains, and in that specific order.  If the priority heuristic is an accurate descriptive 
model of choice behavior then participants should follow the model.  Specifically, like Study 
One, participants should prefer the riskier option in 3
rd
 Reason tasks and prefer the safer option 
in 1
st
 Reason tasks (Figure 4-1).  An additional prediction is made, much like Study One, that 
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decision time should increase as the number of reasons examined increases (i.e., as participants 
fail to stop search at each reason in the priority heuristic’s model).   
 
Figure ‎4-1  Priority Heuristic Predictions for Preferences in Study Two 
 
 Dominance Theory 
Consistent with the psychological formulation of dominance theory by Ermer et al. 
(2008), the theory should predict that, when competing against others of the same sex over 
resources, participants should be more risk-prone when their competitor is perceived as being 
close to the same status.  However, participants should be risk-averse when competing against 
same-sex others perceived as being higher or lower in status than themselves (Figure 4-2).   
An additional hypothesis regarding dominance theory that was supported by Ermer et al. is the 
prediction that the motivation to take risks when competing against same-sex individuals of a 
similar status is sex-specific.  That is, the effect should be limited to male participants. 
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Figure ‎4-2  Dominance Theory Predictions for Preferences in Study Two 
 
 Moderating Effect of Numeracy 
As with Study One’s hypotheses regarding the relationship between numerical literacy 
and evaluating gambles, the same predictions are made in Study Two.  Specifically, it is 
hypothesized that high numerates’ decision patterns should be more consistent with process 
models that assume some level of numerical processing.  For instance, because the priority 
heuristic assumes that individuals may implicitly be computing proportions for a specific 
aspiration level, it follows that high numerates—who are by definition better at such 
calculations—may be more likely to follow such a decision process more accurately than their 
lower numerate counterparts.  This hypothesis is based on findings by Peters and Levin (2008) 
which suggested that high numerates base their choices, when deciding between two options, on 
the outcomes and their respective probabilities, whereas lower numerates base their decisions 
more on ―unimportant‖ contextual factors (e.g., the frame of the decision).   
In sum, high numerates should behave more consistently with the priority heuristic than 
lower numerates (see Figure 3-3).  Because dominance theory does not assume any implicit 
calculations there are no specific predictions made about the relationship between numerical 
literacy and behavior consistent with dominance theory’s predictions in Study Two.  
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 Study Two Method 
 Participants 
Data for Study Two were collected from 120 undergraduate students enrolled in an 
introductory psychology course at Kansas State University.  Of these 120 students, exactly half 
were male and half were female (i.e., n = 60 each).  This was a calculated decision on the part of 
the researcher, and was made due to the theoretical importance of gender in some predictions 
made by dominance theory. 
The average age of participants was consistent with typical undergraduate research 
samples drawn from introductory psychology courses (M = 19.11, SD = 2.15).  Also, although 
of no theoretical importance to the study, ethnicity of participants was consistent with 
demographics in this region of the United States (Caucasian: n = 92; African-American: n = 12; 
Asian: n = 6; Hispanic: n = 8).  Two of the participants identified their ethnicity as ―Other.‖ 
 Design 
Consistent with Study One, decision problems in Study Two were framed in terms of 
gains rather than losses.  The same two-measure protocol of assessing risky choice behavior was 
also used in Study Two.   Specifically, the binary choice paradigm (BC) and the continuous 
preference paradigm (CP) were both used to assess risk preferences. 
The design of Study Two included the two dependent variables (BC and CP) as well as 
five independent variables.  Two of the independent variables were implemented to assess 
potential order effects.  These independent variables were Status Order and Task Order.  Task 
Order, just as in Study One, was a between-participants independent variable used to examine if 
there were systematic differences in risk preference based on whether a participant answered the 
BC or CP dependent measure first or second.  Status Order was implemented for Study Two 
because of the within-participant nature of the Competitor Status independent variable.  
Participants sequentially competed against three separate fictitious students from other 
universities who varied in status.  This created a potential issue of order effects based on the 
order in which each participant competed against the fictitious students from other universities.  
For example, it is possible, although not predicted, that competing against a lower status 
individual may result in different risk preferences depending on whether the previous 
competition was with a person of higher, or lower status.  The Status Order independent variable 
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consisted of three levels which described the order by which each participant would encounter 
each of the fictitious competitors.  These levels were: (1) LowerEqualHigher (LEH), (2) 
EqualHigherLower (EHL), and (3) HigherLowerEqual (HLE). 
The remaining three independent variables are of theoretical importance.  These 
independent variables are Gender, Reason Number, and Competitor Status.  Gender (by 
definition) and Reason Number (by design) were both between-participant independent 
variables.  Reason Number (1
st
 Reason and 3
rd
 Reason) as an independent variable was 
implemented by creating one decision task that would result in stopping search at the 1
st
 Reason 
and choosing the safer gamble.  The 3
rd
 Reason condition was created with characteristics that 
would result in search stopping only after the 3
rd
 Reason and then choosing the riskier gamble.  
Both decision tasks were created and assigned to their respective conditions based on the 
decision process outlined in the priority heuristic.  More detail is offered in the Materials section 
regarding the construction of these decision tasks. 
The last independent variable of theoretical interest was Competitor Status.  Specifically, 
Competitor Status was a within-participant independent variable consisting of three levels 
(Lower, Equal, and Higher), with each denoting the relative status of the fictional student 
competitor in comparison to the participant.  For example, the Lower status indicates that the 
fictional student is ―lower‖ in status than participant.  To manipulate the status level of different 
fictional students, each student was said to attend a specific school, with the different schools 
being of varying relative rank when compared to Kansas State University.  More detail regarding 
the pilot-testing phase for determining schools and their status levels is discussed in the Materials 
section to follow.  
 Materials 
Study Two also used novel decision tasks—different from those in Study One.  The 
decision tasks were similar to those in Study One in terms of the types of features but differed in 
terms of specific probabilities and payoffs.  One major difference between the decision tasks in 
Study One and those in Study Two is that the latter decision tasks did not contain a need level as 
part of their structure.  This is because Study Two was not interested in examining the effect of 
need levels on risk taking since it had already been examined in Study One. 
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In addition to the decision tasks, participants were asked to complete the General 
Numeracy Scale (Lipkus et al., 2001), and the Domain Specific Risk Scale (Kruger et al., 2007).  
One additional component of Study Two was the use of status priming—material which was read 
by all participants that has been shown to elicit status-related motives (e.g., Griskevicius et al., 
2009; Griskevicius, Tyber, & Van den Bergh, 2010).   
 Decision Tasks 
Two different decision tasks were created for Study Two.  These decision tasks were 
created such that one decision task had properties that, if they followed the priority heuristic, a 
person would stop search at the first reason and would choose the safer gamble.  The other 
decision task was created such that, if the priority heuristic was used, people should only stop 
search at the third reason and should choose the riskier gamble
8
.  Additionally, these two 
decision tasks were crossed with the Competitor Status variable (i.e., the status of the person 
with whom they were competing).  This resulted in six different decision tasks, although, for the 
sake of simplification when displaying the variables of theoretical interest, Table 4-1 shows two 
decision tasks, with Reason Number as a between-participant variable and Competitor Status as a 
within-participant variable.   
 
                                                 
8
 In the standard lexicographic order of the priority heuristic Bramdstätter et al. (2006) suggest that gambles’ 
minimum gains should first be compared (i.e., the 1
st
 Reason).  Decision task number 1 in Table 4-1 is designed so 
that the difference between the minimum gains is higher than a threshold (i.e., losing $25 and losing $100 is a 
difference of $75; that difference is greater than 1/10 of the maximum possible winnings of $600).  Thus, search 
should stop and the participant should choose the gamble with the highest minimum earnings (i.e, the safer gamble).  
For decision task number 2, Reasons 1 and 2 do not meet the threshold for stopping, thus search stops at the 3
rd
 
Reason, which is maximum gains.  Thus, participants should choose the gamble with the highest maximum gain 
(i.e., the riskier gamble).  
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Table ‎4-1  Decision Task Characteristics for Study Two 
Decision Task Reason Competitor Status (Earnings) Safer Riskier Safer Riskier
Lower ($100)
Equal ($275)
Higher ($350)
Lower ($145)
Equal ($320)
Higher ($335)
Note. This table displays the characteristics for the two main independent variables of interest (Competitor 
Status and Reason Number).  For the design of Study Two these variables were additionally crossed with 
order controls and participant gender.
$400 (.75)$350 (.80)$50$302 3rd
1 $25 $100 $300 (.95) $600 (.60)
Winnings (Probabilities)Buy-in Amounts
1st
 
 The General Numeracy Scale 
The General Numeracy Scale (Lipkus et al., 2001) (Appendix A) was also used in Study 
Two, just as it was in Study One, to assess any potential moderator effects with priority heuristic-
consistent risky choice decisions. 
 Domain Specific Risk Scale 
The Domain Specific Risk Scale (Kruger et al., 2007) (see Appendix B) was used in 
Study Two to measure individual differences in risk taking propensity in five different 
evolutionarily relevant domains.  The primary reason for assessing risk taking propensity was to 
treat it as a covariate in the primary analyses of Study Two’s data. 
 Status Manipulation 
The status manipulation was very important for the theoretical interpretation of results 
from Study Two.  In order to systematically test whether participants adhered to principles 
outlined in dominance theory—risk aversion against lower and higher status, risk proneness 
against equal status—we had to accurately put each student against competitors which he or she 
believed were lower, equal, and higher in status.  Ermer et al. (2008) performed pilot testing on 
their participant pool’s impressions of the status of different universities (and their students) to 
determine which universities to use and assign to specific status levels.  A similar process was 
used for Study Two to determine universities of varying status.   
As part of an independent pilot sample, a total of 39 participants (17 females, 22 males) 
were given a series of questionnaires (see Appendix E) containing free response items regarding 
attitudes toward 30 different universities of varying size, and their respective students.  These 
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universities ranged from top tier private universities (e.g., Princeton University), to research 
intensive public universities (e.g., Ohio State University), to regional, public universities (e.g., 
Georgia Southern University). 
The universities were evaluated on (1) how much better or worse participants believed 
students from a given university were, compared to the average student from Kansas State 
University
9, (2) each participant’s familiarity with a given university, and (3) how intimidated 
each participant would be by a student from each university.  
Results from this pilot study to determine status manipulations in the form of universities 
revealed that Kansas State University students were most intimidated by students from Harvard 
University (M = 6.26, SD = 1.14), as indicated by a rank ordering of values.  The lowest ranking 
university in terms of intimidation was Emporia State University (M = 2.33, SD = 1.20).  The 
middle two universities (rankings of 15 and 16) were Oregon State University (M = 3.15, SD = 
1.25) and Idaho State University (M = 3.08, SD = 1.20).  Ultimately, Oregon State University 
was chosen as the equal status university because it was more familiar (2.77 for Oregon State 
compared to 2.23 for Idaho State) and because it was rated as closer to the midpoint of the scale 
(i.e., 4 on the 7 point scale).   Thus, the status manipulation was decided to be Harvard 
University, Oregon State University and Emporia State University for the Higher, Equal, and 
Lower Status universities, respectively. 
In addition to choosing specific universities for different status levels, each university—
and it’s fictional student was paired with an ACT score representing the relative status of the 
average student at that particular university.  To find accurate ACT scores for students at each 
university, the scores were taken from www.ed.gov.  This site contained the average ACT score 
for the bottom 25
th
 percentile and top 75
th
 percentile of enrolling freshmen.  The middle score 
between these two figures was taken as the ACT score for the fictional student from each 
university.  This resulted in the fictional Harvard University student having an ACT score of 33, 
                                                 
9
 Although data were collected asking participants to rank the average student from each university relative to the 
average student from Kansas State University, these data were not used because of what appeared to be a regional 
bias in reporting.  Specifically, the University of Kansas—an athletic rival of Kansas State University—received the 
lowest scores on this item indicating that participants viewed KU students as the most inferior students relative to 
KSU students, on the list of all possible universities.  This was problematic due to the observation that KU received 
much different scores on other items, such as the intimidation item. 
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the fictional Oregon State University student received a 24, and the fictional Emporia State 
University student received a 22 ACT score.  Conveniently, these scores were consistent with the 
perceived status of average students from these universities by those Kansas State University 
students we used in pilot testing of university status.        
 Status Priming Vignette 
In order to get participants to think about status during the experiment when viewing 
different decision tasks against different students from the universities previously mentioned, we 
used a status priming technique common in the social evolutionary psychology literature (e.g., 
Griskevicius et al., 2009; Griskevicius, Tyber, & Van den Bergh, 2010).  The specific vignette 
used for Study Two was adapted from the ―competition‖ condition used by Griskevicius et al. 
(2009) (Experiment 1).  This vignette (see Appendix F), including the directions, consisted of 
376 words.  The vignette asked each participant to imagine being in a situation where they are 
hired at a new, high-status job.  The participant then is asked to read that the boss invites all three 
new hires into his office and says that only one of the three will be promoted to a fast-track 
position with a corner office, and that one of the two remaining will be fired.  Participants are 
asked to imagine feeling the emotions they would feel if they were in a similar situation as the 
one provided in the vignette.  Griskevicius et al. (2009) used this status manipulation to attempt 
to elicit intrasexual direct aggression (e.g., violent acts toward a same-sex individual), and they 
succeeded in doing so, showing that the competition priming story—referred to here as status 
priming—induced status-related motives in participants. 
 Study Two Procedure 
Participants were brought to the lab and tested in groups ranging from 1 to 8.  Just as in 
Study One, participants in Study Two were told that the research was actually a gambling 
competition.  The researcher, who wore professional clothing and a white lab coat with a clip 
board, notified participants that the researchers who were organizing the gambling competition 
were collaborating with other scientists at three different universities.  These three universities 
were, of course, the three universities varying in status (i.e., Harvard University, Oregon State 
University, and Emporia State University).  The researcher then explained to the participants that 
they would be competing against same sex students from the three different affiliated universities 
in three separate one-on-one gambling competitions, and that the student—the KSU student or 
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the student from the other university—who earned the most fake money in the gambling 
competitions, would effectively win.  Participants were asked if they understood the gist of the 
competition, and were told that more detailed instructions would be provided prior to playing the 
competition.  Questions were answered prior to asking for informed consent.  
Participants were instructed to click ―OK‖ on the opening screen in MediaLab (Jarvis, 
2008).  Upon clicking ―OK‖ participants first were presented with a ―welcome‖ screen with the 
text ―Welcome to the Decisions about Money Competition.‖  Below this greeting were the logos 
of the four ―participating‖ universities.  This portion of the study was designed and implemented 
using PowerPoint slideshows, so at the end of the welcome screen the slideshow automatically 
proceeded to the informed consent screen. 
Participants were next directed to individual folders containing paper copies of the 
informed consent sheets.  The informed consent sheets were inside these folders, while, on the 
outside, there was text with ―Decisions about Money Competition‖ in bold type.  Also, below the 
title, were the four university logos for the universities ―participating‖ in the competition.  The 
logos and their arrangement were identical to those used for the welcome screen in MediaLab. 
Participants were told that, although they were participating in a competition, it was still 
technically research, and the researchers were required to provide them with enough information 
so that they, the participants, could make an informed decision regarding whether they wanted to 
compete in the inter-university gambling competition. 
After participants signed the informed consent forms the researcher directed them to 
begin the rules section of the competition.  Similar to Study One, the rules section of the 
experiment was set up on a PowerPoint slideshow.  This allowed participants to move through 
the rules of the competition one bullet point at a time, and at their own pace.  During the rules 
section participants learned that they were playing against three randomly chosen students of the 
same sex, one from each of the different universities participating in the inter-university 
competition.  Participants were shown that the competitions were completely independent, 
―similar to running three separate races.‖  Participants read that at the end of their third decision 
task against the third student, which would constitute the end of a round.   To introduce 
uncertainty regarding the decision tasks, participants read that there would be either one or two 
rounds, but that the number of rounds would be randomly chosen by the computer.  It was 
stressed that the individual with whom they were competing in the decision tasks was allowed 
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the same number of rounds, and that there would not be an unfair advantage in favor of the 
competitors from other universities. 
Participants were then told that, similar to what they were currently doing, students from 
the other universities involved in the competition had, in the weeks prior, come into labs at their 
respective universities and participated in the gambling competition.  However, students at those 
universities simply chose which gambles they preferred and then played out the gambles at the 
end, resulting in some accumulated amount of fake money.  Participants were told that we the 
researchers at Kansas State University had taken the data from their participation and put all of it 
onto the computers at which they the KSU students were currently sitting.  The participants were 
told that the primary purpose of the computers was to randomly select a same sex student from 
each university for them to compete against in the competition.  Importantly, participants were 
shown a graph illustrating ―empirical‖ relationship between ACT score and typical performance 
on the gambling competition in which they were about to participate.  This was used to establish 
in the minds of the participants a relationship between ACT score and affiliated university, and 
performance in the gambling competition.  After finishing the rules section PowerPoint 
slideshow participants were asked a series of five questions to determine whether or not they 
understood the basic rules of the competition.  This was used to determine if participants were 
attentive to the study.   
After answering questions about the rules of the competition participants were presented 
with the demographic questions.  Participants reported their age, ethnicity, and their ACT score. 
Next, participants read the status priming vignette (Griskevicius et al., 2009) (Appendix F).  This 
vignette was displayed on two separate screens within MediaLab.  The first screen contained the 
main component of the story used by Griskevicius et al.  Once participants had finished reading 
the vignette they were asked to click ―Continue‖ and move to the next screen.  This next screen 
(Appendix F) asked participants to select which of the different strategies they would employ in 
an effort to obtain the job promotion referenced in the status priming vignette.  This additional 
component, although not used by Griskevicius et al., was used in Study Two in order to further 
engage participants in thinking about status motives.  Thus, to this point in the study, participants 
(a) were aware that they were competing against students from different universities which they 
(according to pilot testing) viewed as having students who varied on levels of intimidation, (b) 
were aware that ACT score was related to performance in the gambling competition, and (c) 
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were primed to think about status motives using priming material which has been successfully 
used in a variety of situations (e.g., Griskevicius et al., 2009; Griskevicius, Tyber, & Van den 
Bergh, 2010). 
Participants then completed one sample decision task.  It was stressed that this decision 
task was simply for teaching purposes and did not count toward the actual competition.  In this 
sample competition, participants were allowed to become familiar with the structure of the 
decision tasks as well as the look of them (Figure 4-3).  Participants were asked to look over the 
gamble options and make a choice.  After making a choice, participants then proceeded to a 
screen in which they played out the gambles they had selected.  This consisted of participants 
being reminded of the gamble they had chosen, and being re-informed of the probabilities and 
payoff potential of the gamble.  Participants played out the gamble by clicking a small button 
located in the middle of the screen.  This virtual slot machine button was designed so that every 
participant, regardless of their choice of gamble during the sample task, ended up winning.  This 
was done in order to remove any unintended effects during the actual competition due to winning 
or losing in the sample decision task.  
 
Figure ‎4-3  Example decision task for Study Two 
 
 
     After participants completed the sample decision task, they were then stopped and 
asked if they had any questions about the procedure or gambling competition before the actual 
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competition began.  If there were questions, the researcher promptly and clearly answered them 
to the best of his or her ability. 
The main part of the study began with participants immediately beginning the 
competition portion.  Participants were shown the decision task (for example Figure 4-3) and 
were asked to either choose which gamble they preferred (Binary Choice) (BC) or to provide a 
rating on a scale from 1 to 6 (Continuous Preference) (CP).  The specific dependent measure 
used first was counterbalanced such that half of the participants answered decision tasks in the 
BC format first and the CP format at the end of the study, whereas the other half answered in the 
CP format first and the BC format at the end of the study.  During this first competition portion, 
participants competed in three sequential decision tasks, each against a different fictional same-
sex student from one of the three ―participating‖ universities.  The specific gamble’s properties 
remained the same across the three different one-on-one competitions because Reason Number 
(the priority heuristic) was a between-participant independent variable.  However, the 
Competitor Status (dominance theory) was within-participant, and each participant competed 
against every level of status (i.e., the different students from Harvard, Oregon State, and Emporia 
State).   Going back to the Design section of Study Two, recall that the ordering of different 
status competitors in the within-participant design was treated as an order variable:  Status Order.  
This was added in order to look for potential order effects and will be discussed in the Results 
section of Study Two.   Because there were two dependent variables (BC and CP), and thus two 
opportunities for Status Order to play a role, the Status Order variable remained constant across 
each individual’s experience.  For example, if the participant competed against fictional students 
in the order of LowerEqualHigher for the BC portion of the experiment then that same order 
was used for the CP portion of the experiment. 
After participants finished the first group of decision tasks they then answered a series of 
individual difference measures.  These measures were implemented in MediaLab from their 
paper and pencil versions, and the ordering of the questions was randomized for each participant.  
Thus, the specific order of questions presented in Appendices A and B is not what each 
participant consistently viewed.  First, participants answered the 11-item General Numeracy 
Scale (GNS) (Lipkus et al., 2001).  After completing this measure, participants then completed 
the 15-item Domain Specific Risk Scale (DSRS) (Kruger et al., 2007).  
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After participants completed the DSRS they were reminded of the decision tasks they 
completed at the beginning of the competition.  They were then told that they were going to 
answer the same exact decision tasks as before, just in a slightly different way.  This second 
answering of the decision tasks constituted the second dependent variable (either the BC or CP 
task depending on each participant’s condition).  This was justified to participants by telling 
them that we, the researchers, wanted to make certain that we matched them with the gambles 
they absolutely preferred so that they could play those out at the end of the competition.   
When participants finished this second group of decision tasks they were asked a series of 
follow-up questions (Appendix G).  After answering these follow-up questions the experimental 
software provided a message to each participant that he or she should notify the experimenter 
that they had completed the study.  When all participants had finished the study, the researcher 
told all participants as a group that there was no real competition, and that deception was used in 
order to get participants to respond in a certain way to the decision tasks.  Participants were 
asked if they were distressed by being deceived.  Although none of the participants responded as 
being distressed, they were encouraged to contact the researchers if they became distressed later 
on after leaving the study.  Contact information, as well as a description of the research goals, 
was provided on the debriefing form (Appendix D) which was provided to each participant upon 
completing the study.  Participants were thanked for their participation and Study Two was 
concluded. 
 Study Two Results 
The goal of Study Two was to systematically test an additional ecology in which the 
priority heuristic may not successfully predict individual risky choices and preferences:  
ecologies in which the decision maker is primed to compete against same-sex others of varying 
levels of perceived status (Ermer et al., 2008; Maynard Smith, 1974; Maynard Smith & Price, 
1973; Stulp et al., 2012; Rosati & Hare, 2012); the priority heuristic does not contain an explicit 
step which takes into account status levels of others with whom one is competing.  For Study 
Two, decision tasks were created in such a way that different patterns of predictions could be 
forecast depending on the ability of either dominance theory or the priority heuristic to explain 
data in our experimental paradigm (similar to the paradigm used in Study One).  In addition, 
predictions were made for the relationship between numerical literacy and risky-preference as it 
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may relate to the priority heuristic, just as in Study One.  To test the many specific hypotheses, a 
host of statistical analyses were performed, each of which are described in the sections that 
follow. 
 Preliminary Data Issues  
Prior to the main data analyses for Study Two, covariates were tested for their potential 
use in removing theoretically unimportant explained variance.  These covariates were the five 
subscales of the DSRS (Kruger et al., 2007) and the self-reported ACT composite score of each 
participant.  ACT composite score was analyzed as a potential covariate because of the nature of 
the status priming; participants with higher ACT score may not feel as intimidated by the 
Harvard University student operationally defined as the higher-status student competitor.  
Additionally, a plan was made for specific types of data analysis in answering the primary 
theoretical questions of Study Two.  These issues are further discussed in the sections that 
follow.  
 Preliminary Data Cleaning 
Decision time data were screened for outliers using the z-score method described by 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), and also used in Study One.  Decision time variables (tBC and 
tCP) were first standardized to z-scores in SPSS.  Next, cases with values greater than ±3.29 
were removed from all subsequent analyses.  Because of the within-participant independent 
variable of Competitor Status, participants each had three decision times for each of the two 
decision task formats (CP and BC).  Because of this, in the event that a single outlier was 
discovered for one level of Competitor Status, cases for the other two levels of Competitor Status 
were also removed so there would not be incomplete within-participant data for the Competitor 
Status independent variable.  
By using the z-score method (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) a total of six data points were 
deleted from the tBC (zs: 7.36, 7.27, 5.68, 3.50, 3.47, 3.40), and three other data points were 
deleted from the tCP (zs: 10.64, 4.39, 4.03).  None of the data points deemed to be statistical 
outliers belonged to the same individual, thus the total sample sizes for the analyses using 
decision time data were n = 114 for tBC and n = 117 for tCP. 
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 Risk Propensity and ACT Composite Score as Covariates 
Although Study One’s analyses did not use risk propensity in the form of the DSRS 
subscales (Kruger et al., 2007) as covariates due to a lack of the appropriate relationships 
between them and the dependent variables, that lack of relationship did not preclude the 
existence of a relationship for Study Two.  For Study Two it was again assumed that risk taking 
propensity, as measured by the DSRS, in participants may have theoretically unimportant effects 
on the dependent variables of interest.  Additionally, ACT composite score was thought to be a 
potential covariate for Study Two because of the way that status was framed and manipulated in 
the experimental procedure.  For instance, it was plausible that individuals with high ACT 
composite scores may view students from higher universities as their equals rather than the 
intended case of viewing the ―equal‖ status college as their equal.   
Three participants did not take the ACT and thus had no composite score to report.  
Because of the potential use of participants’ ACT composite scores in the statistical analyses for 
Study Two these missing values were replaced using mean substitution.  This technique was 
used over more sophisticated methods such as regression because mean substitution offers a 
more conservative estimate, whereas regression, for example, can lead to over fitting 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
To control for these potential effects of risk propensity and individual ACT composite 
score, Pearson correlations were performed to assess relationships, and the viability of each 
variable as a potential covariate in the main analyses of Study Two.  The Pearson correlations 
showed the relationships between the five subscales of the DSRS and ACT composite scores, 
and the summed dependent variables of CP, tCP, and tBC.  The summed dependent variables 
were created to demonstrate the correlations between the covariates of interest—DSRS subscales 
and ACT composite scores—and general risk preference (CP) as well as reaction times in 
decisions (tCP and tBC) when collapsed across the status of the person with whom they were 
competing (Competitor Status). 
 Correlational analyses demonstrated that there was only a single statistically significant 
correlation between a dependent variable of interest and a potential covariate (Table 4-2).  This 
relationship was between ACT composite score and the summed continuous preference ratings 
(Summed CP).   
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Table ‎4-2  Correlations between potential covariates and dependent variables in Study Two 
Depenent Variables Fertility Between-Groups Within-Group Mating Environmental ACT Score
Sum (CP) .04 .01 .09 -.09 .16   .25*
Sum (tCP)   .20* .08 .16 .01  .23* .05
Sum(tBC) -.03 -.08 -.02 -.09 .15   .22*
Note. CP = Continuous Preference Ratings, tCP = decision time for Continuous Preference Ratings,
 tBC =  decision time for Binary Choice tasks.  Statistically significant correlations are denoted by *.
Potential Covariates
 
  
However, further analysis of the relationship between ACT composite score and Summed 
CP at different levels of Reason Number showed that this covariate relationship violated the 
assumption of homogeneity of regression (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  Specifically, although 
there was a significant positive relationship between ACT score and Summed CP at the 3
rd
 
Reason decision task, this relationship was not statistically significant at the 1
st
 Reason decision 
task (Table 4-3).  Due to this serious issue, neither ACT composite score, nor any of the other 
domain specific risk subscales, were used as covariates in the main analyses of Study Two. 
   
Table ‎4-3  Correlations between Potential Covariates and Dependent Variables for Each 
Level of Reason Number 
Reason Number Depenent Variables Fertility Between-Groups Within-Group Mating Environmental ACT Score
Sum (CP) .16 .18 -.03 .04 .17 .16
Sum (tCP) .18 .25   .39* .09 .32* .10
Sum(tBC) .03 -.01 .04 -.09 .32* .24
Sum (CP) -.10 -.05 .17 -.23 .16    .32*
Sum (tCP) .25 -.15 -.15 -.06 .14 -.01
Sum(tBC) -.10 -.14 -.12 -.10 -.03 .20
Note. CP = Continuous Preference Ratings, tCP = decision time for Continuous Preference Ratings, tBC = decision 
time for Binary Choice tasks.  Statistically significant correlations are denoted by *.
1st Reason
3rd Reason
Potential Covariates
 
 
 Potential Order Effects 
For Study Two there were two possibilities for order effects (Status Order and Task 
Order) for each of the three continuous dependent variables (CP, tCP, and tBC).  The potential 
order effects were examined prior to any of the main, theoretically important analyses in order to 
remove these variables from the analyses if they had no effect. 
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For Task Order—whether participants completed the BC or CP decision task first—a 
series of three separate one-way analyses of variance were performed, one for each of the three 
continuous dependent variables.  Results from these analyses demonstrated that for CP, there 
was not a main effect for Task Order, F(1, 118) = 0.68, p = .413, η2 = .01.  This suggests that 
Task Order did not have an impact on continuous preference ratings of risky choice for Study 
Two’s data.  However, there were statistically significant order effects for both tCP, F(1, 115) = 
37.05, p < .001, η2 = .24, and for tBC, F(1, 112) = 88.15, p < .001, η2 = .44.  Regarding decision 
time for continuous preference ratings (tCP), this suggests that decisions take significantly longer 
to make when the CP task is first, than when it is second.  The pattern is reversed for tBC.  
Specifically, the decision time for BC decision tasks was significantly longer when BC was first 
than when it was second.  Reflection upon these order effects for decision time reveals that the 
order effect is easily explained.  Decision time for the continuous preference decision tasks is 
faster after participants have already made a previous choice between the gambles (in the BC 
task).  The same pattern is true for the decision time on the binary choice decision tasks.  
Specifically, decision time is much faster if participants have already made a preference rating 
for the gambles.  Nonetheless, the significant order effect resulted in Task Order being used as an 
independent variable in the analyses of decision time in the main analyses. 
For Status Order—the order in which participants viewed different fictional 
competitors—an additional three one-way analyses of variance were performed, one for each of 
the continuous dependent variables.  Results of these analyses showed that there were no 
statistically significant order effects for CP, F(2, 117) = 0.11, p = .899, η2 < .01, for tCP, F(2, 
114) = 2.21, p = .114, η2 = .04, or for tBC, F(2, 111) = 0.12, p = .890, η2 < .01.  Thus, Status 
Order as an independent variable was left out of subsequent analyses due to the lack of 
theoretical importance and the lack of any statistically significant order effects on any of the 
continuous dependent variables.    
 General Data Analytic Procedures 
Study Two was designed such that specific predictions from dominance theory could be 
compared against specific predictions from the priority heuristic.  One area in which these two 
different theoretical positions make different predictions is in choice behavior: which option do 
people most often choose (Binary Choice) or which option do people prefer (Continuous 
Preference).   
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Continuous preference ratings (CP) were analyzed by using a 2 (Gender) by 2 (Reason 
Number) by 3 (Competitor Status) mixed-factorial analysis of variance, with Gender and Reason 
Number as the between-participant independent variables and Competitor Status as the within-
participant independent variable. 
Binary choices (BC) were analyzed using a combination of McNemar’s test and Mann-
Whitney U test on nonparametric data.  To assess the impact of Reason Number on binary 
choices, the Binary Choice data was summed (0 = safer choice, 1 = riskier choice) which gave 
the dependent variable an ordinal structure with values ranging from 0 to 3 risky choices.  A 
Mann-Whitney U test was performed on this data, essentially the nonparametric equivalent of the 
independent-samples t-test.  To analyze the within-participant variable of Competitor Status, a 
McNemar’s test was performed to examine if there were statistically significant deviations from 
proportions of risky and safe choices between different levels of Competitor Status. 
Both of the decision time dependent variables were analyzed using a 2 (Gender) by 2 
(Reason Number) by 2 (Task Order) by 3 (Competitor Status) mixed-factorial analysis of 
variance with Reason Number, Task Order, and Gender as the between-participant independent 
variables, and with Competitor Status as the within-participant independent variable.  Recall that 
Task Order had a statistically significant effect on decision time, and thus was included in the 
primary analyses. 
Numeracy, as calculated by the General Numeracy Scale (Lipkus et al., 2001), was used 
to determine each participant’s level of numeracy ranging from 0 to 11.  Preliminary 
examination of the distribution of numeracy scores revealed that the distribution of scores was 
negatively skewed (Skew = -0.89, SE = 0.22), with a mean (M = 8.39, SD = 2.16) closer to the 
maximum possible score than the minimum.  However, this distribution is consistent with what 
has previously been seen in other research using numeracy as an individual difference variable 
(e.g., Peters et al., 2006; Hill & Brase, 2012; Liberali et al., 2011), with the authors in those 
studies using different analytic techniques  such as simple regression and median splitting 
numeracy and performing an analysis of variance.  For the purposes of assessing the potential 
moderating effect of numeracy on the effect between Reason Number and Continuous Preference 
ratings for gambles a 2-step hierarchical regression was performed on the summed CP ratings 
(summed across Competitor Status).   
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 Preference Ratings and Binary Choices for Risky Gambles 
Continuous Preference ratings and Binary Choices were analyzed in order to determine 
which pattern of choice behavior was consistent with the different models of behavior, be it 
dominance theory or the priority heuristic.  Just as in Study One, the experimental design was 
structured in a fashion consistent with strong inference (Platt, 1964).  However, there remained a 
possibility that a mixture of results could occur (e.g., main effects for both Competitor Status and 
for Reason Number). In the event of mixed results indicating partial support for both theoretical 
perspectives, the data from the decision time analyses was hoped to illuminate the underlying 
process.  For instance, in the event that both Competitor Status and Reason Number yielded main 
effects on continuous preference ratings, the decision time data for continuous preference ratings 
(tCP) could then be used to estimate which conditions took longer in making a decision.  This 
exploratory observation of the difference in decision time could then be used to approximate the 
underlying cognitive process for future empirical testing. 
 Continuous Preference Ratings 
For this specific analysis on Continuous Preference ratings (CP), the hypothesis 
consistent with dominance theory predicts that there should be a main effect of Competitor 
Status on preference ratings.  However, the specific pattern is also very important.  Dominance 
theory predicts that people should be more risk-prone when competing against someone they 
perceive as equal in status, whereas people should be more risk-averse when competing against 
those who are perceived as higher and lower in status.  Further, consistent with the findings of 
Ermer et al. (2008), it was predicted that this pattern of results would only hold for male 
participants.  Thus, a significant Competitor Status by Gender interaction should be found.  
Dominance theory makes no predictions regarding Reason Number. 
Just as in Study One, decision tasks were created so that specific patterns of choice 
behavior and preference ratings should be found if the priority heuristic is correct.  Based on the 
decision tasks created, the priority heuristic predicted a main effect for Reason Number such that 
decision tasks labeled 3
rd
 Reason tasks should elicit higher preferences for the riskier gamble 
than the 1
st
 Reason tasks which were designed to elicit risk-aversion.  The priority heuristic 
makes no predictions regarding Gender or Competitor Status.  
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Results from the three-way mixed factorial analysis of variance showed a statistically 
significant main effect for Competitor Status, F(2, 232) = 3.24, p = .041, partial η2 = .03.  There 
was also a statistically significant main effect for Reason Number, F(1, 116) = 7.25, p = .008, 
partial η2 = .06.  The two-way interaction between Competitor Status and Gender was not 
statistically significant, F(2,232) = 0.74, p = .480, partial η2 = .01. 
Further examination of the main effect for Competitor Status showed that the main effect 
was due to the much lower preference for the riskier gamble when competing against someone 
lower in status (M = 2.73, SD = 1.83), compared to competing against fictional students 
perceived as higher in status (M = 3.18, SD = 1.93), t(119) = -2.24, p = .027, d = .20.  There was 
not a statistically significant difference between lower status and equal status (M = 3.11, SD = 
1.87), t(119) = -1.97, p = .051, d = .18.  The difference between equal status competitors and 
higher status competitors was not statistically significant, t(119) = -0.43, p = .671, d = .04, and 
more importantly, was not in the hypothesized direction as predicted by dominance theory 
(Figures 4-4 and 4-5).  The main effect for Reason Number was produced by the statistically 
significant difference between 1
st
 Reason tasks (M = 2.66, SD = 1.25) and 3
rd
 Reason tasks (M = 
3.36, SD = 1.55), with the latter receiving higher preference ratings for the riskier gamble.  The 
direction of this main effect was consistent with predictions made by the priority heuristic. 
There was not a statistically significant main effect for Gender, F(1, 116) = 0.64, p = 
.427, partial η2 = .01, nor were there statistically significant interactions between Gender and 
Reason  Number, F(1, 116) = 0.06, p = .813, partial η2 < .01, Competitor Status and Reason 
Number, F(2,232) = 1.18, p = .308, partial η2 = .01, or the three-way interaction between Reason 
Number, Competitor Status, and Gender, F(2,232) = 0.97, p = .382, partial η2 = .01.          
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Figure ‎4-4  The Effects of Competitor Status and Reason Number on Continuous 
Preference Ratings in Males 
 
 
Figure ‎4-5  The Effects of Competitor Status and Reason Number on Continuous 
Preference Ratings in Females 
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 Relationship between Binary Choices and Continuous Preference Ratings 
Continuous Preference ratings were used in Studies One and Two due to the observation 
that participants are generally risk-averse, all else being equal.  This was true for the data in 
Study Two as well:  CP ratings (M = 3.01, SD = 1.44) were on the bottom half of the 1 to 6 scale 
with 6 indicating the highest possible preference for the riskier gamble.  Nonetheless, Binary 
Choice data were also analyzed due to their high ecological validity; people make discrete 
choices rather than choices of degree (e.g., preference ratings).   
To determine a level of consistency in participants’ responding on the two different 
formats of decision tasks—Binary Choice and Continuous Preference—point biserial 
correlations were performed for each level of the Competitor Status within-participants 
independent variable.  Recall that point biserial correlation coefficients typically are suppressed 
due to the restricted range of the binary or dichotomous variable being assessed (Kemery, 
Dunlap, & Griffeth, 1988).  The binary variable in these analyses was the Binary Choice 
dependent variable coded as 0 for the safer choice and 1 for the riskier choice.  The Continuous 
Preference ratings ranged from 1 to 6 with higher scores indicating a stronger preference for the 
riskier gamble and lower scores a stronger preference for the safer gamble. 
Results from these separate correlation analyses indicated quite strong positive 
relationships between Binary Choices and Continuous Preferences regardless if the participants 
were competing against fictional students perceived as lower, rpb (118) = .57, p < .001, equal, rpb 
(118) = .64, p < .001, or higher in status, rpb (118) = .65, p < .001.  This indicates a high level of 
consistency with regard to participants’ choices and preferences, which lends credence to the use 
of the more sensitive, but perhaps less ecologically valid, continuous preference ratings.   
 Binary Choice 
A Mann-Whitney U test was conducted to examine the effect of Reason Number (1
st
 or 
3
rd
) on discrete risky choices collapsed across the Competitor Status independent variable.  The 
risky choice dependent variable was created by calculating the sum of risky choices across the 
within-participant independent variable of Competitor Status; risky choices were coded as 1, and 
safe choices were coded as 0.  This summed dependent variable was ordinal in nature, and 
ranged from 0 to 3, with a score of 3 meaning that the participant chose the riskier gamble in all 
three decision tasks, one against each of the three fictional competitors.  The Mann-Whitney U 
test was used because of the ordinal, rather than interval or ratio, nature of the data.  The Mann-
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Whitney U test is essentially the nonparametric equivalent of the independent-samples t-test 
though.   
Results from the Mann-Whitney U analysis showed that participants receiving the 1
st
 
Reason decision task, designed to elicit risk-averse choices, did make fewer risky choices (Mean  
Rank = 52.95) than the participants who were randomly assigned to receive the 3
rd
 Reason 
decision tasks (Mean Rank = 68.05) which were designed to elicit risk-prone decisions.  This 
difference in mean rank of the ordinal data proved to be statistically significant, U = 1347.00, p 
=.013 (Figure 4-6). 
 
Figure ‎4-6  The Effects of Reason Number on Binary Choice in Study Two 
 
To examine the impact of Competitor Status on eliciting risky choice behavior in 
participants, a McNemar’s test was performed on the within-participant independent variable of 
Competitor Status.  Three separate paired comparisons were made.  Results of these tests 
revealed that there was not a significant difference between the number of risky choices in terms 
of the differences between Lower Status (n = 45) and Equal Status (n = 56), χ2 (1, N = 120) = 
2.33, p = .127, Equal Status and Higher Status (n = 49), χ2 (1, N = 120) = 0.19, p = .665, or 
Lower Status and Higher Status, χ2 (1, N = 120) = 0.88, p = .349 (Figure 4-7). 
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Figure ‎4-7  The Effects of Competitor Status on Binary Choice in Study Two 
 
 Decision Time for Preference Ratings and Binary Choices 
Because the priority heuristic is a process model, additional predictions were made 
regarding the amount of time it should take participants to choose between options (Binary 
Choice) or to indicate a preference (Continuous Preference) based upon the number of reasons 
necessary before search stops (Figure 2-1).  Specifically, because Study Two assumed that 
participants were utilizing the standard lexicographic order of reasons for the priority heuristic—
as outlined by Brändstatter et al. (2006)—decision problems which should, based on their 
construction, require participants to proceed to the reason of maximum payoffs (i.e., the 3
rd
 
Reason), should also take longer to complete.  This would be reflected in differences in reaction 
time data between 1
st
 and 3
rd
 Reason conditions.  Because two different measures of choice 
behavior were recorded for Study Two (i.e., Binary Choice and Continuous Preference), two 
different arrays of decision time were analyzed.  Also, recall that there were order effects for 
Task Order.  Although the most parsimonious explanation for the order effects is theoretically 
inimportant, the independent variable was included in all analyses on decision time data. 
 Continuous Preference Decision Time  
Results from the analysis of Continuous Preference decision times (tCP) showed a 
statistically significant main effect for Task Order (previously shown in the Preliminary Data 
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Issues section), F(1, 109) = 35.82, p < .001, partial η2 = .25.  These data showed that, when 
participants completed the CP decision task first (M = 17,624.68, SD = 5,785.45) they were 
much slower in making decisions than if they completed the BC decision task first and the CP 
decision task second (M = 11,454.91, SD = 5,173.48).  As previously was mentioned, this is an 
intuitive finding.  When people have answered decision task once, it should take less time to 
make a decision about the same gambles again, even if the decision task format changes (e.g., 
from Binary Choice to Continuous Preference).  
There were no main effects for Gender, F(1, 109) = 1.06, p = .305, partial η2 = .01, 
Competitor Status, F(2, 218) = 0.05, p = .947, partial η2 < .01, or of paramount theoretical 
importance, Reason Number, F(1, 109) = 0.61, p = .438, partial η2 = .01.  Specifically, males (M 
= 15,005.57, SD = 6,800.76) and females (M = 13,906.43, SD = 5,694.53) had similar decision 
times for the Continuous Preference decision tasks.  Decision times were similar irrespective of 
whether participants were competing against lower (M = 14,230.91, SD = 11,015.95), equal (M 
= 14,540.80, SD = 9,120.15), or higher (M = 14,610.37, SD = 9,189.54) perceived status 
students (Figures 4-6 and 4-7).  And finally, contrary to the priority heuristic, 1
st
 Reason decision 
tasks (M = 14,873.12, SD = 6,714.51) did not take less time to reach a decision than 3
rd
 Reason 
decision tasks (M = 14,041.16, SD = 5,820.52). 
 The two-way interactions all failed to reach statistical significance: Competitor Status by 
Task Order, F(2, 218) = 0.94, p = .393, partial η2 = .01; Competitor Status by Reason Number, 
F(2, 218) = 0.66, p = .519, partial η2 = .01; Competitor Status by Gender, F(2, 218) = 0.69, p = 
.505, partial η2 = .01; Task Order by Reason Number, F(1, 109) = 0.03, p = .862, partial η2 < .01; 
Task Order by Gender, F(1, 109) = 0.01, p = .922, partial η2 < .01; Reason Number by Gender, 
F(1, 109) = 0.52, p = .473, partial η2 = .01. 
 The three-way interactions also all failed to reach statistical significance: Task Order by 
Reason Number by Gender, F(1, 109) = 0.78, p = .379, partial η2 = .01; Competitor Status by 
Task Order by Reason Number, F(2, 218) = 0.25, p = .779, partial η2 < .01; Competitor Status by 
Task Order by Gender, F(2, 218) = 0.84, p = .434, partial η2 = .01; Competitor Status by Reason 
Number by Gender, F(2, 218) = 0.89, p = .412, partial η2 = .01.  Additionally, the four-way 
interaction between Competitor Status, Reason Number, Gender, and Task Order failed to reach 
statistical significance, F(2, 218) = 0.03, p = .972, partial η2 < .01. 
88 
 
 The lack of statistically significant main effect for Reason Number was further examined 
using the Rouder et al. (2009) Bayes factor score method.  An independent-samples t-value of 
0.72, a sample size of N = 120, and a Scale r of 1.0 were used in the calculation.  The resulting 
JMZ Bayes factor was B01 = 10.71.  This is consistent with what Rouder et al. describe as ―strong 
evidence‖ in support of the null hypothesis, with the null hypothesis of Reason Number having 
no effect on decision time being approximately ten times more likely than the alternative 
hypothesis of Reason Number having an effect on decision time. 
 
Figure ‎4-8  The Effects of Competitor Status, Reason Number, and Task Order on 
Continuous Preference Decision Time (tCP) in Male Participants 
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Figure ‎4-9  The Effects of Competitor Status, Reason Number, and Task Order on 
Continuous Preference Decision Time (tCP) in Female Participants 
 
 
 
 
 Binary Choice Decision Time 
Results from the analysis on decision times for the Binary Choice tasks (tBC) revealed a 
statistically significant main effect for Task Order, F(1, 106) = 89.54, p < .001, partial η2 = .46.  
This was consistent with results from the preliminary analyses examining potential order effects.  
This result also suggested that participants took significantly longer to make a decision between 
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the two gambles in the BC task when they performed the BC task first (M = 16,269.54, SD = 
6,107.33) compared to when they performed the BC task last (M = 7,603.29, SD = 3,530.03).  
Additionally, there was a statistically significant main effect for Gender, F(1, 106) = 4.89, p = 
.029, partial η2 = .04, with females (M = 10,702.19, SD = 6,004.67) responding to Binary Choice 
tasks faster than males (M = 12,714.51, SD = 6,959.14), irrespective of Task Order. 
The main effect for Competitor Status failed to reach statistical significance, F(2, 212) = 
0.60, p = .550, partial η2 = .01, indicating that the relative status of the fictional student 
competitor had no impact on the time to make a decision in the Binary Choice tasks.  
Importantly, there was also not a statistically significant main effect for Reason Number, F(1, 
106) = 0.88, p = .351, partial η2 = .01, suggesting that decision tasks which should have resulted 
in decisions after the 1
st
 Reason took equally long as decision tasks that should have resulted in 
decisions after the 3
rd
 Reason (i.e., after an additional two decision steps) (Figures 4-8 and 4-9).  
This is inconsistent with predictions made by the priority heuristic about the positive correlation 
between decision time and number of reasons used to make a decision. 
All of the two-way interactions failed to reach statistical significance: Competitor Status 
by Task Order, F(2, 212) = 0.89, p = .413, partial η2 = .01; Competitor Status by Reason 
Number, F(2, 212) = 0.19, p = .831, partial η2 < .01; Competitor Status by Gender, F(2, 212) = 
1.96, p = .144, partial η2 = .02; Task Order by Reason Number, F(1, 106) = 0.27, p = .602, 
partial η2 < .01; Task Order by Gender, F(1, 106) = 0.39, p = .534, partial η2 < .01; Reason 
Number by Gender, F(1, 106) = 0.02, p = .888, partial η2 < .01. 
 Also, all of the three-way interactions failed to reach statistical significance: Task Order 
by Reason Number by Gender, F(1, 106) = 1.17, p = .281, partial η2 = .01; Competitor Status by 
Task Order by Reason Number, F(2, 212) = 0.05, p = .951, partial η2 < .01; Competitor Status by 
Task Order by Gender, F(2, 212) = 1.24, p = .292, partial η2 = .01; Competitor Status by Reason 
Number by Gender, F(2, 212) = 0.35, p = .706, partial η2 < .01.  Also, the four-way interaction of 
Competitor Status by Task Order by Reason Number by Gender failed to reach statistical 
significance, F(2, 212) = 0.77, p = .466, partial η2 = .01.  
   The lack of a significant main effect for Reason Number was additionally assessed using 
the JZS Bayes factor method (Rouder et al., 2009).  The independent-samples t-value of -0.59, 
the sample size of N = 120, and the Scale r of 1.0 were used in the analysis.  The resulting JZS 
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Bayes factor was B01 = 11.64.  This is consistent with ―strong evidence‖ in support of the null 
hypothesis that Reason Number does not have an effect on decision time.     
 
Figure ‎4-10  The Effects of Competitor Status, Reason Number, and Task Order on Binary 
Choice Decision Time (tBC) in Male Participants 
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Figure ‎4-11  The Effects of Competitor Status, Reason Number, and Task Order on Binary 
Choice Decision Time (tBC) in Female Participants 
 
 
 
 
 The Role of Numeracy 
To assess the potential relationship between numerical literacy and consistency with the 
priority heuristic and risky choice behavior a 2-step hierarchical regression was performed using 
participants’ numeracy scores (centered to reduce multicollinearity with interaction term), 
Reason Number, and their interaction term as the predictors, and summed CP scores as the 
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criterion.  This method, as opposed to the sum-difference regression used in Study One, was 
possible due to the fact that Reason Number was between-participants in Study Two, rather than 
within-participants as in Study One. 
Centered numeracy scores and Reason Number were added to the model in Step 1, and 
the interaction term of Numeracy by Reason Number was added to the model in Step 2.  
Statistical significance on the part of the interaction term was assessed in Step 2, while main 
effects for Reason Number and Numeracy were assessed at Step 1.   
Results from the 2-step hierarchical regression showed that the model was a statistically 
significant predictor at Step 1, F(2, 117) = 4.31, p = .016, R
2
 = .07.  Assessing the individual 
predictors composing the Step 1 model revealed that, although Reason Number was a unique 
predictor of summed CP ratings, t(117) = 2.88, p = .005, b = 2.25, Numeracy (centered) was not 
a unique predictor, t(117) = 1.13, p = .262, b = 0.21. 
Results from Step 2 of the model showed that the change in predictive power past that of 
the Step 1 model was not statistically significant, ΔF(1, 116) = 0.12, p = .729, ΔR2 < .01.  This 
suggested that that introduction of the interaction term did not add unique predictive power to the 
model beyond what was previously accounted for by the individual predictive power of 
Numeracy and Reason Number alone.  These results suggest that, in Study Two’s data, 
numeracy did not moderate the effect of Reason Number on CP ratings. 
Using the regression parameters from the hierarchical regression, the relationship 
between Numeracy and Reason Number could be plotted.  Numeracy data were plotted using 
two groups (Low and High Numeracy), created by subtracting (Low) or adding (High) one 
standard deviation (i.e., SD = 2.16) from the mean of 0; numeracy was mean centered, which 
meant it retained properties consistent with the scaling of the GNS (Lipkus et al., 2001), but had 
a mean of 0.  Probing of the relationships showed that the slope of the Numeracy line for 1
st
 
Reason tasks (b = 0.14) was only slightly lower than the Numeracy slope for 3
rd
 Reason tasks (b 
= 0.27) (Figure 4-12).       
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Figure ‎4-12  The Effect of Numeracy on the Relationship between Reason Number and 
Summed Continuous Preference Ratings in Study Two 
 
 Study Two Discussion 
The purpose of Study Two was to determine if the priority heuristic (Brandstätter et al., 
2006) could still sufficiently predict participant’s gamble choices (BC) and preferences (CP) 
when they, the participants, were competing against students perceived as having different status 
levels.  Human risky behavior in the context of status competition had previously been predicted 
by dominance theory (Ermer et al., 2008). Specifically, males of equal status should choose 
riskier behavior when competing against one another, but should be risk-averse when competing 
against other males perceived as being either higher or lower in status.  Ermer et al. found data 
consistent with those predictions. Also, just as in Study One, the current study tested a 
hypothesis derived from Peters and Levin (2008) suggesting that high numerates use numerical 
information in risky decision making contexts more than their less numerate brethren.  From this 
hypothesis the following prediction was made for Study Two:  High numerates should be more 
consistent with priority heuristic predictions than low numerates due to the assumed numerical 
nature of the priority heuristic decision process (Figure 2-1).  The results are discussed in detail 
below. 
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 Can the priority heuristic account for competitor status? 
Although there is nothing within the hypothesized process model of the priority heuristic 
which would precisely account for competitor status, the preference and choice data collected in 
Study Two very clearly showed that the priority heuristic’s predictions were supported, 
irrespective of the status of the fictional competitors.  This choice and preference data lends 
support to the lexicographic order hypothesized by the priority heuristic.  Participants in the 1
st
 
Reason task consistently chose, and preferred, the safer gamble, whereas participants in the 3
rd
 
Reason task consistently chose, and preferred, the riskier gamble.  This is important because 
these tasks were designed to elicit that exact pattern of choice and preference, if indeed the 
priority heuristic’s process was an accurate account of our participants’ cognitive processes. 
However, despite strong support for the priority heuristic as a model of decision behavior 
in terms of preferences and choices, the decision time data for those choices and preferences did 
not support the hypothesized underlying process (i.e., the lexicographic order outlined in Figure 
2-1).  Specifically, the 3
rd
 Reason decision task did not take significantly longer to choose, or 
prefer, than the 1
st
 Reason decision task.  In fact, the 3
rd
 Reason decision task took less time, on 
average, to choose and prefer, than did the 1
st
 Reason decision task, although the difference was 
not statistically significant.   
In sum, the priority heuristic predicted behavioral outcomes quite well, even when 
compensating for different statuses of fictional student competitors.  However, the underlying 
process assumed by the priority heuristic was not supported by the decision time data, suggesting 
that the actual process may (a) not apply when participants are in contexts of same-sex 
competition with others of varying perceived status, or (b) that the process is generally incorrect.  
These two options are not exhaustive, but do illustrate the implications of these data on the 
potential scope of the priority heuristic’s hypothesized process.  The scope of the heuristic refers 
to its ecological rationality.  Recall that, in Study One, neither the behavioral outcomes, nor the 
decision time data, were consistent with the priority heuristic.  So, in two separate studies, with 
two separate samples of participants, the process data (tBC and tCP) did not fit with the priority 
heuristic’s predictions.  These data call for a potential reconceptualization of the priority 
heuristic’s decision process (i.e., perhaps it is not lexicographic in nature), or perhaps a limiting 
of the heuristic’s valid ecology to context-free, described gambles; i.e., gambles without the 
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additional contexts of need levels (Study One) or competition against others of varying status 
(Study Two).        
 Are high numerates’ decisions more consistent with the priority heuristic? 
Brändstatter et al. (2006) noted that one of the limitations of the priority heuristic, at least 
when the heuristic was first formulated, was that it does not account for individual differences 
within the decision maker.  Brändstatter et al. explicitly mention individual differences in risk 
taking as a potential ―wrench‖ in the heuristic.  However, results from Peters and Levin (2008) 
suggested another possible individual difference: numerical literacy, or ―numeracy.‖ 
Numeracy was shown in Peters and Levin (2008) to be predictive of risky choice framing 
effects.  Specifically, numeracy did not predict the framing effect per se, but it did predict how 
the individual’s decision process.  More specifically, it predicted what types of information the 
participants used to make their decisions.  Whereas highly numerate individuals used the 
probabilities and payoffs of the options in making their decisions, the low numerates relied more 
heavily on non-mathematical information such as the frame (losses or gains) of the problem.   
In line with the results from Peters and Levin (2008), it was predicted that individuals 
high in numeracy would use the probabilities and payoffs more when making their decisions 
about which of the two gambles they preferred.  Because the priority heuristic assumes that 
individuals perform some type of calculation using exactly the types of information (probabilities 
and payoffs) that high numerates have been shown to use, that these individuals (high numerates) 
would behave more consistent with the priority heuristic’s predictions.  In contrast, the opposite 
was predicted for those lower in numeracy. 
However, data from Study Two did not support the predictions derived from the results 
of Peters and Levin (2008).  Specifically, participants’ numeracy levels were not indicative of 
differential preferences for the 1
st
 Reason and 3
rd
 Reason decision tasks as was hypothesized.  
This suggests that numerical literacy did not, in Study Two, play a major role in moderating the 
effect of problem characteristics, embodied in the Reason Number variable, on choice 
preferences.  And, more importantly, the lack of moderation was not consistent with what would 
be expected if the Peters and Levin conclusions could be extrapolated to priority heuristic-
consistent behavior patterns. 
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These data from Study Two are somewhat consistent with the results from a similar 
analysis in Study One.  Data from Study One indicated that indeed numeracy was not a 
moderator in the Reason Number-Risky Preference relationship.  However, in Study One, 
numeracy did have a negative relationship with preference ratings (CP) in the 3
rd
 Reason 
decision tasks, a finding consistent with the hypothesis.  Unfortunately, due to the lack of a 
statistically significant interaction, the simple slopes analysis technically has no meaning; simple 
slopes should only be examined if there is a significant interaction. 
To conclude, across two studies attempting to assess the potential moderating effect of 
numeracy in the priority heuristic’s process, no substantive evidence was found to support the 
notion of numeracy as a moderator.  At this point it appears that numeracy does not need to be 
accounted for when determining the utility of the priority heuristic, at least in terms of its 
accuracy as a process model.  Brändstatter et al. (2006) were concerned about the potential 
limitations of the priority heuristic due to it not taking into account individual differences.  From 
these data it appears that numeracy as one of the potential individual differences may be crossed 
off the list of possible individual difference ―wrenches‖ threatening the predictive power of the 
priority heuristic. 
 On the role of competitor status in risk taking 
Recall that dominance theory, as made explicit by Ermer et al. (2008), predicts that, when 
males are competing in intrasexual competitions for resources, the relative status of the 
individuals participating makes a difference with regard to risky behavior.  Specifically, if you 
are a male competing for resources against another male, then individuals perceived as being 
higher in status should not be competed against because they are higher in status for a reason: 
they are higher in status because they are good at something and will likely beat you at that 
something, resulting in substantive loss on your part.  Likewise, individuals perceived as lower in 
status should not be competed against because they are lower in status for a reason: they are bad 
at something and therefore have not won frequently enough to acquire any resources.  Thus, a 
win against them would be worthless.  However, competitors perceived as equals are worth the 
risk of competition because they have something to compete for, and they are similar to you in 
ability.  The factor of relative competitor status was hypothesized by Ermer et al. to be a primary 
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motivator to engage in risk.  Such motivational patterns would result in a pattern of results 
similar to Figure 4-13.  Indeed, this pattern of results is what Ermer et al. found in their studies. 
 
Figure ‎4-13  Continuous Preference Pattern of Results Predicted by Dominance Theory 
 
 
 Although there was a statistically significant main effect for Competitor Status in Study 
Two, further examination of the data showed that the pattern of results was not consistent with 
dominance theory, or the pattern displayed in Figure 4-13.  Instead, irrespective of gender, 
participants tended to be relatively risk-averse when competing against students perceived as 
lower in status, but were relatively more risk-prone when competing against students perceived 
as either equal, or higher in status.  Again, this pattern was consistent for both males and 
females.   
 The pattern of continuous preference results from Study Two is, at first, somewhat 
perplexing since the pattern does not match with dominance theory.  However, Ermer et al. 
(2008) offered the exact same pattern of results as an alternative hypothesis for their 2008 
studies.  This hypothesis was based on work by Rode et al. (1999) which showed that risk-
sensitive foraging could explain ambiguity aversion, or a risk-aversion to uncertain variation.  
Applied to competitor status, Ermer et al. posited that a general theory of risk-sensitivity would 
entail the following: Humans have a general risk-sensitivity based on need levels, or aspiration 
levels, and this risk-sensitivity mechanism operates on any physical (e.g., money) or 
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psychological (e.g., status) resource.  This general risk-sensitivity model of risk taking behavior 
posits that humans have need levels for both physical and psychological resources.  If humans 
are below the need level, then people should behave consistent with the standard model of risk-
sensitive foraging and take the risk that will get them to the need level.  Essentially, this is risk-
sensitive foraging, but it is modeled to operate on psychological constructs such as perceived 
status as well as physical resources. 
 The crucial differences between dominance theory’s account of risk taking behavior and 
a general model of risk-sensitivity is that the latter would assume a need level for status.  A large 
amount of research has demonstrated that happiness is relative and that people would prefer 
normatively less if it meant they would have more than their neighbors (e.g., Blanchflower & 
Oswald, 2004; Luttmer, 2005; McBride, 2001; Veenhoven, 1991).  Metaphorically, owning a 
cheap car on a block full of bus-riders feels better than owning a Cadillac when your neighbors 
all have Porches.    In fact, Hill and Buss (2010) demonstrated that people will shift from a safer 
option to a riskier option when the riskier option allows for the possibility of having more than 
those in their peer group.  This is true even when the mean payoff for the riskier option is 
quantitatively less than the mean payoff for the safer option.   
So, if a general model of risk-sensitivity has a need level similar to that in risk-sensitive 
foraging, it appears that the need level is not a fixed amount (e.g., 300 calories, $400).  Rather, 
based on past research it appears that the need level for status is dynamic:  Always try to be the 
highest in status in your group.  In terms of risky preferences this would translate into risk-
aversion against anyone that is lower in status than yourself, but risk-proneness against anyone 
else (i.e., equal status and higher status others) (Figure 4-14).  Indeed, this is the precise pattern 
of results which Ermer et al. (2008) suggested would be consistent with risk-sensitive foraging 
when applied more generally to status competition.  This idea of a general risk-sensitivity with 
need levels for both psychological and physical resources is explored in more detail in Study 
Three. 
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Figure ‎4-14  Idealized Continuous Preference Pattern for a General Model of Risk-
Sensitivity Applied to Status Acquisition 
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Chapter 5 - Study Three 
Through two studies it was shown that the priority heuristic, when considered in its 
entirety (behavioral predictions and decision time process data included), does not perform well 
when having to account for contextual variables such as competitor status and resource need 
levels.  However, from the results of Study Two, it was shown that, despite results inconsistent 
with dominance theory, the data were consistent with a more general model of risk-sensitivity. 
Study One provided support for risk-sensitive foraging theory (Stephens & Krebs, 1986).  
Study Two provided support for the behavioral predictions of the priority heuristic, but more 
importantly, it also provided support for the idea of a more general risk-sensitivity mechanism of 
risky decision making which could be applied to the resource of status.  This general risk-
sensitivity was posed as an alternative hypothesis by Ermer et al. (2008; Experiment 1, 
hypothesis ii-a): 
If men’s [and women’s; my addition] risk-taking motivations result 
from an aspiration for higher status plugging into general risky 
decision-making mechanisms, as on the risk-sensitive foraging 
account, then relative status will up-regulate men’s willingness to 
take risks when their aspiration for higher status has not been met 
(i.e., when their relative status is lower than or equal to that of their 
potential evaluators) (p. 109).  
This hypothesis is an extension of the risk-sensitive foraging model into domains other 
than physical resources (e.g., status).  However, if humans have a general risk-sensitivity 
mechanism which guides decisions between options of different payoff variance then this 
mechanism must also require some need level, or aspiration level.  The need level is important 
because its value determines the relative need of a resource.  This relative need, in turn, dictates 
the individual’s motivations to choose riskier options; when being risky is the only way to get to 
the need level, choose the risky option.  The next issue is determining what a need level would 
look like for a construct such as status. 
Various research has shown that relative status matters when it comes to self-reported 
happiness (e.g., Blanchflower & Oswald, 2004; Luttmer, 2005; McBride, 2001; Veenhoven, 
1991).  This collection of research is in agreement that it generally feels better to have more than 
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your peer group.  Thus, people should prefer to have more than their peer group, and any 
cognitive mechanism consistent with pursuing the goal of a higher status should guide people 
toward decisions which would result in having more than those of the peer group, and obtaining 
a higher status.  Hill & Buss (2010) showed empirically that this is indeed true; that people 
choose options that provide them with a chance of having more than their peer group, even if the 
mean expected outcome is inferior (i.e., the expected value is smaller than a safer alternative).  
Relating this research back to the idea of a need level for status, this would mean that individuals 
should have a dynamic, moving need level.  Specifically, the need level should reside at the level 
of the highest status person in the peer group.  The goal: obtain the highest level of status.  
This is precisely how Ermer et al. (2008) describe the hypothesis of risk-sensitive 
foraging as applied to status (what I refer to as general risk-sensitivity): 
By positing an aspiration level for status, this approach can be 
applied to the current research.  Social status is always relative: 
having a high or low level depends on the current comparison 
group.  Thus, one might expect men to have a relatively constant 
aspiration for higher status relative to others.  If men seek 
resources to gain higher relative status, this model predicts they 
will seek risk when their status is lower than or equal to the status 
of the men observing and evaluating their actions (because their 
status aspiration level has not been met) and avoid risk when their 
won status is higher (because their status aspiration level has 
already been satisfied) (p. 108).  
Graphically, when applied to the resource of status, this hypothesis would look like the 
pattern of results depicted in Figure 4-14.  Participants, both male and female, should have high 
risk preferences when competing against a competitor of equal or higher status than themselves.  
Similar to dominance theory, this general model of risk-sensitivity suggests that people will 
choose less risk when competing against someone of lower status, although for potentially 
different reasons.  This idea of a general model of risk-sensitivity is tested in Study Three, by 
comparing predictions of four separate potential models in a paradigm both similar to that of 
Studies One and Two, and similar to what was done in Ermer et al. (2008). 
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 Hypotheses 
Study Three was designed to test risk-sensitive foraging against dominance theory in the 
same way as Ermer et al. (2008).  Study Three was composed of a combination of features from 
Studies One and Two: (1) need levels in the gambling task to study risk-sensitive foraging, and 
(2) competing against other fictional students to test dominance theory.  However, based on the 
results of Studies One and Two, two additional hypotheses were constructed: general risk-
sensitivity applied to status only, and general risk-sensitivity applied to both status and money.  
Like Studies One and Two, numeracy was also measured in Study Three.  However, unlike 
Studies One and Two, numeracy as a potential moderator was not analyzed in Study Three due 
to the lack of any explicitly known theoretical importance; whereas, the priority heuristic 
assumed that individuals perform calculations when making decisions about two gambles, none 
of the proposed models tested in Study Three assume numerical processing ability.  The 
mathematical models of risk-sensitive foraging (Stephens & Krebs, 1986) are used to predict 
behavioral patterns, not to describe the mental processes occurring in the mind of the forager, be 
it human or non-human.  The hypotheses are described in detail below.  Also, to allow for easier 
comprehension of the differences between various hypotheses, idealized graphical 
representations accompany each hypothesis. 
 Risk-sensitive foraging 
Participants, both male and female, should be relatively risk-averse when the safer option 
will allow them the amount of money needed to reach a potential second round (Positive 
Budget).  However, participants should be relatively risk-seeking when only the riskier option 
allows for the possibility of reaching the amount of money needed to reach a potential second 
round (Negative Budget) (Figure 5-1).  This model of risk taking behavior is limited to monetary 
amounts for the purposes of Study Three, and makes no predictions regarding the effects of 
competitor status, as was the case with risk-sensitive foraging applied to status by Ermer et al. 
(2008) (see previous block quotes).  Their hypothesis is re-labeled as general risk-sensitivity 
applied to status only, and is discussed in a following section. 
104 
 
Figure ‎5-1  Risk-Sensitive Foraging Predictions for Study Three 
 
 Dominance theory 
Dominance theory as laid out for psychological research by Ermer et al. (2008) predicts 
that, when males compete for resources with other males, the relative status dictates risk taking 
behavior.  Specifically, males should be risk-taking in situations where the individual with whom 
they are competing is perceived as relatively equal in status.  This is because there is both 
something to gain, and because the individual has a fair chance to win the competition.  This also 
illuminates why dominance theory predicts risk-aversion against individuals perceived as both 
lower and higher in status; there is nothing to gain against someone lower in status, and there is a 
greater chance of losing against someone higher in status.  This effect is predicted to be limited 
to male-male competition.  Research has shown that females perceive higher status males as 
being more attractive; however, for men, status is not as important factor in determining the 
attractiveness of females (Buss, 1989).  The graphical pattern of results is depicted in Figure 5-2. 
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Figure ‎5-2  Dominance Theory Predictions for Study Three 
 
 General risk-sensitivity for status only 
General risk-sensitivity applied to status only is conceptualized as the general risk-
sensitivity mechanism, but only being applied to the resource of status, at least in terms of the 
results.  This is similar to the alternative, risk-sensitive foraging hypothesis applied to status 
which Ermer et al. (2008) conceived (Figure 4-14).  The key difference is that this hypothesized 
model would neglect the monetary amount needed to move on to a potential next round in the 
experimental procedure, a feature not tested by Ermer et al.  Instead, it would focus on the status 
need level:  the monetary amount greater than that of the person with whom one is competing.  
This model predicts that people would be risk-seeking against those individuals perceived as 
equal and higher in status, but risk-averse against those individuals perceived as lower in status 
(Figure 5-3).  Further, the model predicts no sex differences in risk taking. 
106 
 
Figure ‎5-3  General Risk-Sensitivity (Status Only) Predictions for Study Three 
 
 General risk-sensitivity for status and money 
As opposed to the status-only version of the general risk-sensitivity model, the status and 
money version takes into account both potential motivations to take risk: (1) the motivation to 
earn enough money to reach a potential second round, and (2) the motivation to earn more than 
the person against whom participants are competing.  Essentially, this is a mixture of the risk-
sensitive foraging model and the general risk-sensitivity for status only model.  The key 
difference between the combined model and its constituents is that it assumes individuals will be 
motivated to reach both need levels: (1) enough money to reach the second potential round, and 
(2) enough money to have more than the person against whom the participant is competing 
(Figure 5-4).  In this model, both need levels are important.  Additionally, no sex difference is 
predicted.   
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Figure ‎5-4  General Risk-Sensitivity (Status and Money) Predictions for Study Three 
 
 
 Study Three Method 
 Participants 
The data for Study Three were collected from 120 undergraduate students enrolled in 
introductory psychology at Kansas State University.  Consistent with the design of Study Two, 
the gender split for Study Three was completely even (i.e., n = 60 males and n = 60 females).  
This equal split between males and females was purposeful due to the inclusion of Gender as an 
independent variable necessary for the predictions of dominance theory. 
Participant age was consistent with both Studies One and Two, and was consistent with 
typical research samples drawn from undergraduate courses (M = 18.95, SD = 1.41).  The 
distribution of ethnicities was also typical of research conducted in this specific region of the 
United States with a vast majority reporting themselves as Caucasian (Caucasian: n = 103; 
African-American: n = 4; Asian: n = 4; Hispanic: n = 5).  Additionally, four of the participants 
identified their ethnicity as ―Other.‖  
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 Design 
Just as the decision tasks in Studies One and Two, the tasks in Study Three were also 
framed as gains rather than losses.  Also, the dual-measure methodology used in the two 
previous studies was utilized for Study Three.  Specifically, participants were assessed using 
Binary Choice tasks (BC) and also Continuous Preference tasks (CP); these tasks were 
counterbalanced between participants, and each decision task was answered in both measurement 
formats. 
Study Three’s design included the two dependent variables mentioned in the previous 
paragraph (BC and CP decision tasks).  Study Three was also composed of five total independent 
variables, two of which were control variables used to assess potential order effects.  These two 
order variables were Task Order and Status Order.  Task Order, a between-participants 
independent variable, was defined as the ordering of the different dependent variables in terms of 
which format of decision task was completed first and which decision task was completed last.  
There were two levels of Task Order: BC 1
st
 and CP 1
st
.  Status Order was a between-participants 
independent variable used to describe the order in which participants competed against different 
fictional student competitors.  There were three levels of Status Order:  LowerEqualHigher 
(LEH), EqualHigherLower (EHL), and HigherLowerEqual (HLE). 
The last three independent variables were Gender, Budget, and Competitor Status.  These 
three independent variables, and their interrelationships, were of primary theoretical importance 
for each of the four proposed models of risk taking (see Study Three Hypotheses).  Gender is 
inherently between-participants.  However, Budget was designed to be a between-participant 
independent variable.  Budget was composed of two levels: Negative Budget and Positive 
Budget.  This independent variable was conceptually identical to the Energy Budget independent 
variable described in Study One.  Specifically, decision tasks were categorized as Negative 
Budget if the riskier option was the only option which provided a chance of reaching the pre-
specified need level.  However, if both the riskier and safer options offer the chance of reaching 
the need level, then it was categorized as Positive Budget.  This is consistent with the energy-
budget rule (Stephens & Krebs, 1986) and their conception of positive and negative energy 
budgets in relation to sampling between resource patches of differing variance.  Last, the 
independent variable of Competitor Status was a within-participants independent variable 
composed of three levels (Lower, Equal, and Higher) of competitor status relative to the 
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participant.  The same universities and manipulations as used in Study Two for Competitor 
Status were used in Study Three.   
 Materials 
The statistical properties of Decision Task # 1 from Study Two were used for all of the 
decision tasks in Study Three.  However the need levels of money required to reach a potential 
second round were manipulated in order to create the different levels of Budget.  Also, these 
decision tasks were coupled with information for the different fictional competitors similar to the 
way materials were constructed for Study Two. 
Also, participants answered questions on a variety of individual difference measures.  
These measures included the Domain Specific Risk Scale (Kruger et al., 2007) and the General 
Numeracy Scale (Lipkus et al., 2001), although the numeracy scale was only used in an 
exploratory fashion, and no theoretical predictions were made regarding its relationship to risky 
preference.  The DSRS was measured in order to use as a potential covariate in the main 
analyses, despite not being used in Studies One and Two due to inappropriate statistical 
relationships with the dependent variables, and a violation of the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance.  Also, participants were primed to think about status motives by using the status 
priming material which was also used in Study Two (Griskevicius et al., 2009; Griskevicius et 
al., 2010).   
 Decision Tasks 
Two decision tasks were created (Table 5-1) to study risky preference behavior in Study 
Three.  Both decision tasks had the same probabilities and payoffs; however, the need level 
varied between the two decision tasks.  This variation in the need level was the manipulation for 
Budget, and allowed participants to be in a Negative or Positive Budget.  Further, as can be seen 
by the construction of Table 5-1, each participant competed against all three of the fictional 
student competitors who varied in perceived status.  The decision tasks were created such that, in 
a Negative Budget, only the riskier gamble offered the possibility of reaching the need level 
required to move to a potential second round.  However, in the Positive Budget decision task 
both the riskier and safer gambles offered the possibility of reaching the need level.  
Regarding Competitor Status, participants had to choose whether or not to try and earn 
more money than the fictional student competitor based on that fictional student’s perceived 
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status.  When competing against lower status individuals the participant did not have choose the 
riskier gamble in order to earn more money than the lower-status individual.  When competing 
against someone perceived as equal in status the participant could choose the safe option with a 
high probability of earning the same amount as the equal-status fictional student, or the 
participant could choose the riskier gamble to try and earn more than the fictional student.  When 
competing against the higher status fictional student, the only option providing a chance to beat 
the fictional student was the riskier option.   
 
Table ‎5-1  Decision Tasks Characteristics for Study Three 
 
 The General Numeracy Scale 
Just as in Studies One and Two, the General Numeracy Scale (Lipkus et al., 2001) 
(Appendix A) was also used in Study Three.  However, in Study Three it was primarily 
measured for the sake of consistency, and comparison with Studies One and Two.  Data from the 
GNS were used in an exploratory post-hoc fashion since there were no theoretically motivated 
hypotheses regarding the proposed models and individual differences in numerical processing.  
Also, because these analyses are not theoretically motivated, they are not included in this 
dissertation.  The inclusion of the GNS is mentioned here to provide full disclosure to the 
methodology used in Study Three, including the measures used to assess individual differences 
(e.g., the GNS). 
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 Domain Specific Risk Scale 
The Domain Specific Risk Scale (Kruger et al., 2007) (see Appendix B) was also used in 
Study Three as a potential covariate to control for individual differences in domain specific risk 
taking. 
 Status Manipulation 
The same universities as were used in Study Two were also used in Study Three.  These 
universities were pilot tested, and their use in Study Two yielded theoretically interesting and 
meaningful patterns of results.  Therefore, there was no apparent reason to perform an additional 
pilot test to determine new universities for the low, equal, and high status levels of Competitor 
Status.  In sum, the universities and their corresponding ACT scores used in Study Two were 
used in their entirety for Study Three as well. 
 Status Priming Vignette 
In order to prime participants to think about status-based motivations, Study Three used a 
status priming procedure utilized in some social evolutionary psychology research (Griskevicius 
et al., 2009; Griskevicius, Tyber, & Van den Bergh, 2010).  This vignette was the same as the 
one used for Study Two (Appendix F), and consisted of 376 words, including the directions.  The 
vignette described a story about recently being hired at a high-status job and then being told that 
you (the participant) will have to compete for the job.  The vignette then closes by asking 
participants to indicate the ways in which they would vie for the higher-status, corner office job.  
This vignette was used with good results in Study Two, and also has a long list of research by 
Griskevicius and colleagues showing that it is capable of successfully priming participants to 
think about status-based motivations. 
 Study Three Procedure 
All participants in Study Three were tested in a computer lab in groups ranging from 1 to 
8.  The researchers wore white lab coats and carried clip boards to present an appearance of 
professionalism and authority.  Essentially, the purpose of the researchers’ attire was to influence 
participants to take the study seriously.  Just as in Study Two, the participants in Study Three 
were told that they would be competing in an inter-university gambling competition against 
students from Emporia State University, Oregon State University, and Harvard University. 
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The researcher explained to students participating in the study that they would be 
competing against three separate, randomly selected same-sex students in one-on-one gambling 
games.  Participants were told that researchers at Kansas State University were collaborating 
with scientists from the other three universities to examine gambling behavior in students at 
different universities.  Participants were told that they would compete in one-on-one games with 
other same-sex students, and that, if they earned more money than the student against whom they 
were competing, they would win the competition.  It was made clear that no monetary awards 
would be actually distributed based on their performance in the gambling tasks.  Participants 
were asked if they understood the gist of the competition.  If there were questions the researcher 
did his or her best to answer those questions.  Once all questions were answered the participants 
were instructed to click ―OK‖ on the MediaLab screen and proceed to the informed consent 
page. 
 After clicking ―OK‖ participants were presented with a welcome screen with the logos of 
the four universities affiliated with the ―competition‖: Kansas State University, Emporia State 
University, Oregon State University, and Harvard University.  Accompanying these logos was 
the text ―Welcome to the Decisions about Money Competition‖ in bold type.  Immediately 
following the welcome screen was an electronic version of the informed consent sheet.  
Participants were then directed to individual tan folders in front of each computer monitor.  
These folders had cover art similar to that of the welcome screen presented on MediaLab.  
Participants were told to open their folders and find the paper copies of the informed consent 
sheets.  Each folder contained two forms, one for them to sign and one for them to keep for their 
own records.  The researcher then explained that, although the participants were competing in a 
gambling competition, they were still technically participating in research.  Due to this fact, the 
researcher explained that they the researchers were required to provide students with adequate 
information about the study such that they could make an informed decision about whether or 
not they wanted to participate.  Participants were then asked to read the informed consent, either 
the electronic version or the paper version, and sign the form if they wished to participate. 
 Once participants had signed the informed consent sheets the researcher directed 
participants to begin the rules section of the competition.  Just as Studies One and Two, the rules 
for Study Three were implemented using a PowerPoint slideshow.  This allowed participants to 
proceed through the rules section at their own pace.  This was important because understanding 
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how the competition worked was crucial to the manipulations such as Budget (whether 
participants understood that they needed to earn a certain amount to move to a potential next 
round). 
 In the rules section of the study, participants learned that they would be competing 
against three randomly chosen same-sex students from each of the universities collaborating in 
the gambling competition.  Participants learned that, similar to what they were currently doing, 
students at those universities had come into labs on their own campuses in the weeks prior and 
had made selections about gambles they would like to play.  They then played out those gambles 
and earned (or did not earn) fake money toward the gambling competition.  The data from each 
of those students on all of the universities involved was then uploaded onto the computers at 
which they (the participants) were currently sitting, and the role of the computer was to randomly 
select a same-sex student from each university for them to compete against. 
Participants learned that the competitions were completely independent of one another. 
Specifically, participants were told that money earned in one competition did not go toward 
money totals from other competitions.  This was explained as being similar to running in three 
separate races.  
It was explained that a single round would conclude at the end of the third one-on-one 
competition with a student from a different university.  In order to introduce the idea of an 
uncertain future, participants were told that the computer would randomly select whether or not 
there would be a second round in which participants could earn additional money.  Participants 
were told that this potential second round was not automatic however, even if the computer 
randomly determined that there would be a second round.  It was then explained that, in order to 
reach this potential second round participants would have to earn a minimum amount of money 
in the first round (i.e., reach a need level).   
Participants were then shown a line graph demonstrating the ―empirical‖ relationship 
between competitors’ ACT scores and typical performance on the gambling competition.  This 
fictional relationship was given to participants in order to establish a relationship between status 
associated with each university and performance in the competition in which they were going to 
be performing.  When participants finished the rules section they were then asked a series of 
follow-up questions about the rules section.  This was done in order to test participants’ 
knowledge and comprehension of the rules of the competition, and to test whether participants 
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were paying attention or simply clicking through the slides without reading the content.  If 
participants answered a question incorrectly they were notified that their answer was incorrect, 
and the correct answer was displayed.   
After answering the follow-up questions participants were asked to answer basic 
demographic questions about their age, gender, ethnicity, as well as their ACT composite score.  
After completing the demographics portion of the study participants proceeded to the status 
priming vignette.  Participants were asked to read the vignette consisting of approximately 350 
words (Appendix F).  The vignette was displayed on two separate screens.  The first screen 
contained the main text of the vignette.  Participants were asked to carefully read the vignette 
and click ―Continue‖ when they had finished reading.  On the next screen participants were 
asked to select different strategies they would take to increase their chances of receiving the 
promotion at the high-status job described in the vignette.  This additional screen and its required 
responses were used with the goal of increasing thinking about the status priming vignette. 
At this point in the study participants were aware of, or were exposed to, several key 
pieces of information: (1) they were aware that they would be competing in one-on-one 
competitions with same-sex students from universities which they perceived as varying in status, 
based on pilot testing, (2) they were aware that ACT scores were positively correlated with 
performance on the gambling competition, and (3) they were primed to think about status-based 
motivations. 
After the status priming vignette participants were asked to complete a sample decision 
task.  It was made clear that the decision task in no way was related to the actual competition, but 
was rather a chance to familiarize competitors with the format of the competition’s structure 
(Figure 5-2).  Participants were asked to study the information on the decision task and make a 
choice about which gamble they preferred.  After making a choice, participants were directed to 
the payoff screen.  On this screen participants were reminded of the gamble they had selected to 
play.  They were then shown a button which, when pressed, told them if they had won or lost the 
gamble.  The results of the button-press were manipulated so that each participant won money.  
This was done in order to remove any unintended effects of winning or losing the sample task on 
actual risk preferences in the more theoretically important part of the study. 
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Figure ‎5-5  Example Decision Task for Study Three 
 
 
When participants finished the sample decision task they were presented with a ―stop 
screen‖ telling them to stop and notify the researcher.  When all participants tested in a group 
(ranging from 1 to 8) had made it to the stop screen, all participants were again asked if they had 
any questions about the competition, rules, or other things related to the competition.  The 
researcher answered any questions. 
Participants were then wished good luck and were told to continue to the main part of the 
study.  First participants were shown a decision task (see, for example Figure 5-2) which was the 
first of the three one-on-one competitions against a fictional student competitor.  The ordering of 
the fictional student competitors in the sequential one-on-one competitions was accounted for by 
the Status Order independent variable.  Additionally, the format of this first decision task, either 
Binary Choice (BC) or Continuous Preference (CP), was counterbalanced and captured by the 
Task Order independent variable.  Also, because Study Three, just as Studies One and Two, used 
this two dependent measure system, the Status Order was kept constant across both decision task 
formats (CP and BC).  For example, if a participant in the BC 1
st
 condition competed in one-on-
one competitions in the order of HigherLowerEqual the same order would also be used 
when the participant reached the Continuous Preference portion of the study near the end. 
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   When participants completed the first grouping of decision tasks they were then 
presented with a series of questionnaires used to assess individual differences in risk-taking 
propensity (DSRS) (Kruger et al., 2007) and numerical processing ability (GNS) (Lipkus et al., 
2001).  First, participants completed the GNS (Appendix A) and then participants completed the 
DSRS (Appendix B), both of which were re-formatted from a paper/pencil questionnaires to 
MediaLab questionnaire files.  Question order for both questionnaires was randomized and thus, 
each participant saw a different question order.  This means that the question orders appearing in 
Appendices A and B are not indicative of what each individual participant viewed.   
After participants completed both the GNS (Lipkus et al., 2001) and the DSRS (Kruger et 
al., 2007) they were reminded of the decision tasks they had completed previously.  Participants 
were then told that, in order to make certain of which gambles they preferred, they would be 
presented with those decision tasks again but would be asked to respond in a slightly different 
format depending on how they responded in the initial task.  Participants were then explained the 
difference between the Binary Choice and Continuous Preference decision formats. 
After completing the second grouping of the same decision tasks participants were asked 
to answer four follow-up questions (Appendix H).  Once participants had answered these follow-
up questions the MediaLab software displayed a message telling participants to notify the 
researcher that they had completed the experiment.  When all of the participants had finished the 
study, the researcher debriefed the entire group.  Specifically, participants were told that there 
was not a real competition between students from different universities.  Instead, participants 
were told the nature of the experiment and its hypotheses.  Participants were given a debriefing 
form (Appendix D) and were asked if any of them felt distressed as a result of being deceived by 
the researchers.  No students responded as being stressed.  Participants were nonetheless directed 
toward the contact information on the debriefing form, and were told to contact one of the 
researchers if they became distressed in the days and weeks following the study.  Questions 
asked by participants were answered, and when finished, all participants were thanked.  This 
concluded the procedure for Study Three. 
 Study Three Results 
Study Three was designed to test four separate models of risk taking in a single 
experiment (Figures 5-1 through 5-4).  Several statistical analyses were used to test the risk 
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preferences (CP) and the discrete choices (BC).  Additionally, because MediaLab collected 
decision time data, this was analyzed in an exploratory fashion; none of the hypothesized models 
tested in Study Three make clear predictions about relative differences in decision time based on 
different levels of the important independent variables.  The analyses are described in detail in 
the sections that follow. 
 Preliminary Data Issues  
Data for Study Three were first examined for any potential issues.  This was done by 
examining the decision time data (tBC and tCP) for potential outliers; continuous preferences 
(CP) on a scale from 1 to 6 were limited in responses, thus extreme outliers were not possible.  
Additionally, DSRS scores and self-reported ACT composite scores were examined for their 
potential influence as covariates on the dependent variables of interest.  Last, potential order 
effects – Status Order and Task Order – were statistically examined in order to determine if they 
should be included in the main analyses.  The general data analytic techniques used to answer 
different research questions are also described in the sections that follow. 
 Preliminary Data Cleaning 
Data from the decision time measures were screened for outliers using the z-score 
method (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  This method was used in Studies One and Two as well.  
First, the decision time data (tBC and tCP) were standardized to z-scores using SPSS.  Values for 
the z-scores were then examined.  The criterion of ±3.29 was used to determine if a value was a 
statistical outlier.  Since the Competitor Status variable was within-participants, and thus 
decision time was also within-participants, any deletion of a decision time on a specific level of 
Competitor Status meant that there would be incomplete data across a participant’s decision time 
values.  Thus, if an outlier was found for one level of Competitor Status, the other values were 
also removed from the data set.  This method was consistent with the method used in Studies 
One and Two. 
The z-score method located a total of three outliers from the tBC (zs: 10.57, 9.41, and 
3.74).  The z-score method located eight outliers for the tCP though (zs: 9.68, 7.56, 4.77, 3.96, 
3.51, 3.45, 3.31, and 3.30).  None of the data points determined to be outliers belonged to the 
same individual.  The total sample sizes for the analyses using decision time data were n = 117 
for tBC and n = 112 for tCP. 
118 
 
 Risk Propensity and ACT Composite Score as Covariates 
Studies One and Two did not utilize any of the subscale scores of the DSRS as covariates 
due either to (1) the lack of relationships between the subscale scores and the continuous 
dependent variables (CP, tCP, and tBC), or (2) a violation of the homogeneity of regression 
assumption.  However, the same individual difference measures (DSRS scores) and self-reported 
intelligence measures (ACT scores) were assessed as potential covariates in Study Three.  Just as 
in Study Two, ACT composite scores were thought to have unintended consequences on the 
primary theoretically-motivated analyses because ACT score was used as part of the status 
manipulation; students who have a high ACT score may not be as intimidated by Harvard 
students.  Four participants did not take the ACT.  All of these students were international 
students and self-reported their ethnicity as ―Asian.‖  However, to compensate for this missing 
data point, the mean substitution technique was utilized instead of regression (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007). 
To help control for the possibility of unwanted, and theoretically unimportant, covariate 
effects, ACT composite scores and the five subscale scores of the DSRS were correlated with the 
three continuously measured dependent variables (CP, tCP, and tBC) to assess the strength of the 
relationships.  The dependent variables were summed across Competitor Status, thus the 
correlation matrix seen in Figure 5-6 is based on summed scores for the dependent variable. 
Analyses showed that there were no relationships between any of the potential covariates 
and the dependent variables of interest.  Because of this lack of statistically significant 
relationships across the entire range of variables, no tests for the homogeneity of regression were 
performed. 
 
Table ‎5-2  Correlations between potential covariates and dependent variables in Study 
Three 
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 Potential Order Effects 
There were two potential order effects for the data in Study Three.  These order effects 
were described in the data by Status Order and Task Order.  Status Order described the ordering 
of the fictional student competitors in the sequential one-on-one competitions for each individual 
participant.  The levels were LEH, EHL, and HLE, with L, E, and H standing for Lower, Equal, 
and Higher, respectively.  The ordering of those status levels is determined by moving from left 
to right (i.e., LEH means the order was LowerEqualHigher).  Task Order was used as a way 
to describe order effects based on the two different dependent variables.  Task Order described 
whether participants completed the CP task first or the BC task first.  These order effects were 
analyzed prior to the main analyses.  If no significant relationships were found, per each 
continuous dependent variable (CP, tCP, and tBC), then the order variables were not utilized in 
the main analyses described in later sections. 
For Status Order, a series of three one-way analyses of variance were performed on the 
three summed dependent variables of interest.  The dependent variables were summed across the 
Competitor Status independent variable.  Results from the analyses showed that there was not a 
statistically significant effect of Status Order on Continuous Preference ratings (CP), F(2, 117) = 
0.31, p = .731, η2 = .01, or on decision time for Continuous Preference ratings (tCP), F(2, 109) = 
0.04, p = .966, η2 < .01, or on decision time for Binary Choices (tBC), F(2, 114) = 0.11, p = .892, 
η2 < .01. 
For Task Order another series of three separate one-way analyses of variance were 
performed on the summed dependent variables of interest.  Again, these dependent variables had 
previously been computed by summing across Competitor Status; they were the same dependent 
variables used in the previous analysis on Status Order.  Results from these analyses suggested 
that Task Order did indeed have a significant relationship with Continuous Preference ratings 
(CP), F(1, 118) = 3.92, p = .050, η2 = .03, decision time for Continuous Preference ratings (tCP), 
F(1, 110) = 58.23, p < .001, η2 = .35, and also with decision time for Binary Choices (tBC), F(1, 
115) = 62.78, p < .001, η2 = .35.  
The order effects for Task Order on decision time are consistent with what was observed 
in prior results, and most likely is explained in this way: It should take longer to make a decision 
on the Continuous Preference task (tCP) if the Continuous Preference task is the first decision 
task the participant completes (CP 1
st
: M = 20,064.61, SD = 7,053.95).  However, if the 
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Continuous Preference task is the second decision task, the participant has already answered the 
task and has a preference.  Thus, it should take less time to determine which gamble he or she 
wishes to prefer (BC 1
st
: M = 11,476.16, SD = 4,773.10).  The opposite pattern should be true for 
decision time on Binary Choice tasks (tCP).  Indeed this is the pattern we see in the data (CP 1
st
: 
M = 9,622.96, SD = 4,356.99; BC 1
st
: M = 16,598.87, SD = 5,150.90).  
The Task Order effect for Continuous Preference ratings (CP) however is not as easily 
explained.  Based on the data it appears that average preference ratings are higher when the 
Binary Choice task (BC) is completed first (M = 3.00, SD = 1.43) rather than second (M = 2.51, 
SD = 1.27).  This may suggest that those participants who receive a binary all-or-nothing choice 
at first are more likely to state their preferences on the extremes of the scale when given the 
continuous preference task later.  However, this could also result in no difference, or lower 
ratings for those who complete the BC task first.  It is unclear what the Task Order effect means 
in terms of the behavior of the participants.  Nonetheless, Task Order was included in all of the 
main analyses in Study Three. 
 General Data Analytic Procedures 
Study Three was designed with the intentions of being able to illuminate which of the 
four hypothesized models (Figures 4-1 through 4-4) most accurately described choice patterns.  
The models were evaluated on choice patterns, both in terms of Binary Choices (BC) and in 
terms of Continuous Preferences (CP).  However, different data analytic techniques were 
performed for both of these metrics.  
Continuous Preference ratings (CP) were analyzed using a 2 (Gender) by 2 (Budget) by 2 
(Task Order) by 3 (Competitor Status) mixed-factorial analysis of variance.  Gender, Budget, and 
Task Order were between-participant independent variables, and Competitor Status was the 
within-participants independent variable. 
Binary choice data (BC) were analyzed using both the Mann-Whitney U test on 
nonparametric data for the between-participants variable of Budget, and the McNemar’s test on 
nonparametric data for the within-participants variable of Competitor Status.  Similar to Study 
Two, the data on binary choices were coded as 0 = safer choice and 1 = riskier choice.  The 
choices were then summed across Competitor Status and used as the dependent variable, with a 
range from 0 to 3 riskier choices. This dependent variable was utilized for the Mann-Whitney U 
test, which is essentially the nonparametric equivalent of the independent-samples t-test.  To 
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analyze the effect of Competitor Status on binary choices (BC), a McNemar’s test was 
performed on the proportions of risky and safe choices between the three levels of Competitor 
Status. 
Although decision time was not a primary analysis in Study Three due to the lack of 
explicit predictions about decision time made by the four proposed models, decision time was 
still analyzed in an exploratory fashion.  To analyze both the tBC and tBC variables a 2 (Gender) 
by 2 (Budget) by 2 (Task Order) by 3 (Competitor Status) mixed-factorial analysis of variance 
was performed on both of the decision time variables independently.  Competitor Status was the 
within-participant independent variable, whereas the other three independent variables were 
between-participants. 
 Preference Ratings and Binary Choices for Risky Gambles 
Data from Continuous Preference ratings and Binary Choices were analyzed to determine 
choice and preference behavioral outcomes based on the different manipulations in Study Three.  
Unlike Studies One and Two in which patterns of data, other than those predicted by the models 
tested, were possible, Study Three contained a more exhaustive list of proposed models.  This 
more exhaustive list of models concurrently allows for a more complete method of strong 
inference (Platt, 1964).  The methodological concern of strong inference is designed to allow for 
incremental advances in knowledge, despite results inconsistent with the researcher’s 
expectations.  Thus, as a way of designing experiments, it is highly desirable.  
 Continuous Preference Ratings 
The main analysis of Continuous Preference ratings (CP) should result in specific 
patterns of main effects, interactions, and paired-comparisons for each of the specific proposed 
models of risk taking.  For risk-sensitive foraging (RSF), there should only be a main effect for 
Budget and nothing else.  For dominance theory (DT), there should be a main effect for 
Competitor Status, with paired comparisons showing a significant difference between lower- and 
equal-status levels, and equal- and higher-status levels, but no difference between lower- and 
higher-status levels.  Further, there should be a significant interaction between Competitor Status 
and Gender such that the specific paired comparison pattern previously described is only 
consistent with male participants, but not for female participants.  For general risk-sensitivity 
(status only) (GRS-Status), there should be a main effect for Competitor Status with paired 
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comparisons showing only differences between the lower- and equal-status, and lower- and 
higher-status levels but not between the equal- and higher-status levels.  Further, there should not 
be an interaction between Competitor Status and Gender with regard to the pattern of risk taking 
relative to Competitor Status.  This is because it is a model of general risk-sensitivity.  Last, for 
the model of general risk-sensitivity (status and money) (GRS-Status & Money), there should be 
a pattern of results precisely similar to the GRS-Status model, with the addition of a main effect 
for Budget. The exact results of the analyses are described below. 
The results from the four-way mixed-factorial analysis of variance revealed a statistically 
significant main effect for Competitor Status, F(2, 224) = 14.06, p < .001, partial η2 = .11, 
suggesting that status matters to participants when making preference ratings about gambles 
varying in risk (i.e., variance).  Paired-comparisons of the three Competitor Status levels were 
performed using paired-samples t-tests.  These analyses showed that there were statistically 
significant differences between the lower (M = 2.31, SD = 1.61) and equal status levels (M = 
2.72, SD = 1.83), t(119) = -2.23, p = .027, d = .20, the lower and higher status levels (M = 3.24, 
SD = 1.86), t(119) = -4.95, p < .001, d = .45, and between the equal and higher status levels, 
t(119) = -3.36, p = .001, d = .31 (see Figure 5-6). 
Results additionally showed a main effect for Budget, F(1, 112) = 6.67, p = .011, partial 
η2 = .06.  Examination of the effect showed that individuals in a negative budget (M = 3.07, SD 
= 1.56) indicated a higher preference for the riskier gamble than did individuals in a positive 
budget (M = 2.44, SD = 1.07).  Also, consistent with the preliminary data analysis on order 
effects, Task Order showed a main effect, F(1, 112) = 4.12, p = .045, partial η2 = .04.  This effect 
is described in more detail in previous sections.    
There was not a statistically significant main effect for Gender, F(1, 112) = 0.14, p = 
.713, partial η2 < .01, nor were there statistically significant interactions between Gender and 
Budget, F(1, 112) = 0.55, p = .462, partial η2 = .01, Gender and Task Order, F(1, 112) = 2.18, p 
= .143, partial η2 = .02, or Competitor Status and Gender,  F(2, 224) = 2.78, p = .065, partial η2 
= .02.  There was not a Budget by Task Order interaction, F(1, 112) = 1.92, p = .169, partial η2 = 
.02, nor were there interactions between Competitor Status and Budget, F(2, 224) = 0.23, p = 
.792, partial η2 < .01, or Competitor Status and Task Order, F(2, 224) = 0.60, p = .550, partial η2 
= .01. 
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All of the three-way interactions failed to reach statistical significance: Competitor Status 
by Budget by Gender, F(2, 224) = 0.64, p = .531, partial η2 = .01; Competitor Status by Budget 
by Task Order, F(2, 224) = 1.82, p = .164, partial η2 = .02; Competitor Status by Gender by Task 
Order, F(2, 224) = 0.07, p = .930, partial η2 < .01; Budget by Gender by Task Order, F(1, 112) = 
0.69, p = .408, partial η2 = .01.  Also, the four-way interaction failed to reach statistical 
significance, F(2, 224) = 0.67, p = .511, partial η2 = .01.  
 
Figure ‎5-6  The Effects of Competitor Status, Budget, and Gender on Continuous 
Preference Ratings 
 
 
 Relationship between Binary Choices and Continuous Preference Ratings 
Consistent with procedures used in Studies One and Two, Continuous Preferences were 
used as a more sensitive measure of risky choice than the Binary Choices alone.  Continuous 
Preferences were primarily utilized to combat widespread risk-aversion in the experimental 
procedure.  Nonetheless, it could be argued that the most ecologically valid metric for choice 
behavior is all-or-nothing binary choice.   
In order to see if participants were generally consistent in their Binary Choices and 
Continuous Preference ratings, the two metrics were correlated at each level of Competitor 
Status.  Because one of the variables is binary (i.e., the Binary Choice variable) and one of the 
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variables is continuous (i.e., Continuous Preference variable), the correlation coefficient is a 
point-biserial coefficient.  Research has shown that point-biserial correlations can be suppressed 
due to a restricted range of variability in the binary variable (Kemery et al., 1988).  Binary 
Choice was coded as 0 = safer choice and 1 = riskier choice.  The Continuous Preference ratings 
were scored on a scale from 1 to 6 with higher scores indicating a stronger preference for the 
riskier option. 
Results from these correlational analyses showed that, despite the limitations of point-
biserial correlations, the effects were quite large.  Specifically, the correlations between BC and 
CP decision tasks were large and positive when participants were competing against someone 
lower in status, rpb (118) = .56, p < .001, equal in status, rpb (118) = .72, p < .001, and higher in 
status, rpb (118) = .66, p < .001. 
 Binary Choice 
To examine the effect of Budget on binary choices between a riskier or safer gamble in 
the experimental task a Mann-Whitney U test was conducted.  To calculate the effect of Budget 
on risky choices, the binary choice data (coded as 0 = safer, 1 = riskier) were added across the 
levels of Competitor Status such that there was a summed dependent variable of risky choice.  
This variable was ordinal and ranged from 0 to 3, indicating the number of risky choices made 
across the levels of Competitor Status. 
The Mann-Whitney U test showed that participants in a Negative Budget (Mean Rank = 
70.07) chose the riskier option significantly more than participants in the Positive Budget (Mean 
Rank = 50.93).  This difference in mean rank of the ordinal data was statistically significant, U = 
1226.00, p =.001 (Figure 5-7). 
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Figure ‎5-7  The Effects of Budget on Binary Choice in Study Three 
 
 
 
The effects of Competitor Status on risky choices in the Binary Choice task were 
assessed using McNemar’s test on within-participant nonparametric data.  Specifically, three 
separate paired comparisons were made between the three levels of Competitor Status.  Results 
of these tests showed that there was a significant difference in the proportions of risky choices 
between Lower Status (n = 25) and Equal Status (n = 41), χ2 (1, N = 120) = 5.63, p = .018, and 
between Lower Status and Higher Status (n = 52), χ2 (1, N = 120) = 14.38, p < .001.  However, 
there was not a significant difference between Equal Status and Higher Status levels, χ2 (1, N = 
120) = 3.45, p = .063 (Figure 5-8), showing support for both of the general risk-sensitivity 
models (Status, and Status and Money), but not for dominance theory or risk-sensitive foraging. 
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Figure ‎5-8  The Effects of Competitor Status on Binary Choice in Study Three 
 
 
 Decision Time for Preference Ratings and Binary Choices 
Decision time was analyzed in Studies One and Two because those studies tested the 
priority heuristic (Brändstatter et al., 2006).  The priority heuristic made predictions about 
decision time because it is an explicit process model with a hypothesized ordering of input and 
manipulation.  However, the models tested in Study Three (RSF, DT, GRS-Status, and GRS-
Status and Money) did not make explicit predictions about decision time.  Despite this, decision 
time data were collected for both Continuous Preference and Binary Choice decision tasks.  The 
logic for collecting decision time data was that, if there were any significant effects, it may 
provide some illuminating information regarding the underlying cognitive processes causing the 
behavioral outcomes observed in the Continuous Preference ratings and the Binary Choice data.   
 Continuous Preference Decision Time  
Aside from Task Order, which was already shown to be statistically significant, F(1, 104) 
= 58.52, p < .001, partial η2 = .36,  there were no statistically significant main effects for decision 
time on the Continuous Preference ratings (tCP): Budget, F(1, 104) = 0.56, p = .454, partial η2 = 
.01; Gender, F(1, 104) = 0.01, p = .915, partial η2 < .01, Competitor Status, F(2, 208) = 1.94, p = 
.147, partial η2 = .02. 
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There were no statistically significant two-way interactions: Competitor Status by 
Budget, F(2, 208) = 0.47, p = .629, partial η2 < .01; Competitor Status by Gender, F(2, 208) = 
0.18, p = .840, partial η2 < .01; Competitor Status by Task Order, F(2, 208) = 0.73, p = .484, 
partial η2 = .01; Budget by Gender, F(1, 104) = 1.36, p = .246, partial η2 = .01; Budget by Task 
Order, F(1, 104) = 2.03, p = .157, partial η2 = .02; Gender by Task Order, F(1, 104) = 2.37, p = 
.127, partial η2 = .02. 
Additionally, there were not any statistically significant three-way interactions: Budget 
by Gender by Task Order, F(1, 104) = 0.62, p = .434, partial η2 = .01; Competitor Status by 
Budget by Gender, F(2, 208) = 0.01, p = .994, partial η2 < .01; Competitor Status by Budget by 
Task Order, F(2, 208) = 0.65, p = .526, partial η2 = .01; Competitor Status by Gender by Task 
Order, F(2, 208) = 0.72, p = .489, partial η2 = .01.  Also, the four-way interaction failed to reach 
statistical significance, F(2, 208) = 0.67, p = .515, partial η2 = .01 (Figure 5-9). 
 Binary Choice Decision Time 
Decision time data for the Binary Choice decisions (tBC) was analyzed in the same way 
as decision time data for Continuous Preferences (tCP).  Results from the analysis showed that, 
other than Task Order, F(1, 109) = 62.76, p < .001, partial η2 = .37, there were no statistically 
significant main effects:  Budget, F(1, 109) = 3.89, p = .051, partial η2 = .03; Gender, F(1, 109) = 
0.18, p = .671, partial η2 < .01; Competitor Status, F(2, 218) = 1.61, p = .203, partial η2 = .02. 
The two-way interactions in the analyses all failed to reach statistical significance:  
Competitor Status by Budget, F(2, 218) = 1.05, p = .351, partial η2 = .01; Competitor Status by 
Gender, F(2, 218) = 0.08, p = .924, partial η2 < .01; Competitor Status by Task Order, F(2, 218) 
= 1.50, p = .225, partial η2 = .01; Budget by Gender, F(1, 109) = 0.20, p = .653, partial η2 < .01; 
Budget by Task Order, F(1, 109) = 0.05, p = .833, partial η2 < .01; Gender by Task Order, F(1, 
109) < 0.01, p = .980, partial η2 < .01.   
The three-way interactions also failed to reach statistical significance: Budget by Gender 
by Task Order, F(1, 109) = 1.98, p = .162, partial η2 = .02; Competitor Status by Budget by 
Gender, F(2, 218) = 1.78, p = .171, partial η2 = .02; Competitor Status by Budget by Task Order, 
F(2, 218) = 2.84, p = .061, partial η2 = .03; Competitor Status by Gender by Task Order, F(2, 
218) = 0.44, p = .643, partial η2 < .01.  Also, the four-way interaction failed to reach statistical 
significance, F(2, 218) = 1.85, p = .160, partial η2 = .02 (Figure 5-10).  
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Figure ‎5-9  The Effects of Gender, Budget, Competitor Status on Continuous Preference 
Decision Time (tCP) 
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Figure ‎5-10  The Effects of Gender, Budget, Competitor Status on Binary Choice Decision 
Time (tBC) 
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 Study Three Discussion 
Study Three was designed to test four different hypothesized models of risk-taking. Two 
of the models were based in the literature and had previously been tested by Ermer et al. (2008): 
risk-sensitive foraging, and dominance theory.  However, in response to the data collected in 
Studies One and Two, and based in literature on happiness (e.g., Blanchflower & Oswald, 2004; 
Luttmer, 2005; McBride, 2001; Veenhoven, 1991) as well as alternative hypotheses by Ermer et 
al., two additional models were tested: General risk-sensitivity (Status), and General risk-
sensitivity (Status and Money).  Each of the four models made different but fairly explicit 
predictions about choice patterns, but not necessarily about decision time, or decision processes 
as was the case with the priority heuristic.  Implications of Study Three’s results are discussed in 
the sections to follow. 
 Which model best accounts for the data? 
To be explicit, each model and its predictions will be discussed, as well as whether the 
predictions were supported by the data from Study Three.  Risk-sensitive foraging (Stephens & 
Krebs, 1986) predicted a main effect for Budget, but no main effects for Competitor Status, or 
Gender, and no interactions.  Dominance theory (Ermer et al., 2008) predicted a main effect for 
Competitor Status with a specific pattern of Lower status equal to Higher status, and Equal status 
higher than both Lower and Higher status levels (Figure 5-2).  Further, dominance theory 
predicted no main effect for Budget, but did predict an interaction between Competitor Status 
and Gender, such that the effect of Competitor Status was limited to male participants.  The 
General risk-sensitivity (status) model predicted main effect for Competitor Status similar to 
dominance theory, however the pattern of paired comparisons differed: lower status is less than 
equal status and higher status, equal status and higher status are not different.  Further, the 
general risk-sensitivity (status) model predicted no main effect for Budget, and no interactions 
(the same pattern of results were predicted for males and females).  Last, the general risk-
sensitivity (status & money) model predicted a main effect for Competitor Status with the same 
pattern as that of the status-only version of general risk-sensitivity, but it also predicted a main 
effect for Budget, similar to risk-sensitive foraging.  Also, no interactions were predicted for this 
model.   
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Results showed that there was a main effect for Budget, consistent with risk-sensitive 
foraging and also consistent with the general risk-sensitivity (status & money) model.  However, 
there was also a main effect for Competitor Status, which risk-sensitive foraging did not predict, 
but which the general risk-sensitivity (status & money) model did predict.  Thus, it appears from 
the pattern of data that the general risk-sensitivity (status & money) model’s predictions fit better 
than the other proposed models.  The only troubling aspect is that, in Continuous Preference 
ratings (CP) paired comparisons showed that there was a significant difference between risk 
ratings in the higher- and equal-status levels of Competitor Status.  The model predicted no 
difference, and this deviation from prediction should not be ignored.   
One explanation could be that the preference to take risk appears as more elevated against 
participants who are perceived as higher in status than the participant because they are higher in 
status.  This would mean that there would have to be a greater motivation to take risk against 
someone higher in status than yourself as opposed to someone equal in status than yourself.  
However, this would only appear in continuously measured metrics such as the Continuous 
Preference (CP) ratings.  Real choices are typically discrete, all-or-nothing decisions such as 
those in the Binary Choice (BC) tasks.   
In fact, examination of the nonparametric results for the paired comparisons using 
nonparametric statistical analyses showed that, despite an absolute difference in the number of 
risky choices between the equal- and higher-status levels, the difference failed to reach statistical 
significance.  At least in terms of inferential statistical analysis, the proposed explanation fits the 
data.  However, as is the case with any HARKing (hypothesizing after the results are known) 
(Kerr, 1998), these explanations should be tested empirically.  They are merely offered here as a 
potential explanation for the data patterns deviating from predictions made by the best fitting 
model (general risk-sensitivity (status & money)).   
 The role of decision time, and implications for process models 
Decision time data were collected in Study Three primarily for exploratory purposes 
since none of the models made explicit predictions about differences in decision time based on 
different levels of the utilized independent variables.  It was thought that any significant effects 
of different variables on decision time may provide some stepping stone to future work 
examining the underlying cognitive process driving the behavioral outcomes seen in Continuous 
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Preference (CP) and Binary Choice (BC) data.  Unfortunately, for both of the decision metrics 
(CP and BC), their decision time data did not show a single theoretically meaningful statistically 
significant effect.  The issues of (1) decision time in relation to the three studies discussed here, 
and (2) the implications for these data on future research into process models using decision 
time, are discussed in more detail in the General Conclusions section of this manuscript.   
133 
 
Chapter 6 - General Conclusions 
Risk-taking happens.  This has been well-documented.  The psychological literature on 
risk-taking has historically attempted to understand why humans (and non-human animals) take 
risk, with the guiding normative philosophy being that risk-taking is irrational or not consistent 
with utility maximization.  However, recent research using fast-and-frugal heuristics, as well as 
research incorporating models of risk-taking from the literature on foraging and intrasexual 
competition has suggested that indeed it may be ―rational‖ to choose risk over certainty, if 
rationality is redefined in terms of evolutionarily adaptive behavior (Brandstätter et al., 2006; 
Ermer et al., 2008; Mishra & Fiddick, 2012; Mishra, Gregson, & Lalumière, 2012; Mishra & 
Lalumière, 2010; Rode et al., 1999; Wang & Johnson, 2012). 
This definition of rationality is based in  the notion that a behavior—including a decision 
to take risk—is ultimately judged by whether the resultant outcome of the behavior leads, over 
deep evolutionary time, to a fitness advantage, either by spreading one’s own genes or by 
helping to spread the genes of one’s kin. 
The results of three studies examining the priority heuristic, dominance theory, risk-
sensitive foraging theory, and two proposed models of general risk-sensitivity, suggested that the 
participants in these studies behaved as if context truly mattered.  However, the contextual 
importance of the decisions was keyed to aspiration or need levels, irrespective of whether the 
resource one was aspiring to reach was status (Studies Two and Three) or money (Studies One 
and Three), thus supporting a general model of risk-sensitivity applying to both status and money 
resources.   
The fast-and-frugal priority heuristic underperformed in predicting choice patterns (Study 
One) and in the decision process (Studies One and Two), suggesting that the heuristic’s proper 
ecology may not extend to domains in which need levels are an important factor (e.g., those 
tested in Studies One and Three).  Also, despite some support for decision preferences in Study 
Two, the decision process was not supported, as evidenced by a lack of the predicted decision 
time patterns.  These data suggest a narrowing of the heuristic’s ecology, or at least a 
reconceptualization of the heuristic’s actual process. 
The lack of consistency with respect to the priority heuristic’s predictions about decision 
time is troubling for the heuristic’s claim as a process model of decision making under risk.  This 
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lack of consistency raises questions about why the results were not found in the present 
collection of studies.  It is possible that reading time required for the decision tasks perhaps 
affected the overall decision time to respond, masking any effects of increased number of 
priority heuristic reasons on actual decision time.  However, due to the relatively limited amount 
of reading required of participants and the average time observed in making a decision (15-20 
seconds), it is unlikely that reading time had any effect.  One additional possibility is that reasons 
flip (see Directions for Future Research) based on cues of resource scarcity or competitor status.  
This would alter the predictions made about the specific decision tasks in Studies One and Two.  
However, to fully articulate accurate hypotheses about decision times in response to the flipping 
of priority heuristic reasons, one would have to first know under which conditions those reasons 
would reliably flip, and also the exact ordering of reasons once they have been flipped.  This 
work is currently underway.   
Dominance theory did not explain the patterns of choice preferences for Studies Two or 
Three.  Specifically, participants generally were risk-prone for both equal and higher status 
individuals, a finding inconsistent with some sequential methods of increasing aggression 
proposed by various theorists (Hammerstein & Parker, 1982; Maynard Smith 1974; Maynard 
Smith & Price, 1973).  In these models, one useful strategy is to systematically assess the relative 
status of the other competitor, and only increase escalation (risky behavior) if the competitor is 
of a similar status to yourself.  Results from Studies Two and Three suggested that individuals 
did not curtail their motivation to take risk when they noticed that the other competitor was 
higher in status.   
Also, the predicted gender difference in response to competitors of different status was 
not supported in Studies Two or Three.  Males and females responded to competitor status in 
statistically equal ways.  This finding is inconsistent with dominance theory and a wide array of 
research showing that individual status should not theoretically be as important to females as 
males (e.g., Buss, 1989).  Eagly (1987) suggests that traditional gender differences in behavioral 
patterns (e.g., risk-taking in the face of status competitors) are largely the result of learned social 
roles.  It could be argued that, because all of our participants were college students that the social 
roles of the male and female students were roughly equivalent.  Most of them could be status-
seeking individuals which is why they have chosen college; the assumption here being that our 
students chose college in order to acquire a higher-status career than would be possible given no 
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college education.  Essentially, it is possible that our sample is more homogenous with respect to 
the status motivations of the respective males and females in the studies.  However, it should be 
noted that Ermer et al. (2008) also used college-age males and females in their study.  In their 
studies they showed data consistent with the gender difference predicted by dominance theory.  
The model of general risk-sensitivity as applied to status and money appeared to best fit 
the data collected from Study Three, while also being consistent with the data from Study Two; 
however, the model was developed in response to Study Two’s results, so that data cannot be 
used as evidence for the model’s predictive ability.  Specifically, it appears that the human 
participants in Study Three were choosing options of varying risk based on motivations to reach 
multiple need levels.  These results were consistent with the hypothesis that two need levels 
existed: one for money necessary to reach a potential second round, and one for desiring to have 
the highest status level, determined by having more money than the fictional student competitor. 
 Implications for the Concepts of Modularity and Domain-Specificity 
The findings consistent with a general risk-sensitivity mechanism may appear to call into 
question the hypothesis that the mind is composed of many content-dependent modules, each 
used to solve specific adaptive problems which our ancestors faced throughout deep evolutionary 
time.  However, the results from Studies One through Three do not suggest that the mind is 
content independent.  They do support the notion that the mind may contain at least one 
relatively generalized risk-sensitivity mechanism which can operate on both monetary amounts 
and psychological constructs such as perceived status.  The extent to which the use of a general 
risk-sensitivity mechanism on multiple domains is currently adaptive is an open question, but 
does not preclude the hypothesis that it is an adaptation.  Within that line of thought, it is also 
quite possible that what is being observed in Study Three is the existence of a risk-sensitive 
foraging mechanism operating (incorrectly) on status levels as well as monetary amounts; this is 
theoretically plausible given Sperber’s (1996) distinctions between actual and proper domains of 
a cognitive module designed by evolutionary selection pressures.  The answers to some of these 
open questions will require many more theoretically motivated experiments.   
 Alternative Accounts and Potential Limitations 
With regard to dominance theory, it is possible that participants did not perceive the 
fictional students as higher or lower in status.  In short, perhaps our manipulation did not work.  
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This is doubtful since pilot testing of the same general population of students indicated these 
preferences, and this pilot testing is the reason why specific schools were used in Studies Two 
and Three.  
It is also possible that the GRS model is not always used when competing against others 
of varying status.  Specifically, if participants felt as though they could lose something by 
competing against others of higher status, the results may have differed for Studies Two and 
Three.  Recall that the original conception of the dominance theory’s mechanisms is based in 
intrasexual competition, whereby competition implies the possibility of losing something when 
you compete against the other individual of varying status.  If our participants did not recognize 
the situation in that way, then dominance theory’s proposed cognitive mechanism may not have 
been activated, leading to the results which were contrary to its own predictions.  It should be 
noted, however, that a similar methodology as was used in Studies Two and Three, was used by 
Ermer et al. (2008), and those authors found support for dominance theory.  Clearly, more 
research is needed to build on the specific cognitive mechanisms which are at play when 
choosing between options of varying risk (i.e., variance), and scientists need to work toward 
elucidating the contextual factors which call each of the cognitive mechanisms into action. 
Ermer et al. (2008) cite research by Daly and Wilson (2001) suggesting that participants’ 
beliefs that others of different status are actually watching and evaluating the participants’ 
behaviors, may play a very important role in the regulation of motivational systems designed to 
up-regulate risk taking in response to cues of varying status.  Thus, in Studies Two and Three, 
participants’ status-based mechanisms may not have been activated since their competitors were 
not explicitly said to have been watching each participant’s decision making.  This is 
questionable however, since participants did behave as if status was important, just not in the 
specific way predicted by dominance theory. 
As is the case with any research using static, descriptive examples of risk-taking, in order 
to move toward more comfortable claims about evolutionarily-designed mechanisms, one has to 
move the experimentation to more ecologically valid methodology.  Specifically, Studies One 
through Three used the traditional static, described gambles, where the probabilities and payoffs 
were explicitly available for participants to make informed decisions.  This is what Knight 
(1921) referred to as decisions under risk, rather than decisions under uncertainty.  It is likely 
that most decisions are, at least initially, decisions under uncertainty.  Thus, this avenue of 
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research should be implemented in more dynamic, experience-based experimental paradigms 
(e.g., Mishra & Lalumière, 2010; Hertwig et al., 2004).    
 Directions for Future Research 
Future research should examine the true viability of the priority heuristic.  These fast-
and-frugal heuristics are very elegant scientific models of decision choice, and while their 
explicit structure allows for clear falsification under experimental evidence, it also allows for 
easy modification to improve on the heuristic’s ability to account for both behavior and process.  
Specific future directions should include: looking into this heuristic process as it accounts for 
decisions from experience (Hertwig et al., 2004).  This could be used to assess the difference 
between what was studied in this collection of research (risk) and what is in the larger world 
(uncertainty) (Knight, 1921; Volz & Gigerenzer, 2012).   
Also, in personal communication with Gerd Gigerenzer
10
 about how such a heuristic 
would account for differences in resource availability (as in risk-sensitive foraging) he noted that 
one possibility is that individuals are capable of reordering the standard lexicographic order of 
the priority heuristic (Figure 2-1).  This would lead to the conceptualization of the priority 
heuristic’s reasons as moveable tiles, easily rearranged based on contextual cues in the 
environment.  Such a conception could alleviate some concerns with the heuristic’s inflexibility 
(Fiedler, 2010, p. 27-28).  These cues could be in the form of cues of scarcity.  This would 
suggest that individuals examine different orders of reasons, potentially resulting in entirely 
different decisions.  This is also consistent with Rieskamp’s (2008) priority model—an extension 
of the priority heuristic.  Thus, a technique similar to those used to test the priority heuristic’s 
processes (i.e, Mouselab) could be used, in conjunction with varying energy budget 
manipulations to determine if, under a negative budget, for instance, people focus on the 
maximum gains first, as opposed to the minimum gains.  This work is currently being conducted.  
Results are forthcoming. 
Other research is looking into the general model of risk-sensitivity as outlined in Studies 
Two (results section) and Three (a hypothesized model).  If there exists a general risk-sensitivity 
mechanism which is activated in environmental situations containing need levels, it is plausible 
                                                 
10
 July 10, 2013 at the Summer Institute on Bounded Rationality; The Max Planck Institute for Human 
Development, Berlin, Germany 
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that such a mechanism would be responsive to less explicit cues of such need levels.  An open 
question regarding the risk-sensitivity mechanism is just how sensitive it is to cues of scarcity in 
the environment.  For instance, will the present results hold without setting up explicit situations 
in which a variable gamble will reach a need level whereas a less variable gamble will not?  
Similarly, if people are primed to think about a (monetarily) resource scare environment (see 
Griskevicius et al., 2013), will they behave as if they were in an explicitly framed negative 
budget?  Such priming effects would suggest that the system is very sensitive to cues of a 
negative budget (i.e., cues of a resource-scarce environment).   
The general risk-sensitivity mechanism may be primed by status as well.  The status 
priming story used in Studies Two and Three (Appendix F) has been used by other researchers to 
elicit different forms of economically motivated decision making behaviors (Griskevicius et al., 
2009; Griskevicius et al., 2010).  In the present collection of studies, however, it was not used as 
a manipulation, and thus may have primed all participants to behave according to an 
environment where status has real consequences.  This was indeed the motivation for using the 
status priming in Studies Two and Three.  However, to assess the sensitivity of the general risk-
sensitivity mechanism for cues of status, a between-participants manipulation may be necessary. 
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Appendix A - General Numeracy Scale 
Directions:  Answer the following questions to the best of your ability. 
 
1. Imagine that we roll a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times.  Out of 1,000 rolls, how many times 
do you think the die will come up even (2, 4, or 6)?  
2. In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances of winning a $10.00 prize are 1%.  What is 
your best guess about how many people would win a $10.00 prize if 1,000 people each 
buy a single ticket from BIG BUCKS? 
3. In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of winning a car is 1 in 1,000.  
What percent of tickets of ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a car? 
4. Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease?  1 in 
100, 1 in 1000, or 1 in 10 
5. Which of the following represents the biggest risk of getting a disease?  1%, 10%, or 5% 
6. If Person A’s risk of getting a disease is 1% in ten years, and Person B’s risk is double 
that of A’s, what is B’s risk? 
7. If Person A’s chance of getting a disease is 1 in 100 in ten years, and Person B’s risk is 
double that of A, what is B’s risk? 
8. If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would bet expected to get the 
disease out of 100? 
9. If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected to get the 
disease out of 1000? 
10. If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this would be the same as having a 
___% chance of getting the disease. 
11. The chance of getting a viral infection is .0005.  Out of 10,000 people, about how many 
of them are expected to get infected? 
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Appendix B - Domain Specific Risk Scale 
Directions: Rate each of the behaviors below according to how likely you would be to 
engage in each behavior or activity.  Use the following scale: (1) Very Unlikely to (5) Very 
Likely. 
1. Getting sterilized so you cannot have children but have more leisure time and more 
financial flexibility.  ______ 
2. Exposing yourself to chemicals that might lead to birth defects for a high-paying job.  
______ 
3. Participating in medical research that pays $10,000 but has some chance of making 
you sterile.  ______ 
4. Adamantly defending the honor of your local team against a fan from a different 
sporting team even if it might cause a fight.  ______ 
5. Sitting in the section for fans of the opposing team with a group of friends while 
wearing your team’s colors.  ______ 
6. Driving to a rival university at night and stealing the school’s flag from the flagpole 
at the center of campus.  ______ 
7. Standing up to your boss in front of coworkers when your boss is being unfair.  
______ 
8. Trying to take a leadership role in any peer group you join.  ______ 
9. Physically intervening between two friends who are aggressively pushing each other, 
to prevent a fight.  ______ 
10. Spending a large portion of your salary to buy a sporty new convertible.  ______ 
11. Engaging in unprotected sex during a one-night stand.  ______ 
12. Maintaining long-term romantic relationship with more than one partner.  ______ 
13. Chasing a bear out of your wilderness campsite area while banging pots and pans.  
______ 
14. Swimming far out from shore to reach a diving platform.  ______ 
15. Exploring an unknown city or section of town.  ______ 
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Appendix C - Follow-Up Questions for Study One 
1. When making your decisions, how important was the amount of money needed to 
qualify for Round 2? 
 
 
2. When making your decisions, how important was comparing Gambles A and B based 
on the chances of winning the minimum amount? 
 
 
3. How important was comparing the possible minimum winnings between Gambles A 
and B when making your decisions? 
 
 
4. How important was comparing the possible maximum winnings between Gambles A 
and B when making your decisions? 
 
 
5. How suspicious were you about the authenticity of the competition?   
 
153 
 
Appendix D - Debriefing Form 
Debriefing Form 
Decisions about Money 
 
Thank you for your participation in today’s study. The goal of the experiment was understand the 
conditions necessary for you to make a risky decision during the gambling task.  You were told that the 
study was actually a competition involving yourself, other students from Kansas State University, and 
potentially students from other universities.  This is not true.  There is no competition.  You were told 
about a competition in order to provide motivation to respond in a certain way to the gambling task.  
Research has shown that status and competition can make people behave in a riskier way (Ermer paper 
cited below).  Today we also examined your level of numerical literacy—how well you understand and 
reason with numbers, and your general level of risk-proneness.   
 
Because this was not a real competition between yourself and other students there is not an actual correct 
answer to the gambling task, which you answered.  Thus, you did not perform better or worse than 
anyone else in the study.  Further, your data will be used only as a component in an average and your 
name will in no way be tied directly to any of your information, including your reported ACT score.   
 
Your participation today has helped the research team take a small step in answering some important 
research questions. Again, thank you for your participation. Below I have listed a few citations for 
material related to this study. Also, if you are interested in this line of research—either as a research 
assistant or just general interest—feel free to contact us.  
 
Related Works 
 
Brandstӓtter, E., Gigerenzer, G., & Hertwig, R. (2006). The Priority Heuristic: Making choices without 
trade-offs. Psychological Review, 113, 409-432. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.113.2.409 
 
Ermer, E., Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2008). Relative status regulates risky decision making about 
resources in men: Evidence for the co-evolution of motivation and cognition. Evolution and 
Human Behavior, 29, 106-118. doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.11.002 
 
Rode, C., Cosmides, L., Hell, W., & Tooby, J. (1999). When and why do people avoid unknown 
probabilities in decisions under uncertainty? Testing from predictions from optimal foraging 
theory. Cognition, 72, 269-304. 
 
Stephens, D. W. (1981). The logic of risk-sensitive foraging preferences. Animal Behaviour, 29, 628-629. 
 
Contact Information 
 
W. Trey Hill  wthill@ksu.edu  (405) 714-0044 
Dr. Gary Brase  gbrase@ksu.edu (785) 532-0609 
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Appendix E - Status Manipulation Pilot Testing Material 
What is your age?  _________ 
What is your gender? (Circle one)         Male            Female 
Directions:    Listed below are the same universities.  To the right of each university please circle whether you 
believe students from that university are better or worse than students from Kansas State University. 
School                        
 
                      
  
                      
   Stanford University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
University of Kansas 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
University of Nebraska 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
New Mexico State University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
Cornell  University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
Ohio State University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
Harvard University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
Wichita State University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
Princeton University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
Georgia Southern University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
University of North Texas 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
West Virginia University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
University of Arkansas 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
Oklahoma State University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
University of Wyoming 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
University of Mississippi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
University of Cincinnati 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
Oregon State University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
University of Akron 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
Texas Tech University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
University of Missouri 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
Portland State University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
Idaho State University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
University of Louisville 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
University of Southern Mississippi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
Brown University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
University of California, Berkeley 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
University of Memphis 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
Emporia State University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
Mississippi State University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
   
Much Worse than KSU Students Much Better than KSU Students 
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Directions:    Listed below are the same universities.  To the right of each university please circle how familiar 
you are with that university. 
School 
       Wichita State University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Brown University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Texas Tech University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
University of Nebraska 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Oklahoma State University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ohio State University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Portland State University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
University of Akron 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Oregon State University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Georgia Southern University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
University of Memphis 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Cornell  University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
West Virginia University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
University of Arkansas 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Princeton University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Stanford University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
University of Cincinnati 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Emporia State University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
University of Kansas 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
University of California, Berkeley 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
University of Southern Mississippi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Mississippi State University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
University of Mississippi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Idaho State University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
University of North Texas 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
University of Louisville 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
New Mexico State University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
University of Missouri 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
University of Wyoming 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Harvard University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
 
Not at all familiar Very familiar 
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Directions:    Listed below are again the same universities.  Imagine that you are in an intellectual 
competition with a random student from each university.  To the right of each university please circle how 
intimidated you would be by a student from that university. 
 
School 
       University of Wyoming 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Stanford University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
University of Southern Mississippi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Harvard University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Oregon State University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
University of Akron 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Portland State University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
West Virginia University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Emporia State University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
University of Arkansas 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Wichita State University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Texas Tech University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ohio State University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
University of Cincinnati 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Cornell  University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Idaho State University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
University of Missouri 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
University of California, Berkeley 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
University of Memphis 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
University of Mississippi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
University of Louisville 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
University of Kansas 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
University of Nebraska 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Princeton University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Mississippi State University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Oklahoma State University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Georgia Southern University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Brown University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
New Mexico State University 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
University of North Texas 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
Not at all intimidated Very intimidated 
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Appendix F - Status Priming Vignette  
Directions: Before you begin the competition we want to first know how you normally would 
handle competition. Please carefully read the following story. As you read, try to imagine 
yourself in the scenario and try to feel the emotions and feelings that the person is experiencing.  
 
Imagine you have recently graduated from college and are arriving for your first day of 
work at a high-status job. You arrive at the spacious marble and glass reception area, 
remembering how intimidating it was when you first arrived for your interview. Getting to your 
new office requires going through the company’s oak-paneled research library and passing a 
number of the large offices that senior partners occupy, but you find that your office is smaller 
and windowless. There are two other offices near yours that are similar in size, and soon you 
realize that the people arriving to these offices are also new employees. There are three of you 
that are all here on your first day of work. All three of you are called to your boss’s office about 
an hour into the day. Your boss welcomes you to the company, confirms that you have all done 
your personnel paperwork, and then explains what will happen over the course of the next year. 
Specifically, the three of you will be in competition with each other. The boss explains to the 
three of you that one of the three will be fired, and one of you will not only be promoted to a 
luxurious corner office but will also get a large bonus. That person will basically be put on the 
fast track to a partnership in the company. The third person will continue to work for the 
company but will remain at their current position, their current office, and likely not get 
promoted. Think about how you would feel as you look forward to your new job and all that it 
involves. Imagine raising your levels of enthusiasm and motivation to perform as well as you 
can, impress your boss, and get the fast-track promotion. On the next screen are several things 
that you might consider in your efforts to be the best of the three new employees. Click Continue 
and examine those options. 
 
(New Screen)  
In reference to the story you previously read, carefully think about each option, consider the 
implications for each one, and then decide which things you would be most likely to actually do. 
Select all the options that you believe you would do.  
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o Ask a lot of questions about how things work at the company 
o Be outspoken about how things are done at the company 
o Bring in food for other employees 
o Develop new projects on your own initiative 
o Find out about all the office gossip and politics 
o Host after-work activities 
o Identify and develop a mentor for your career 
o Invest in nicer clothes for a more professional appearance 
o Memorize the names of every co-worker in the company 
o Keep as quiet as possible and try not to be noticed 
o Start a blog about your job 
o Stay at work late and come in to work on the weekends 
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Appendix G - Follow-Up Questions for Study Two 
1. When making your decisions, how important was your competitor’s ACT score? 
 
 
2. When making your decisions, how important was comparing Gambles A and B based 
on the chances of winning the minimum amount? 
 
 
3. How important was comparing the possible minimum winnings between Gambles A 
and B when making your decisions? 
 
 
4. How important was comparing the possible maximum winnings between Gambles A 
and B when making your decisions? 
 
 
5. How suspicious were you about the authenticity of this competition? 
 
 
6. When making your decisions, how important was the status of your competitor’s 
university? 
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Appendix H - Follow-Up Questions for Study Three 
1. When making your decisions, how important was your competitor’s ACT score? 
 
 
2. When making your decisions, how important was the amount of money needed to 
qualify for Round 2? 
 
 
3. How suspicious were you about the authenticity of this competition? 
 
 
4. When making your decisions, how important was the status of your competitor’s 
university? 
 
